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INTRODUCTION
The value and earning capacity associated with intangibles such as
copyrights, patents, trademarks, know-how, and goodwill are important
aspects of any business.' Despite recognized defects in the federal taxa-
tion of intangibles,2 the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("1986 Act") failed to
address intangibles.' Given the comprehensive review of our tax laws
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See generally G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 15-44 (2d ed. 1975); K. CLARK-
SON, INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN 20-22 (1977); L. TELSER, COM-
PETITION, COLLUSION, AND GAME THEORY 356-57 (1972); Ben-Zion, The Investment
Aspect of Nonproduction Expenditures: An Empirical Test, J. ECON. & Bus. 224,
227-28 (1978); Brozen, Foreword to K. CLARKSON, supra, at 7-10; Grabowski &
Mueller, Industrial Research and Development, Intangible Capital Stocks, and Firm
Profit Rates, 9 BELL J. ECON. 328, 328-32 (1978); Hirschey, Intangible Capital As-
pects of Advertising and R&D Expenditures, 30 J. INDUS. ECON. 375, 375-79 (1982).
2 The Second Circuit, in often-quoted language, has noted:
In the realm of intangibles . . . the rulings and decisions are in a state of
hopeless confusion . . . . The taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest
and penalties for guessing wrong, is entitled to reasonably clear criteria or
standards to let him know what his rights and duties are. As matters
stand, the following quotation alluded to by a court of appeals of another
circuit, which was wrestling with this general area of federal income tax
law, is pertinent,
"This kind can come forth by nothing, but by prayer and
fasting."
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973). See gener-
ally B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS % 20.4.4-
.4.5 (1981); Doernberg & Hall, The Tax Treatment of Going-Concern Value, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353 (1984); Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassessment
of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 28 TAX LAW. 251 (1975); Grigsby &
Cotter, Amortization of Certain Intangibles, 30 U.S.C. TAX INsT. 543 (1978); Gunn,
The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 443 (1974); Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear
Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of
Basics, 6 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1986); Wilberding, An Individual's Business Investigation
Expenses: An Argument Supporting Deductibility, 26 TAX LAW. 219 (1973); Note,
Taxation: Start-up Cost Treatment Under § 195: Tax Disparity in Disguise, 36
OKLA. L. REV. 449 (1983); Recent Developments, Deductibility of Start-up Expendi-
tures under Section 162-The "Clear-Reflection-of-Income" Test, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 618 (1976)[hereinafter Deductibility].
' Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 1986 U.S.
(1179)
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during the development of the 1986 Act, the failure to deal with in-
tangibles is puzzling. This Article argues that the source of the current
intangibles defects is the basic approach taken by Congress, the courts,
and the Treasury to key issues. By adopting a different approach, this
Article develops a legislative proposal for the taxation of intangibles
that is missing from the 1986 Act.
Part I of this Article examines the basic criticisms of current law
based on the accepted tax policy criteria of simplicity, equity, and neu-
trality. It notes that even though the evidence indicates that there is an
economic similarity between depreciable assets and intangible value,
current law treats them differently. I conclude that, in addition to the
complexity associated with the current differing tax treatment for assets
and intangible value, there are three severe equity and neutrality
problems:" (1) an implicit tax preference for many expenditures related
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
In February, 1986, the Treasury prepared a revenue estimate for a proposal that
would have disallowed the deduction of 20% of advertising expenditures, increasing
revenues approximately $4 billion a year. See Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1986, at 54, col. 1.
This proposal went nowhere. It would have addressed only one of the three problems
in current law, and that one not very well. In the early 1970's, the American Bar
Association Tax Section failed in an attempt to deal with this area. See Committee on
Depreciation and Amortization, American Bar Association, Report, 27 TAx LAw. 554
(1974).
" There, of course, are other problems associated with the taxation of intangible
value. The following lists a few of the problems that will not be covered in this Article
because similar problems are present with respect to tangible assets. The different tax
consequences for the sale of a separately transferable intangible asset, as opposed to a
lease or license of the intangible, reaches confused and unsatisfactory results. See I.R.C.
§ 1235 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (sale or exchange of patents). See generally Harding,
Obtaining Capital Gains Treatment on Transfers of Know-How, 37 TAX LAw. 307
(1984); Olson, Federal Income Taxation of Patent and Know-How Transfers, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 537 (1984). Similarly, the line between a transfer of intangibles such as
know-how and the provision of services (also taxed differently) is poorly drawn. See
Harding, supra, at 312-14; Olson, supra. The law determining an arm's length royalty
for intangibles is confused. See I.R.C. § 482 (1982 & West Supp. 1987) (last sentence)
(special rule for determining intangibles' royalties); H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 423-25 (1985). Issues arise involving expenditures that arguably relate to in-
tangible value, but really relate to something else. See I.R.C. § 276(a)(1) (1982) (ad-
vertising expenditures that inure to benefit of political party are nondeductible). The
tax treatment of some charitable contributions that arguably relate to intangible value,
such as (i) when contributions to a charity generate goodwill for the donor, (ii) when
donations of computers to a university improve the market for the computers, or (iii)
when donations to an educational organization enable the donor to hire more qualified
employees, presents problems. For example, in Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d
413 (Ct. Cl. 1971), the corporation was not allowed charitable deductions with respect
to bargain sales of sewing machines to schools, because the goodwill-like benefit to the
corporation undermined the charitable nature of the transactions. Finally, there are
problems in the law pertaining to the source of intangible income and deductions for
foreign tax credit and U.S. tax jurisdiction purposes. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 703-06 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 383-87 (1985); 2
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to intangible value,5 (2) an unjustified extra tax on sales of businesses
with intangible value,6 and (3) a disadvantageous tax preference for
going concerns.
Part II reinforces Part I's critique of current law by demonstrating
that the current problems stem, not from a rejection of accepted tax
policy criteria, but from an unfortunate approach to intangible value.
This discussion begins by analyzing the basic rules for the taxation of
business expenditures." I conclude that this current regime is in general
better than alternative regimes, because it minimizes problems of asset
valuation, transactional accounting, and accounting for expectations.
The nature of intangible value, particularly the uncertainty in identify-
ing and valuing it at any given moment, however, presents problems for
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM
FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 365-66 (1984) [hereinafter
TREASURY I].
Issues involving the minimum taxes and selected issues involving international tax-
ation are considered only in the footnotes of this Article. This Article is further con-
fined to business taxation. For instance, while individuals may invest in themselves
through education, health care, etc., this Article only considers third-party investments
in individuals. Cf. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AMER. ECON. REV. 1,
13 (1961) (Individuals make substantial investments in their own human capital.). This
Article also does not consider the different tax treatments of payments for damaging an
individual's business goodwill and damages for personal injury. See, e.g., Roemer v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). This Article does not consider the taxa-
tion of benefits to individuals from business expenditures on intangible capital, such as
training or a goodwill safari. Finally, this Article does not take into account the addi-
tional complexity of the "double taxation" of corporate income. It is assumed that the
purpose of the corporate income tax is to impose an income tax much like the individ-
ual income tax. See generally C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED
TWICE? (1979); American Law Institute Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter
C-Proposals of the American Law Institute on Corporate Acquisitions and Disposi-
tions and Reporter's Study on Corporate Distributions 341-53 (W. Andrews rep.
1982) [hereinafter ALI]; Bradford, The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on
Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1981); McLure, Corporate Income Tax:
Restoration, Integration, or Elimination?, in To PROMOTE PROSPERITY: U.S. Do-
MESTIC POLICY IN THE MID-1980's 303 (J. Moore ed. 1984); Shakow, Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111,
1132-37 (1986).
' See Gregorcich, supra note 2, at 254-58; McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal
Income Tax, 45 VA. L. REV. 645, 648-54 (1959); Deductibility, supra note 2, at 632-
33; infra notes 69-138 and accompanying text.
8 See Gregorcich, supra note 2, at 258-71; Schenk, Depreciation of Intangible
Assets: The Uncertainty of Death and Taxes, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 501, 528-29 (1967);
infra notes 139-174 and accompanying text.
7 See Note, supra note 2, at 466 (more favorable treatment of existing businesses);
infra notes 175-191 and accompanying text.
8 The basic rules for the taxation of business expenditures generally allow deduc-
tions for business expenses as made, but treat expenditures related to depreciable assets
as costs of the assets that are only deductible later through the depreciation allowance.
For a basic economic discussion of the traditional approach, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 192-222.
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the general regime. Congress, the courts, and the Treasury have dealt
with these problems by treating expenditures related to intangible value
similarly to expenditures related to assets only when it is both (i) easy
to identify the associated value, either because the value is represented
by an asset, such as a patent, or because the value is simple to measure,
such as goodwill expressly paid for when a business is purchased, and
(ii) easy to identify the relationship between the expenditure and the
associated value. This fairly inflexible, transactional, asset-oriented ap-
proach side-steps the need to deal with the uncertain and otherwise
difficult nature of intangible value. By identifying the reasons for the
current problems, Part II also motivates a possible reform.
Part III proposes a more flexible non-asset oriented approach to
taxing intangible value. This approach is directed toward reducing the
current problems, while being consistent with the concerns underlying
the basic rules for the taxation of expenditures. Part III examines how
the proposed approach has precedent in analogous areas of current and
past law. It concludes with a review of both the advantages and disad-
vantages associated with this proposal.
Parts I through III are predicated on a tax system without explicit
tax preferences (other than for capital gain), tax penalties, or inflation.
Part IV incorporates these additional concerns into the proposal. It also
demonstrates that they do not affect the basic conclusions of Parts I
through III, and indeed can be dealt with more satisfactorily under the
proposal in Part III.
I. CRITIQUE
A. Tax Policy Criteria
Tax provisions generally are evaluated using three criteria: sim-
plicity, equity, and neutrality.' The simplicity criterion is virtually self-
explanatory. A tax provision is sound when it is simple for taxpayers to
comply with and for the I.R.S. to enforce. Simplicity assures that the
provision does not impose undue administrative costs upon those com-
plying with and enforcing the provision."0
The equity criterion looks to evenhanded treatment. A tax provi-
sion is fair when similarly situated taxpayers are treated similarly. An
inequitable tax provision is objectionable per se and also is likely to
I See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-8 (1986); B. BITTKER, L. STONE &
W. KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 11-16 (6th ed. 1984) [hereinafter BITTKER
& STONE].
10 See 1 TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 15-16 (discussing simplicity in taxation
and how such simplicity results in reduced administrative costs).
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damage taxpayers' perceptions of the tax, undermining taxpayers' com-
pliance with the tax, political support for the tax, and, perhaps, citi-
zens' willingness to pay for government through taxes.11
Neutrality requires that a tax provision not modify behavior un-
less there are good reasons to believe that the modified behavior is pref-
erable to the unmodified behavior. 2 When a tax modifies behavior, it
imposes a burden on taxpayers in addition to the tax, the burden of
behaving differently.'" Unlike the tax itself, the additional burden does
not necessarily benefit the government and therefore is troubling. Con-
sequently, unless this burden is justified, a tax provision should avoid
it.1
4
This Article's critique of current law is based solely upon these
11 See 1 TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 13-17. Evenhanded treatment generally is
referred to as "horizontal" equity. BITTKER & STONE, supra note 9, at 12. There is
another equity notion: "vertical" equity. Id. A tax satisfies the vertical equity criterion
if those better off pay relatively more tax than those less well off. Id. The vertical
equity criterion rarely comes into play in evaluating a narrow tax provision, like the
taxation of intangible capital. Cf. 1 TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing verti-
cal equity in taxation). I do not use it to appraise the taxation of intangible capital.
12 See 1 TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 13.
I3 See W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 604-05
(3d ed. 1985).
14 The neutrality criterion sometimes is stated more strongly as an efficiency crite-
rion. The idea underlying the efficiency criterion is that the behavior that would occur
in the absence of governmental modification probably represents the economy operating
as efficiently as possible, so that any tax-induced modification of this behavior reduces
economic efficiency. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1986). There are
those who question the efficiency criterion's assumption that an unregulated economy is
socially optimal. See J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 32-34 (3d ed. 1976).
Even assuming the general validity of the efficiency criterion, there are two
problems with applying the criterion when looking at a given narrow tax provision.
First, there is no reason, per se, to believe that a slight reduction in the tax system's
effect on behavior will increase efficiency. Other tax.provisions or governmental regula-
tions may have so changed the economy from what it would be in the absence of gov-
ernmental modification that an additional modification from a tax provision might
countermand some other efficiency-reducing effect of government or otherwise increase
economic efficiency. See generally Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (the classic article suggesting that once govern-
ment has changed a number of economic decisions, eliminating one changed decision
might not increase efficiency). Second, in looking at most tax provisions, the issue is not
whether to modify behavior, but which of two modifications is preferable. There are no
ready standards by which to measure the relative effects of behavior changes from dif-
ferent specific provisions. See Ballard, Shoven & Whalley, The Total Welfare Cost of
the United States Tax System: A General Equilibrium Approach, 38 NAT'L TAX J.
125, 125 (1985). For example, it is not clear whether discouraging work effort (per-
haps through taxing wages) results in greater or less efficiency than discouraging saving
(perhaps through taxing the return on savings). See 1 TREASURY I, supra note 4, at
198-99; Bradford, The Economics of Tax Policy Toward Savings, in THE GOVERN-
MENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 11, 20-38 (G. von Furstenberg ed. 1980). This Arti-
cle uses the more modest neutrality criterion to avoid the problems associated with the
efficiency criterion.
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three criteria. a5 Aspects of current law can be criticized on other
grounds. For example, some believe that certain advertising is bad be-
cause it reduces competition, distorts values, and misleads.16 These
commentators might criticize current law because it does not penalize
advertising.1" Some believe that investment in human beings is desira-
ble."' These individuals might criticize current law for having too few
incentives for this investment. These concerns raise policy issues beyond
the scope of this Article.
Current law is objectionable in terms of all three criteria: simplic-
ity, equity, and neutrality. The complexity of current law will be evi-
dent in the discussion below and therefore the simplicity criterion needs
no additional explication. In order to examine the equity and neutrality
concerns, it is helpful to review the evidence on the economics of intan-
gible value in a business. The analysis does not take into account ex-
plicit tax preferences (other than the preference for capital gain), tax
penalties, or inflation until Part IV.
15 A current fad in tax policy is to evaluate provisions in terms of the financial
accounting notion of "matching." See, e.g., S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 140
(1986) (principal consideration underlying section 263A is "mismatching"). Matching
requires that gross income and associated deductions be taken into account at the same
time. Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises, Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Concepts No. 3, §§ 84-89 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1980).
Many of the concerns of this Article can be seen as mismatching problems. I do not
adopt a matching perspective, however, for three reasons: first, the analysis under the
three criteria reaches all concerns that would be identified from a matching perspective;
second, a matching perspective does little to solve the concerns once identified, see infra
text accompanying notes 225-237, 260-69; and, third, matching analysis frequently
leads to incorrect tax results, as policy judgments are hidden in assumptions about
which income and deductions are to be matched, see, e.g., Mundstock, Accelerated De-
predation and the Interest Deduction: Can Two Rights Really Make a Wrong?, 29
TAX NOTES 1253, 1253-54 (1985) (Current deduction of interest associated with in-
come deferred because of accelerated depreciation is still proper.).
It is not clear that matching is always sound policy. Matching is abandoned when
it is perceived as being too generous to taxpayers. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 461(h) (Supp. III
1985 & West Supp. 1987) (deductions attributable to current income deferred to later
periods); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) (income taxed
prior to associated deductions). This is not surprising, since the matching notion serves
financial accounting purposes that are frequently inconsistent with sound tax policy.
See infra text accompanying notes 323-26. For financial accounting purposes, it is im-
portant that a proper net profit be determined for each year. This supports matching.
For tax purposes, each tax year does not stand by itself. It is acceptable that a given
year's taxable income be mismeasured (which is inevitable under current tax account-
ing regimes), as long as the "error" is offset by errors in other years so that the present
value of taxes does not vary substantially from the perfect result.
16 See, e.g., W. COMANOR & T. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER
252 (1974).
17 See J. SIMON, ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING 278-85 (1970);
Doyle, Economic Aspects of Advertising: A Survey, 78 ECON. J. 570, 597-98 (1968).
" See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 4, at 14-15.
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B. The Nature of Intangible Capital
It is necessary to define two terms: "intangible capital" and "in-
tangible capital expenditures." "Intangible capital" is value in a busi-
ness that is not attributable to tangible assets or cash and similar cash-
equivalent intangibles (such as foreign currency, bank deposits, etc.).19
Examples are value attributable to copyrights, trademarks, service
marks, goodwill, patents, and employees who are trained, knowledgea-
ble, efficient, healthy, and happy. "Intangible capital expenditures" are
expenditures that increase the amount of intangible capital" at the end
of the year in which the expenditures are made.2" Examples are ex-
10 A business makes expenditures to form the business entity, to acquire equity
capital, and to borrow money. These expenditures may be viewed as a means of in-
creasing the value of the business. Alternatively, these expenditures may be viewed as
the costs to investors of participating in the business. Because the second view is more
appropriate, and for purposes of simplifying the discussion, this Article does not treat
these expenditures as business intangible capital.
20 A question arises whether production period interest should be viewed as an
intangible capital expenditure. Current law requires the capitalization of most produc-
tion period interest related to tangible assets. See I.R.C. § 263A (West Supp. 1987).
The underlying problem can be seen in a comparison of self-produced and purchased
property. If one produces property to sell, one's price must include all outlays, includ-
ing production period interest, in order to break even. The purchase price would there-
fore be expected to include these items (plus a possible profit for the builder). For this
reason, when one self-produces property, the property also should be expected to in-
crease in value not only by the amount of the direct expenditures, but also by at least
the amount of production period interest.
Production period interest, however, does not stand on the same footing as other
costs. This is because equity-financed property should experience the same value in-
crease as debt-financed property. The market price will not vary depending on how the
property is financed. There is an economic basis for this result. A rational equity-
financed seller should get out of the property not only his costs, but also a return for
what could have been earned if the funds tied up in production had been profitably
invested. The same factor, the use of money during production, affects the equity-fi-
nanced seller just as it affects the debt-financed seller. The debt-financed seller pays for
the use of money by paying interest, while the equity-financed seller pays for the use of
money by not earning a current return on its funds used in production. As a result,
roughly parallel treatment of debt-financed and equity-financed self-production (in a
world that treats production period interest as a cost of the property) would tax im-
puted lost interest (if equity-financed) and capitalize the imputed interest as a cost of
the property. Exactly parallel treatment would allow the deduction of production pe-
riod interest and both impute and capitalize lost interest on all production costs (be-
cause the imputed rate might be different than the rate on the borrowing that finances
any production period interest). For this reason, it is not necessary to view production
period interest as an intangible capital expenditure.
2 The tax accounting method for determining when expenditures are taken into
account is irrelevant for purposes of this Article. Consequently, this Article refers to
expenditures "made" as a shorthand for referring to expenditures paid or incurred
(accrued). The focus of this Article is on expenditures paid in one year that relate to
taxable income in later years. It therefore deals with a problem that is the reverse of
the mislabelled "premature accrual" problem-expenditures that relate to current taxa-
ble income but that are not paid until later years. See 1 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
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penditures on advertising, promotion, research and development
("R&D"), and employee recruitment, education, training, care, and re-
tention. This Article tries to avoid distinguishing between intangible
capital represented by something that can be viewed as an asset (like a
patent) and other, non-asset, intangible capital (such as trained em-
ployees), as it argues that the asset notion22 contributes to the problems
in current law.
As so defined, in the abstract, intangible capital expenditures are
economically similar to expenditures on tangible assets. A tangible asset
has value only to the extent it is expected to generate future cash flow,
either by being sold or by increasing future net cash flow.23 In fact, one
can look at the value of an asset as being the present value of the ex-
pected future cash flow. 24 Because receipt of the future cash flow is
delayed, however, the cash flow must repay the expenditures plus an
additional return to compensate for the delay. The return merely as-
sures (i) that the present value of the future cash flow equals the
amount of current expenditures and (ii) that the owner of the asset is
compensated for the risk of receiving the cash flow. Expenditures on
tangible assets therefore convert the cash expended into an expected
stream of future net revenues that repay the expenditures plus a return.
Intangible capital is value in a business not attributable to tangible
assets or cash equivalents. Such value is present only if the business is
expected to generate net cash flow in the future in excess of a market
return on the tangible assets, cash equivalents, future expenditures, fu-
ture services, etc.2 5 There are two ways intangible capital expenditures
can contribute to future excess net cash flow. 26 First, the expenditures
can result in increased future revenues. For example, advertising can
increase future sales or increase the prices that can be charged. Second,
expenditures can result in future cost savings that increase the future
net cash flow of the business. R&D expenditures, for example, may
result in a manufacturing procedure or employee know-how that
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMM. ON
MARCH 21, 1984 264-67 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF PROVI-
SIONS]. For a remarkably clear and insightful analysis of the economic issues involved
in "premature accruals," referred to by the author more accurately as "reverse invest-
ments," see Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of a "Reverse Investment", 26 TAX NOTES
925 (1985).
22 A discussion of the asset and property notions as they inf6rm our tax and other
laws is well beyond the scope of this Article. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient
to view an asset as something that can be transferred for value.
23 R. MILLER, INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICS 155 (1978).
24 This result is assumed by most economists. 3 F. MACHLUP, KNOWLEDGE: ITS
CREATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE 403-18 (1984).
25 Doernberg & Hall, supra note 2, at 366-69.
26 Hirschey, supra note 1, at 376-77.
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reduces energy costs, increasing the business's future profits. Intangible
capital expenditures, like expenditures on tangible assets, therefore con-
vert into the expectation of increased future net revenues that repay the
expenditures plus a return. A prospective purchaser of the business
should be willing to pay roughly as much for the business after the
expenditures are made as before, because, although the expenditures
are gone, future net revenues should be greater, compensating for the
"lost" expenditures.
Many intangible capital and asset-related expenditures have an-
other similarity: both "depreciate." 2 Depreciation is the loss in value
over time of a business as a result of the effects of exhaustion, wear,
tear, obsolescence, and the like on the business. A machine wears out or
becomes obsolete. Patents exhaust over their seventeen-year legal life as
the end of the life approaches. A trained workforce becomes less valua-
ble as employees quit.
The existing scholarship focuses on three specific types of expendi-
tures that contribute to intangible capital.28 First, a number of studies
find that some advertising increases intangible capital.29 The economic
evidence indicates that while much advertising may have short-lived ec-
onomic effects,30 other advertising may benefit the business for quite
27 For simplicity, this Article treats "amortization" as a form of "depreciation."
28 See Brozen, supra note 1, at 7.
29 See J. LAMBIN, ADVERTISING, COMPETITION AND MARKET CONDUCT IN OL-
IGOPOLY OVER TIME 90-100 (1976); K. PALDA, THE MEASUREMENT OF CUMULA-
TIVE ADVERTISING EFFECTS 95 (1964); Abdel-khalik, Advertising Effectiveness and
Accounting Policy, 50 ACCT. REV. 657, 657 (1975); Ben-Zion, supra note 1, at 227-
28; Hirschey, supra note 1, at 375-78. Basically, there are two schools on how to view
advertising. One school views advertising as an asset (i.e., paying only a market return),
while the other views advertising as "better" than an asset (i.e., reducing competition in
a market so that the advertising pays not only a market risk-adjusted return on invest-
ment but also a greater monopoly profit). See, e.g., J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND
COMPETITION 155-57 (1967) (not clear); W. COMANOR & T. WILSON, supra note 16,
at 238-53 (no monopoly); ECONOMISTS ADVISORY GROUP, THE ECONOMICS OF AD-
VERTISING 65 (1967) (no monopoly); J. LAMBIN, supra, at 166-68 (no monopoly); F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 390-93
(2d ed. 1980) (monopoly, with reservations); R. SCHMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF
ADVERTISING 216-44 (1972) (not clear); Comanor & Wilson,' The Effect of Advertising
on Competition: A Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 453, 470-73 (1979) [hereinafter Comanor
& Wilson 1979] (monopoly); Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON.
537, 538 (1964) (no monopoly). This dispute is not relevant for purposes of this Arti-
cle. Both sides agree that advertising can increase future revenues. In other words, both
sides apparently would agree that advertising can result in intangible capital. See, e.g.,
Comanor & Wilson, Advertising Market Structure and Performance, 49 REV. ECON.
& STATISTICS 423, 437 (1967).
SO See, e.g., Abdel-khalik, supra note 29, at 667; Comanor & Wilson 1979, supra
note 29, at 464; Falk & Miller, Amortization of Advertising Expenditures, 15 J.
AccT. RES. 12, 21-22 (1977) (100% depreciation in one year from date when made,
but not within calendar year made); Picconi, A Reconsideration of the Recognition of
Advertising Assets on Financial Statements, 15 J. AcCT. RES. 317, 323 (1977) (service
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some time."x For example, television advertising for consumer goods has
been found to depreciate3 2 only about 20% a year.33 Cigarette advertis-
ing in general has been found to depreciate between 35% and 45% a
year in one study, 4 and only 15% to 20% in another.3" Advertising on
"Lucky Strike" cigarettes (from 1926 to 1939) was found not only to
depreciate, but also to provide a nominal" return37 of approximately
15%.3' One study of selected firms found food, drug, and cosmetic ad-
vertising to last approximately 5.5 years. 9 It is very difficult to genera-
lize about the factors that influence the effect of advertising.4 Its effects
vary from firm to firm in a given industry.41 Most agree, however, that
life of advertising expenditures tended to expire within annual accounting period.). An
important type of non-intangible capital advertising expenditure is the cost of "defen-
sive" advertising. Defensive advertising merely prevents the business from losing sales
as a result of competitors' advertising. It occurs in small markets, particularly oligopo-
lies. Arguably, defensive advertising is socially wasteful as it does not contribute to
economic activity (other than of advertising agencies, the media, etc.). See J. LAMBIN,
supra note 29, at. 107-09, 124-27; F. SCHERER, supra note 29, at 386-90; Dixit &
Norman, Advertising and Welfare, 9 BELL J. ECON. 1, 9-13 (1978); Peles,
Econometric Measurement of the Duration of Advertising Effect on Sales: A Comment,
16 J. MARKETING REs. 284, 284-85 (1979). There may be similar problems with
R&D. See Grabowski & Mueller, supra note 1, at 338.
" See Grabowski, The Effects of Advertising on the Interindustry Distribution of
Demand, 3 EXPLORATIONS ECON. REs. 21, 69-70 (1976) (suggesting that industries
most benefited by advertising were those most suited to television advertising); Hir-
schey, supra note 1, at 386-87 (noting that television advertising tends to be long-lived).
2 The studies, for the sake of convenience, generally assume that advertising de-
preciates in a "declining balance" fashion. See, e.g, Ben-Zion, supra note 1, at 225;
Grabowski & Mueller, supra note 1, at 330. The same assumption is made in this
Article. Declining balance depreciation provides that a fixed percentage of the value of
an asset at the beginning of each year is lost each year. For example, if an asset cost
$100, 20% declining balance depreciation would allow annual deductions of $20, 16,
12.8, 10.24, 8.19, 6.55, 5.24, 4.2, etc. Declining balance depreciation never ends, be-
cause in each year only a percentage of the remaining value is depreciated. In later
years, however, the amount depreciated becomes insignificant.
8 See Hirschey, supra note 1, at 387 (21.1%).
, See Peles, Rates of Amortization of Advertising Expenditures, 79 J. POL.
EcoN. 1032, 1052 (1971).
See Telser, Advertising and Cigarettes, 70 J. POL. ECON. 471, 498 (1962).
A "nominal" return is not adjusted for inflation, while a "real" return is.
87 This Article is concerned only with the return to the business. One of the great
questions with respect to much intangible capital is the relationship between this pri-
vate rate of return and the social rate of return. See, e.g., Mansfield, Rapoport, Romeo,
Wagner & Beardsley, Social and Private Rates of Return From Industrial Innova-
tions, 91 Q.J. ECON. 221, 221 (1977) (reporting the results of 17 case studies, each of
which estimates the social and private rate of return from the investment in a particular
industrial innovation).
"I See Telser, supra note 35, at 483. Years 1929 through 1932 were omitted be-
cause of data problems. Id. at 482.
s See Abdel-khalik, supra note 29, at 663-64.
o See Hirschey & Weygandt, Amortization Policy for Advertising and Research
and Development Expenditures, 23 J. AccT. RES. 326, 333 (1985).
41 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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institutional goodwill advertising42 and advertising on nondurable con-
sumer goods4 are likely to increase intangible capital. Second, various
studies have concluded that research and development expenditures
contribute to intangible capital.44 The economic life of R&D appears to
be less variable than the life of advertising.45 In four different studies,
R&D expenditures have been found to depreciate at an annual rate of
(i) approximately 25%,46 (ii) 15% on average,4 (iii) between 18% and
36%,48 and (iv) approximately 20%.49 A fair amount of work has been
42 See Kuehn, How Advertising Performance Depends on Other Marketing Fac-
tors, 2 J. ADVERTISING RES. 2, 3 (1962) (not based on empirical work).
'" See Grabowski, supra note 31, at 61; Hirschey & Weygandt, supra note 40, at
333; cf. Porter, Consumer Behavior, Retailer Power and Market Performance in Con-
sumer Goods Industries, 56 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 419, 430 (1974) (retail chan-
nels affect consumer demand).
" See, e.g., Ben-Zion, supra note 1, at 228; Ben-Zion, The R&D and Investment
Decision and Its Relationship to the Firm's Market Value: Some Preliminary Results,
in R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 299, 308 (Z. Griliches ed. 1984); Connolly &
Hirschey, R&D, Market Structure and Profits: A Value-Based Approach, 66 REV.
ECON. & STATISTICS 682, 686 (1984); Grabowski & Mueller, supra note 1, at 342;
Griliches, Market Value, R&D, and Patents, in R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIV-
iTY supra, at 249, 250; Pakes, On Patents, R&D, and the Stock Market Rate of
Return, 93 J. POL. ECON. 390, 401 (1985).
"5 See Grabowski & Mueller, supra note 1, at 328-29; Hirschey, supra note 1, at
386-87 . Studies of the relationship between R&D and the value of the firm have noted
an interesting effect. The market value appears to be affected only by unexpected
changes in R&D. See Griliches, supra note 44, at 252; Pakes, supra note 44, at 406. A
1% unexpected increase in R&D was found to increase the value of the firm 0.39%. See
Pakes, supra note 44, at 402. Another study found a $2 increase in value from a $1
increase in R&D. See Griliches, supra note 44, at 250. Similar results were obtained in
Ben-Zion, supra note 44, at 308. The studies speculate that R&D increases when there
is a discovery, which discovery also increases the firm's value, so that there is no cause
and effect relationship between expenditures and value. See Griliches, supra note 44, at
252; Pakes, supra note 44, at 407. For this reason, these studies, other than confirming
that R&D probably results in intangible capital, are not helpful for evaluating the
specific relationship between expenditures and value. Many of the R&D studies pre-
sent similar "chicken or egg" problems. It is not clear whether the R&D causes the
associated increased profits and value or vice versa. See Baily, Research and Develop-
ment Costs and Returns: The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 80 J. POL. ECON. 70,
83-84 (1972). One study has concluded that R&D causes profitability and not vice
versa. See Branch, Research and Development Activity and Profitability: A Distributed
Lag Analysis, 82 J. POL. ECON. 999, 1008-11 (1974). An analogous problem might be
present with advertising, but J. LAMBIN, supra note 29, at 132-34, concludes
otherwise.
48 See Hirschey, supra note 1, at 386.
47 See E. MANSFIELD, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVA-
TION-AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 79 (1968).
' See Pakes & Schankerman, The Rate of Obsolescence of Patents, Research Ges-
tation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources, in R&D, PAT-
ENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY supra note 44, at 73, 80.
" Ben-Zion, supra note 1, at 228.
This Article is concerned only with the decay of the value of intangible capital to
the owning businesses. This is a somewhat different issue from the depreciation of the
social value of the total stock of R&D, see, e.g., 3 F. MACHLUP, supra note 24, at 555-
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done on the return on investment in R&D. One of these studies found
a nominal return of approximately 12%, with research intensive firms
earning 15% to 20%.50 Another study found real returns from 7.5% to
17.4%." The most ambitious study found real returns varying from
negative for research on an electronic device (the investment did not
pay back the expenditures, which can happen with any risky invest-
ment), to 214%, for research that developed a household cleaning de-
vice, with most in the 15% to 50% range. 52 An historical study found
real returns of approximately 35% for 1954, declining evenly to 25% in
1961 .5 Another found nominal returns of approximately 11% to 18%
in 1960 and approximately 3% to 6% in 1973.4* Other works suggest
that returns are declining.
55
Third, there is some work that concludes, on the basis of indirect
evidence, that expenditures for improving the production or other use-
ful attributes of employees-expenditures on recruiting, selecting,
training, health care, morale, retention, etc. (which can be viewed as
expenditures on the business's "human capital")-contribute to a busi-
ness's intangible capital.5 ' A large body of literature investigates indi-
viduals' investments in themselves, particularly through education and
on-the-job training. This work generally concludes that individuals'
educational investments (cost plus lost income while in school) pay for
themselves (plus a return) through higher future wages.5 7 Similarly,
56, and from the lagged effect of advertising on sales, see, e.g., Clarke, Econometric
Measurement of the Duration of Advertising Effect on Sales, 13 J. MARKETING RES.
345 (1976).
50 Grabowski & Mueller, supra note 1, at 336-37, 342.
5 Pakes & Schankerman, supra note 48, at 85.
52 Mansfield, Rapoport, Romeo, Wagner & Beardsley, supra note 37, at 233.
5 Baily, supra note 45, at 82.
5' See D. SCHWARTZMAN, THE EXPECTED RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH 36, 44 (1975).
11 See H. GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL EVI-
DENCE AND POLICY OPTIONs 54 (1976). This may be because only less risky (and
therefore lower yielding) projects are being undertaken. A concern that only low-risk
R&D was being done was the basis for the research and experimentation credit enacted
in 1981, discussed infra text accompanying notes 276-79, 343-45. See S. REP. No. 144,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1981). None of these studies involve years subject to the
credit.
56 G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 15-44.
57 See, e.g., G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 147-237; Blaug, The Empirical Status of
Human Capital Theory: A Slightly Jaundiced Survey, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 827, 840
(1976); Garen, The Trade-Off Between Wages and Wage Growth, 20 J. HUM. RE-
SOURCES 522, 538 (1985). Kiker and Roberts, in The Durability of Human Capital:
Some New Evidence, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 269, 279-80 (1984), find that job interruption
results in extraordinary drops in the value of human capital. From this the authors
conclude that human capital is short-lived and requires substantial "repairs" to main-
tain value. An alternative conclusion is that letting human capital lie unused results in
greater depreciation, much as happens to a machine that is left unused and allowed to
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the literature concludes that individuals invest in their own on-the-job
training by accepting lower wages in jobs that provide training.58 Most
studies find that such individuals' investments in their training also pay
back the investment plus a return.59 For example, one study found
nominal returns between 9% and 12.7%,6o while another found that
one dollar of training results in twelve cents increased earnings per
year over the remaining working career.61 The underlying economic
models suggest that businesses should invest in their employees and that
the investment should repay that investment plus a return to the busi-
ness.62 For example, the problem that employees can quit, destroying
rust, etc.
"' See G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 16-37; Rosen, Learning and Experience in
the Labor Market, 7 J. HuM. RESOURCES 326, 327-29 (1972).
5' See J. MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS 93-94 (1974) (re-
turns on education plus training); Duncan & Hoffman, On-the-Job Training and
Earnings Differences by Race and Sex, 61 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 594, 601-02
(1979). One related issue that has received considerable attention is whether human
capital (primarily education and on-the-job training) explains inequality of earn-
ings-higher earnings of some merely representing a return on investment. See, e.g.,
Hancock & Richardson, Discount Rates and the Distribution of Lifetime Earnings, 20
J. HUM. RESOURCES 346, 356 (1985) (Uncertainty remains about the extent to which
return of investment explains differences in current earnings.). Minorities and inter-
rupted careers (primarily women) have presented real problems for the human capital
theory explaining apparent inequality. See, e.g., Hanushek & Quigley, Life-Cycle
Earning Capacity and the OJT Investment Model, 26 INT'L ECON. REV. 365, 381-83
(1985) (suggesting that non-investment models of life-cycle variations in earnings be
analyzed in order to understand inequality of wage growth across race or gender
groups). Even those who believe that human capital theory does not explain inequality,
however, recognize that some expenditures and lost income have capital characteristics
(although those expenditures may be race or sex limited), which represents the only
conclusion needed for purposes of this Article. Bartel & Lichtenberg, in The Compara-
tive Advantage of Educated Workers in Implementing New Technology: Some Empiri-
cal Evidence, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1718
(1985), reach the conclusion that employee education demonstrates more characteristics
of human capital the more technologically sophisticated the work place. Consequently,
there may be symbiosis between types of intangible capital.
60 See Mincer, On-The-Job Training: Costs, Returns, and Some Implications, 70
J. POL. ECON. 50, 56 (Supp. 1962).
61 See Rosen, Taxation and On-The-Job Training Decisions, 64 REV. ECON. &
STATISTICS 442, 446-47 (1982).
62 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Education and training are not the
only aspects of employer investment in employee-related human capital. Employers also
can invest in employee mental and physical health. See G. BECKER, supra note 1, at
41. There is a large body of literature on the economics of employees investing in their
own health, particularly health insurance. See Grossman, On the Concept of Health
Capital and the Demand for Health, 80 J. POL. ECON. 223, 246-48 (1972); Pauly,
Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J.
ECON. LIT. 629 (1986). This literature is less helpful than, for example, the literature
on employee training, since most employer-provided health care probably benefits prin-
cipally the employees (and not the employer), while much employer-provided training
(that is not transferable to other employers) benefits employers. Also, employer invest-
ment in health probably is quite small. See G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 41.
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the business's investment, is reduced by observing that in these cases the
employer will pay a higher wage (but not higher than the value of the
investment) to retain the investment.8 There is no empirical work,
however, that verifies the intangible capital result for employer invest-
ments in their employees or that indicates depreciation patterns or rates
of return.
The literature has focused on these types of expenditures because
data is available, not because of a judgment that these are the only
types of intangible capital expenditures. 6" For example, while non-ad-
vertising promotional expenditures, like salesmen's salaries, probably
result in intangible capital, 5 there is no empirical work on these
expenditures.
Despite the economic similarity between intangible capital ex-
penditures and expenditures with respect to assets, current tax law pro-
vides different treatment for many intangible capital expenditures than
for expenditures on economically similar tangible assets. It also treats
intangible capital expenditures differently in three situations: (1) al-
lowing a deduction for many when incurred by a going concern,66 (2)
allowing practically no deduction at all when incurred in the acquisi-
tion of a business,6 7 and (3) allowing 60-month depreciation when in-
curred by a start-up business.6" This inconsistent regime is the source
of the three following equity and neutrality problems.
C. Implicit Preference for Much Intangible Capital
1. Applicable Law
The first problem, an implicit preference for many intangible cap-
ital expenditures, results from the current rules that determine the tax
treatment of expenditures at the time made. Current law in general
6 See G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 31-32.
See, e.g., J. SIMON, supra note 17, at xv; Weiss, Advertising, Profits, and
Corporate Taxes, 51 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 421, 421 n.1 (1969).
85 See J. SIMON, supra note 17, at xv; Grabowski & Mueller, supra note 1, at
334.
", I.R.C. § 162 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). See infra notes 69-
107, 224-38 and accompanying text.
17 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-l(a) (as amended in 1965) (capital expenditures in
general), 1.461-1(a) (as amended in 1967) ("If an expenditure results in the creation of
an asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable
year such an expenditure may not be deductible .... "). See infra notes 139-65, 248-
56.
88 I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra notes 175-83 and ac-
companying text.
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allows an immediate deduction for business expenses.69 No deduction is
allowed, however, for the costs of purchased assets7" or for expenditures
incurred in connection with the self-construction or improvement of
non-inventory71 assets.72 These expenditures, which are "capitalized"
as costs of the assets, may be deducted subsequently. For example, the
costs of qualified "depreciable" business assets are deductible over time
through a depreciation allowance. 3 Depreciation deductions are al-
lowed so that, as the depreciable asset is expected to lose value over
time, the expected value loss is treated like an expense.74 The capital-
ized costs of most tangible assets used in business are allowed as depre-
ciation deductions.75 In contrast, many expenditures related to intangi-
ble value are immediately deducted as business expenses.
These rules in effect provide more generous treatment for many
expenditures related to intangible capital than for economically similar
expenditures related to tangible assets. This difference can be quite im-
portant. Consider an example: A taxpayer has $1,000 to use in its busi-
ness. It is considering two uses, buying television advertising or buying
a new manufacturing machine. The two uses of $1,000 are equally
69 I.R.C. § 162 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
70 I.R.C. § 263 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). See infra notes
199-201 and accompanying text.
71 Special rules provide similar treatment for expenditures with respect to inven-
tory. I.R.C. §§ 263A(a) (West Supp. 1987), 471 (1982 & West Supp. 1987); Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.471-1 (1960) to 1.472-8 (as amended 1982). Because intangible capital gen-
erally is more similar to non-inventory assets than to inventory, this Article focuses on
the general capitalization rules.
72 I.R.C.§§ 263(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987), 263A(b)
(West Supp. 1987). This is an oversimplification of current law. See infra text accom-
panying notes 192-217.
73 I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). If a business
asset is abandoned, destroyed, becomes worthless, or (for depreciable property) retired
at a time when all of the capitalized costs have not been allowed as depreciation deduc-
tions (i.e., when the taxpayer still has a positive adjusted basis), the adjusted basis is
allowed as a loss deduction or as a final depreciation deduction (reduced by residual
value in the case of retirements). I.R.C. § 165 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp.
1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8 (as amended 1977) (gains and losses on retirements);
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-6(a)(3), 49 Fed. Reg. 5970-71 (1984); see also B. BITTKER,
supra note 2, at % 23.8 (discussing Treasury Regulations that govern the treatment of
depreciable assets withdrawn from service).
74 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I (as amended in 1972) (deduction for expected loss
in value); Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1974) (purpose of
depreciation accounting for tangible assets is to allocate the assets' costs to periods bene-
fited by the assets' physical consumption); see also OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM, 64-67
(1977) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]. There are other views of depreciation. See J.
DODGE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES, POL-
ICY, PLANNING 507-08 (1985) (discussing other theories of capital recovery). These
views are less consistent with the neutrality criterion. See infra note 79.
78 I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
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attractive economically. Both will increase the business's income by
$263.80 per year over the next five years (and have no effect or value
after five years). This cash flow returns the $1,000 plus pays a 10%
compounded annually before-tax return on the balance of the $1,000
not recovered. 6 The taxpayer is in the 35% tax bracket. Compare the
tax results with immediate deduction and pro rata (straight-line) depre-
ciation over five years:
Table I
Income Deduction Tax Net Cash Prsnt Val"
Immediate Deduction
Year 1 263.80 1,000 -257.67 521.47 489.64
Year 2 263.80 -0- 92.33 171.47 151.18
Year 3 263.80 -0- 92.33 171.47 142.95
Year 4 263.80 -0- 92.33 171.47 133.29
Year 5 263.80 -0- 92.33 171.47 125.15
1,207.35 1,042.21
Pro-Rata Depreciation
Year 1 263.80 200 22.33 241.57 226.73
Year 2 263.80 200 22.33 241.47 212.89
Year 3 263.80 200 22.33 241.47 199.90
Year 4 263.80 200 22.33 241.47 189.70
Year 5 263.80 200 22.33 241.47 176.24
1,207.35 1,003.4678
Immediate deduction (100% first year depreciation) provides earlier,
and, therefore, more valuable in present value terms, tax deductions,
resulting in a larger present value after-tax cash flow. If the advertising
is deducted immediately 'and the machine is limited to depreciation, the
advertising gets a tax preference. Although the advertising and the ma-
chine provide identical before-tax returns, immediate deduction would
" The discussion assumes that the cash flows are risk-free. If the cash flows are
subject to differing levels of risk, for the two uses of funds to be equally economically
attractive, the relative returns (and cash flows) should change to reflect the differing
risk.
, The after-tax cash flow is discounted using a 6.5% compounded annually after-
tax discount rate.
78 The asset is "worth" somewhat more than its cost because pro rata tax depreci-
ation is somewhat accelerated compared to depreciation for the actual annual loss in
value (economic depreciation). See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
130-35 (4th ed. 1985). This error is sufficiently small, however, that it does not seem
worthwhile to abandon the simplicity of pro rata depreciation.
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make the advertising more attractive, after taxes, than the machine.7
Two basic problems arise when making the important distinction
between immediately deductible expenses and capital expenditures with
respect to intangible capital: (i) determining what is an intangible asset
and (ii) deciding whether an expenditure is sufficiently related to an
intangible asset that the expenditure must be capitalized as a cost of the
asset. These two problems become so intertwined, however, that the
two problems must be discussed together.
The current law has most often drawn the line between immedi-
ately deductible expenses and capital expenditures (the "asset-capital-
ized" rules) 0 with respect to intangibles in cases and rulings."' This
law is remarkably confused, as the Eleventh Circuit has observed:
The proper line between deduction and capitalization . . .
[is] difficult to draw when the long-lived benefit achieved as
the result of an expenditure is not a tangible asset or a read-
ily identifiable intangible asset. . . . That problem has re-
ceived a great deal of judicial attention, with results that are
not entirely consistent."2
The contrasting treatment in two recent cases presents an excellent
example of the confusion. In the first, the Fourth Circuit allowed a
financial institution to deduct the costs of marketing surveys undertaken
in order to plan new branches.8 3 In the second, the Fifth Circuit disal-
lowed a similar deduction. 4 To the Fourth Circuit, there is no asset
created by marketing surveys.8 5 The Fourth Circuit opinion is in line
with a series of cases holding that banks' expenditures in beginning
11 See Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invari-
ant Valuations, 72 J. POL. EcON. 604, 604-05 (1964) (demonstrating that under the
assumption that the taxpayer's tax rate does not change over the life of an asset, only
economic depreciation assures that, if one asset has a higher before-tax return than
another, the after-tax return of the first asset will be greater than the after-tax return
of the second). The text applies this result to asset-like intangible capital.
1o This Article draws a distinction between "asset-capitalized" expenditures and
"asset-related" expenditures. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. "Asset-
related" expenditures are any expenditures that increase the value of a business's non-
cash equivalent assets. "Asset-capitalized" expenditures are expenditures treated as as-
set-related for tax purposes.
81 See B. BITKER, supra note 2, at 1 20.4.4 (discussing cases and rulings regard-
ing the capitalization of intangibles-related expenditures).
82 Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 n.7 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
8' NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 293-94 (4th Cir. 1982).
" Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1984).
" See NCNB Corp., 684 F.2d at 290-91 (The Fourth Circuit did not consider the
marketing survey expense a capital cost because it did not meet the "separate and dis-
tinct additional asset" test.).
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credit card services are deductible.8 6 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit views
marketing surveys as costs of the "branch," a valuable intangible asset
separate from the tangible assets located at the branch."
The taxation of advertising reflects similar anomalies. One early
case held that successful advertising to acquire new customers creates
assets:
[I]t is clear that there was both an expenditure of a large
amount of money, and the acquirement of something of per-
manent use or value in the business. The taxpayer here ad-
mits the expenditure of money, but denies the acquisition of
anything of permanent use or value in its business. The an-
swer to that contention is that the corporation acquired (1)
. . . new customers, and (2) goodwill, and (3) elimination of
competition.8"
Other cases note that advertising (or at least increased advertising) can
be capital, but allow a deduction for all advertising because of the diffi-
culty in determining what portion of total advertising should be capital-
ized.89 As the Board of Tax Appeals noted in one of these cases:
Briefly summarized, petitioner's contentions are that the ex-
penditure for advertising. . . was made during the first year
of its existence; that the amount spent for this purpose was
abnormally large because of the fact that it was seeking to
establish a market for its product and that it should be per-
mitted to take deductions over a series of years for this ab-
normal and unusual expense in order that the subsequent
years which received the benefit of the advertising might
bear their proportionate part of the cost thereof. . . . And
we may add that with the principles asserted we are in en-
tire accord. The difficulty presented is in the application of
86 See, e.g., First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th
Cir. 1979); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th
Cir. 1979); First Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 558 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir.
1977); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir.
1974).
87 See Central Tex. Sav. & Loan, 731 F.2d at 1185. The I.R.S. appears to be
equally confused. See Wabich, Expenses Relating to Abandoned Acquisitions and Bus-
iness Expansion: Capital v. Ordinary, 64 TAxEs 377, 380 (1986) (comparing private
letter rulings, which reflect a similarly inconsistent analysis).
88 Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814, 816 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937).
8I See, e.g., Colonial Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 154, 156-58
(1927).
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these principles to the facts before us."°
Notwithstanding, the I.R.S. generally does not challenge advertising de-
ductions.91 It appears that the courts are adopting this view.92
Some early cases held that expenditures by periodicals to acquire
subscribers, including advertising, must be capitalized as a cost of "cir-
culation," an intangible asset.93 In 1950, a special statutory provision
allowing an immediate deduction for such circulation expenditures re-
gardless of the general asset-capitalized rules was enacted to eliminate
the uncertainty created by the cases.9 Nevertheless, one case held that
advertising to allay the public's fear of nuclear power so as to expedite
receiving an operating permit for a nuclear power plant must be
90 Colonial Ice Cream Co., 7 B.T.A. at 156. For an examination of why the
taxpayer argued for capitalization, see infra text accompanying notes 241-45.
91 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-1(a) (1960), -20(a)(2) (1965) (goodwill advertising is
generally deductible); Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2 C.B. 117, 119; see also B. BrITKER,
supra note 2, at 1 20.4.5 (Advertising expenses generally are deductible, assuming a
sufficient nexus between the expenditure and the taxpayer's business.).
" See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 231
(1985) (stating that "[e]xpenditure[s] for institutional or 'goodwill' advertising are gen-
erally deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses"); Consolidated Apparel
Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1570, 1582 (1952) ("Reasonable costs of advertising are
generally allowable as business expenses."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 207 F.2d
580 (7th Cir. 1953).
9' See, e.g., Public Opinion Publishing Co. v. Jensen, 76 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir.
-1935) ("The circulation of a publication is a capital asset, and money expended in
increasing it is a 'capital expenditure' and is not deductible in determining the pub-
lisher's taxable income."); Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890, 891
(8th Cir.) ("[Mioney expended in building up circulation structure is a capital expen-
diture" because a magazine's circulation is an intangible capital asset.), cert. denied,
790 U.S. 646 (1933); Strong Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 550, 552 (7th
Cir. 1932) (stating that monies used to increase circulation of a publication are capital
expenditures).
9" Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 64 Stat. 906, 929 (1950) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 173 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)); S. REP. No.
2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 63-64 (1950). Current law provides an alternative minimum
tax on taxpayers that benefit from tax preferences. The tax basically is 20% (21% for
individuals) of alternative minimum taxable income less exemption amounts. See I.R.C.
§ 55 (West Supp. 1987). The tax applies when it exceeds the regular income tax.
I.R.C. § 55(a) (West Supp. 1987). Alternative minimum taxable income basically is
regular taxable income increased to reflect certain tax preferences. See I.R.C.
§ 55(b)(2) (1982 & West Supp. 1987). Section 56(b)(2) provides that, in the case of
individuals, circulation expenditures described in section 173 must be depreciated over
three years for minimum tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1987).
This preference treatment is questionable given that section 173 was not enacted for a
preferential purpose. In the case of corporations, circulation expenditures may increase
the preference item for 50% of the difference between book income and alternative
minimum taxable income (75% of the difference between earnings and profits [a tax
term of art] and alternative minimum taxable income, after 1989). See I.R.C.
§ 56(c)(1), (0, (g) (West Supp. 1987). A corporation may elect three-year depreciation
in lieu of this treatment. See I.R.C. § 59(e)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
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treated as a capital cost of the permit, an intangible asset.95
The law on non-advertising promotional expenditures is even
more confused. Cases and rulings go both ways with respect to the de-
duction of the costs of catalogues distributed to customers96 and of ex-
penditures for promotional gifts.9" One case held that free samples must
be capitalized.9 In a revenue ruling, the I.R.S. held that, while a util-
ity's advertising to promote sales is deductible, cash incentives to new
customers are a capital cost of acquiring the customers, an intangible
asset.99 A highly publicized private ruling held that the cost of design-
ing the "L'Eggs" package must be capitalized.' °
Similar confusion is present in the law applicable to other intangi-
ble capital expenditures. A few early cases suggest that some R&D
expenditures must be capitalized.' Following the precedent of periodi-
cals' circulation expenditures, Congress enacted a special statutory pro-
vision102 allowing an immediate deduction for certain "research or ex-
perimental" expenditures in part to reduce the uncertainty created by
these cases.' The law dealing with similar costs outside the scope of
9 Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 231-33.
98 Compare E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 655, 659, 661 (6th
Cir. 1954) (deductible) with Best Lock Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1217, 1235
(1959) (capitalized) and Rev. Rul. 68-360, 1968-2 C.B. 197, 197 (capitalized).
" Compare Poletti v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 818, 821-23 (8th Cir. 1964) (de-
ductible, capitalization issue apparently not litigated) with Liberty Ins. Bank v. Com-
missioner, 14 B.T.A. 1428, 1435 (1929) (capitalized), rev'd on other grounds, 59 F.2d
320 (6th Cir. 1932).
9' Durovic v. Comimissioner, 542 F.2d 1328, 1334 (7th Cir. 1976) (no reasonably
ascertainable useful life of free samples).
" Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2 C.B. 117, 118 (Cash allowances to builders, contrac-
tors, and owners of buildings to encourage use of natural gas and other expenses of
campaign are capital in nature.).
0 Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,611,005 (March 5, 1986) (Package design costs were iden-
tifiable intangible assets with useful lives in excess of the taxable year and had to be
capitalized.); see Roberts & McCarthy, Capitalization of Package Design Costs: Criti-
cal Analysis and Proposal for Relief, 38 TAx EXECUTIVE 309, 309 (1986) (critical of
the I.R.S.'s decision and offering a proposal for taxpayer relief); Wall St. J., April 16,
1986, at 1, col. 5.
101 See e.g., Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 424, 442
(1937) (requiring capitalization for research expenditures designed to improve tax-
payer's product and to develop new product ideas). See generally Rice, Research and
Development Costs, 25 TAXES 41 (1947) (a good discussion of pre-§ 174 law).
10 Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 174(b), 68A Stat. 1, 66-67 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 174(b) (1982 & West Supp. 1987)).
10I See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1954). Section 56(b)(2) provides that individuals must depreci-
ate research or experimental expenditures subject to section 174 over 10 years for pur-
poses of the alternative minimum tax. I.R.C. § 56(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1987).
Much like with circulation expenditures, preference treatment may be wrong given that
section 174 was not enacted exclusively for preferential proposes. Corporations may
elect 10-year depreciation. I.R.C. § 59(e)(1), (2)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
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the special statute is unclear. For example, the I.R.S. allows an imme-
diate deduction for the costs of developing computer software regardless
of whether the costs are "research or experimental" expenditures.""
Human capital expenditures generally are deductible. 0 5 One case,
however, held that the costs of training employees at a new plant are a
nondeductible cost of the new plant.10 6 Another held that the cost of a
fund established to make loans to employees so as to increase employee
goodwill was nondeductible.'0°
2. The Problem
a. Current Law's Significant Implicit Preference
The law concerning capital expenditures is complicated and con-
fused. The net result, however, is generous deductibility of many intan-
gible capital expenditures compared to the less advantageous treatment
of many economically similar asset-capitalized expenditures. The effect
is an implicit preference for the intangible capital created by deductible
expenditures ("preferred" intangible capital).'08
There is evidence that the implicit preference for preferred intan-
gible capital may be quite significant. As discussed below,'09 financial
accounting generally requires that expenditures for advertising and
R&D must be deducted immediately. There is evidence that this treat-
ment results in substantial variations in the financial accounting profits
of ongoing businesses compared to a regime that treats intangible capi-
tal similarly to other investments.'" The size of the variations differs
from industry to industry and from firm to firm."' These variations
104 See I.R.S. News Release IR-83-71 (April 19, 1983) (reaffirming Rev. Proc.
69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, § 3, which allows the deduction). It seems likely that the
uncertainty that would result from trying to capitalize and depreciate software costs
was a factor in the 1983 decision to continue the 1969 practice.
105 See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 234
(1985); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,303,012 (Oct. 7, 1982).
106 Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 227-30.
107 Robertson v. Steele's Mills, 172 F.2d 817, 820-22 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 848 (1949). This case seems to be consistent with subsequent authority discussed
infra text accompanying notes 224-35.
108 See Weiss, supra note 64, at 426.
109 See infra text accompanying notes 316-17.
110 See K. CLARKSON, supra note 1, at 33-34; Bloch, Advertising and Profitabil-
ity: A Reappraisal, 82 J. POL. ECON. 267, 283 (1974); Reekie & Bhoyrub, Profitabil-
ity and Intangible Assets: Another Look at Advertising and Entry Barriers, 13 AP-
PLIED ECON. 99, 107 (1981).
Ill See K. CLARKSON, supra note 1, at 59; Weiss, supra note 64, at 426-30.
These studies assume crude estimates for depreciating advertising and R&D and there-
fore basically conclude that since advertising and R&D levels vary, the effects of capi-
talization vary, hardly a surprising result. An additional basis for the conclusion in the
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are significant in dollar amount.112 For example, in 1983, taxable U.S.
corporations spent approximately $72 billion on advertising and $29
billion on R&D."'
One caveat must be noted. It is possible to view the special statu-
tory deductions for research or experimental expenditures and for cir-
culation expenditures, discussed above,"" as explicit preferences. In this
case, it is inappropriate to consider their effect along with the effects of
the more general rules not intended to prefer certain types of assets or
activities. Ignoring the two special provisions, one can still conclude
that there is a large implicit preference, however, because, as noted
above," 5 many amounts covered by the special provisions would be de-
ductible under the general asset-capitalized rules in any event. Whether
or not one views the special provisions as explicit preferences, there is a
significant implicit preference for preferred intangible capital.
It can be argued that the implicit preference is not material. Busi-
nesses are allowed excess deductions for current preferred intangible
capital expenditures, but are permitted no deduction for depreciation of
past preferred intangible capital expenditures." 6 A regime that treats
preferred intangible capital similarly to asset-capitalized expenditures
would allow depreciation deductions. Consequently, the amount of
over-deduction (compared to asset-capitalized treatment) in a given
year may be relatively small, as the understated depreciation could well
equal the overstated deduction for current expenditures. 117 Moreover,
the businesses most likely to have small depreciation deductions, so that
an immediate deduction for current expenditures is likely to exceed the
depreciation deduction under asset-capitalized treatment, are start-up
businesses, and, as discussed below,"' start-up businesses do not get a
current deduction.
This argument proves too much, as it also would suggest that the
cost of depreciable tangible assets could be immediately deductible with
little tax effect. In fact, the current treatment of assets subject to accel-
text can be reached by looking at the evidence, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 33-44, of the varying effects of advertising to businesses with the same levels of
advertising.
112 See Abdel-khalik, supra note 29, at 667; Bloch, supra note 110, at 284.
113 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME-1983 CORPORATION
INCOME TAX RETURNS 22, 61 (1986).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 94, 102-03.
118 See id.
118 See supra notes 69-107 and accompanying text (discussing different treatment
of intangible expenditures).
117 Cf Swales, Advertising as an Intangible Asset: Profitability and Entry Barri-
ers, 17 APPLIED ECON. 603, 607-10 (1985) (Advertising fluctuations are the key to
understanding the effect of expensing on financial profits.).
118 See infra text accompanying notes 175-81.
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erated depreciation (which is less generous than an immediate deduc-
tion11 ) is estimated to cost approximately $38 billion a year compared
to depreciation that approximates the actual decay in the value of de-
preciable assets.120 The economic evidence of the extent of the intangi-
ble capital preference, noted above, 2 ' also suggests that this argument
is in error.
The argument that immediate deductibility is not significant fails
to take into account the magnitude of the difference between immediate
deduction and depreciation.1 22 Except under unusual circumstances,
whenever an ongoing business increases preferred intangible capital ex-
penditures, immediate deduction results in greater deductions than if
depreciation were taken into account.
Not all deductions for employer-provided human capital'represent
a preference for employer investments in human capital. As noted
above, many employees who benefit from employer-provided training
in effect finance some or all of the training by accepting a lower wage
than if the training were not part of the employment.1 2' The employee,
in effect, is paid in human capital. For tax purposes, employee compen-
sation in the form of property generally is treated as if the employer
paid cash wages in an amount equal to the value of the property and
the employee purchased the property with the cash. 24 Similar treat-
ment should apply to compensation in the form of human capital. Con-
sequently, to the extent the higher wages would be deductible to the
employer, the proxy in the form of training also should be deductible to
the employer. The current deduction would not, then, constitute an im-
plicit preference.1 21 If cash compensation would have been capitalized
or inventoried, however, the human capital expenditures should be as
well. In this case, the immediate deduction would be a preference, al-
though for employee, and not employer, human capital.
b. Effects of the Preference
There could be a number of economic effects of the implicit pref-
119 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
120 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL
YEAR 1988 G-44 (1987).
12I See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 76-79 and Table I.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
124 See I.R.C. § 83 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-6(b) (1978).
225 Under the payment-in-property approach, the employer would have income on
the sale and thus would be able to offset the deduction for the amount by which the
value of the human capital exceeds the employer's cost.
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erence for preferred intangible capital. The ultimate effects of the pref-
erence depend on how it influences various prices (including wages).
The first part of the discussion assumes no changes in prices; the sec-
ond part assumes that the only prices changed are the prices of pre-
ferred intangible capital; and the third part considers other price
effects.
First, if prices are not changed by the preference, there are various
possible effects of the implicit preference. It encourages businesses to
make preferred intangible capital expenditures (to "buy" preferred in-
tangible capital) rather than make some alternative use of the funds
available to buy preferred intangible capital. As a result, businesses
probably make more preferred intangible capital expenditures than
they would otherwise. This increases the sales volume of businesses
that sell preferred intangible capital, such as advertising agencies, the
media, research laboratories, recruiting services, training consultants,
and the like. To the extent the increased intangible capital expenditures
reflect increased advertising that increases consumption (over saving),126
greater consumption results.1 27 The preference also causes preferred in-
tangible capital to pay higher after-tax returns than other uses of
funds. Consequently, businesses and industries that use preferred in-
tangible capital are more profitable after tax than other businesses and
industries.
Second, assume that the preference only changes the prices of pre-
ferred intangible capital. This happens if the special tax treatment en-
courages taxpayers to buy more preferred intangible capital and no
other factor discourages these purchases. The resulting increased de-
mand enables sellers of preferred intangible capital to charge more than
they could if there were no preference.'28 These higher prices soften the
volume effects described in the preceding paragraph by discouraging
preferred intangible capital expenditures, which reduces the benefits to
businesses that use preferred intangible capital. 29 The higher prices,
however, have other effects. Businesses that sell preferred intangible
capital receive more for their products and services. This results in in-
2' See W. COMANOR & T. WILSON, supra note 16, at 238-39; J. SIMON, supra
note 17, at 205.
127 See J. LAMBIN, supra note 29, at 136-38 (noting that some, but not all, adver-
tising might increase consumer demand). There is a nice irony in this result. A prefer-
ence for advertising is an investment incentive that encourages consumption (in later
periods than the investment).
128 See Siegfried & Weiss, Advertising, Profits, and Corporate Taxes Revisited,
56 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 195, 196 (1974).
128 See id.
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creased profitability for these firms, benefiting their owners.1 30 These
profits may not be very large, as new firms, attracted by the higher
profitability, may enter the business of selling preferred intangible capi-
tal, increasing the supply and reducing the price. As a result, there may
be more advertising agencies than there would be if there were no
preference.
The price of preferred intangible capital determines the allocation
of the benefits of the preference between the businesses buying pre-
ferred intangible capital and the businesses selling preferred intangible
capital. Regardless of whether the ultimate effect of the preference is to
benefit businesses that buy or sell preferred intangible capital, busi-
nesses in general benefit (assuming no other price changes) from the
reduced revenues collected from businesses as compared to the revenues
collected from wages (the other principal source of taxable income131).
Assuming that the government has fixed revenue needs (and ignoring
any effects of the preference on economic growth), the implicit prefer-
ence requires higher tax rates than under a regime in which preferred
intangible capital is treated like asset-capitalized expenditures. This re-
sults in higher average taxes on wages than business income, since the
tax increase is shared by businesses and wage-earners, while the equal,
offsetting tax reduction from the preference goes exclusively to
businesses.
Third, consider other possible effects of the implicit preference. As
just noted, the preference benefits business. The economic effects of a
tax preference for business are unclear. If an increased tax on wages
discourages work effort, which many believe, 3 2 the preference discour-
ages work effort. If increased after-tax returns on business income en-
courage saving, investment, and capital formation, as many believe,'
the preference has the effect of increasing saving, investment, and capi-
tal formation. Either of these effects might change wage levels (ignoring
the effects on prices of consumer goods and services, discussed below).
Discouraging work effort might decrease the labor supply and therefore
potentially increase wages. Wages also might increase because encour-
aging investment, etc., might increase the demand for labor. Alterna-
tively, the preference might encourage the substitution of intangible
capital for labor, thus decreasing the demand for labor, and potentially
decreasing wages.
130 See id.
"I See Bradford, supra note 14, at 15-16 (noting that the major sources of taxable
income are returns to capital and labor).
a See, e.g. id. at 20-28.
l See id.
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The preference may also affect the returns earned by businesses.
Investors prefer to invest in the favored businesses. Other businesses
have to offer higher before-tax returns to compete with the higher af-
ter-tax returns of the preference beneficiaries. Those businesses that
cannot offer competitive returns cannot raise capital and may be re-
quired to liquidate. Businesses that benefit from the preference, there-
fore, succeed when they might not without the preference.
These effects may change the prices of consumer goods and ser-
vices. Intangible capital may benefit businesses by enabling them to
charge relatively more for their goods or services (instead of increasing
sales without a price effect). The preference for intangible capital,
therefore, might be stimulating higher prices. On the other hand, new
firms entering the businesses benefited by the preference might have
driven prices down. In fact, the reduced total tax on business, by at-
tracting saving and thereby increasing the level of business activity,
might have resulted in a greater supply of goods and services and a
corresponding lower price level for consumer goods and services (com-
pared to a regime without the preference).
This analysis must be modified somewhat in the case of preferred
human capital expenditures. As noted above, many of these expendi-
tures benefit employees."' The employees probably finance most or all
of the training that benefits them through a lower wage, so that there is
little net employee benefit. To the extent, if any, training really fi-
nanced by employers (i.e., not offset by lower wages) results in net
benefits to employees, however, the associated intangible capital ex-
penditures benefit employees. Under these circumstances, the implicit
preference benefits those employees receiving the employer-financed
training.
c. Equity and Neutrality Concerns
Each possible effect of the implicit tax preference for much intan-
gible capital violates the equity criterion. To the extent the preference
results in benefits, directly or indirectly, to only one of two similarly
situated persons, horizontal equity is violated. The preference poten-
tially provides benefits to businesses and industries that use preferred
intangible capital (over other businesses and industries), to investors in
businesses and industries that use preferred intangible capital (over
other investors), to sellers of preferred intangible capital (over other
businesses and industries), to investors in sellers of preferred intangible
capital (over other investors), to those who live off income earned by
11 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
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businesses (over those who live off wages), to those who benefit from
any change in the level or mix of consumer goods and services prices
(over everybody else), and to those employees who receive a net benefit
from employer-financed human capital expenditures (over everybody
else). Each of these benefits violates the equity criterion.
Similarly, the neutrality criterion is violated. Many believe that
there are good reasons to encourage saving, investment, and capital for-
mation.1" 5 These people would have no objection to the preference en-
couraging this behavior, but others would. Many believe that incentives
for R&D'36 and investment in human capital.. 7 are advantageous.
These people would have no objection to the preference encouraging
R&D and investment in human capital, but others would. Only those
in advertising would argue, however, that preferences for advertising,
advertisers, sellers of advertising, or investors in sellers of advertising
are economically advantageous.""8 Also, the increased tax on wages is
troubling. On balance, current law has severe neutrality problems, al-
though one's judgment of the significance of the problems depends on
one's views of the nature and desirability of the various indirect effects
of the preference.
D. Extra Tax on Sales...
1. Applicable Law
The current rules for sales of businesses, combined with the rules
for depreciation, provide markedly different treatment of self-developed
and purchased intangible capital. Much self-developed intangible capi-
tal is deductible immediately. 4 ° Purchased intangible capital is not im-
mediately deductible, and, moreover, is subject to very restricted depre-
ciation rules. 4 ' This inconsistent treatment has the effect of imposing
an extra tax on the sale of businesses with self-developed nondeprecia-
ble preferred intangible capital because the seller will always owe a tax
(having no basis in the sold intangible capital) and, unlike the case with
depreciable assets, the buyer will be allowed no depreciation with re-
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1981).
118 See, e.g., id.
... See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 4, at 14-15.
'8 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
139 The discussion in this section of the Article was motivated by ALI, supra note
4, at 120-33. See generally Land, Unallocated Premium in Corporate Acquisitions
Under the American Law Institute Subchapter C Proposals, 34 TAx LAW. 341, 356-
69 (1981).
140 See supra notes 69-107 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
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spect to the purchased intangible capital that can cushion the economic
consequences of the seller's tax by being reflected in a higher price.
This extra tax is objectionable on both equity and neutrality grounds.
The sale of a business 42 is treated as a separate sale of each asset
transferred with the business.143 This requires that the total considera-
tion paid for the business be allocated among the transferred assets in
order to determine a selling price for each asset. If the aggregate price
is less than the sum of the values of the individual assets, the respective
selling prices of the assets are reduced proportionately. 4" When the
purchase price exceeds the value of tangible assets plus identifiable in-
tangibles, the excess consideration is allocated to goodwill . 45 The law
142 A transfer of a corporate business by transferring stock or in a tax-free reor-
ganization and a transfer of a partnership business by transferring partnership interests
generally have no tax consequences with regard to the assets of the business and there-
fore are not discussed. In certain circumstances, a transfer of corporate stock will be
treated similarly to a sale of assets. I.R.C. § 338 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987). Similarly, section 754 provides an election to treat a purchase of a part-
nership interest much like a sale of the partnership's assets with respect to the new
partner. I.R.C. §§ 743 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 754 (1982). The analysis in the text
applies to these deemed sales.
Transfer of a business to a partnership by the partners, incorporation of a part-
nership or proprietorship, and liquidation of a partnership do not involve changes in
ownership and generally have few tax consequences. See I.R.C. §§ 351 (1982 & West
Supp. 1987), 721, 731 (1982). Therefore, they are not discussed. A corporate liquida-
tion (other than a subsidiary liquidation) is treated much like a sale by the corporation
to the shareholders. See I.R.C. §§ 331 (1982), 336 (West Supp. 1987), 337 (West
Supp. 1987). The analysis in the text applies to these deemed sales.
Section 367(d) provides a special deferred toll-charge on certain otherwise tax-free
transfers of intangibles to a foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 367(d) (1982 & Supp. III
1985 & West Supp. 1987). The legislative history indicates that this rule was not in-
tended to apply to transfers of foreign goodwill and going concern value (but foreign
goodwill and going concern value can be subject to the rules for a current toll-charge on
incorporating loss branches in section 367(a)(3)(C)). H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1320 (1984); EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS, supra note 21, at 365; see also
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 434, 435 (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 BLUEBOOK]. According to the Joint Committee Staff, the rationale for
the special treatment is that "[gloodwill and going concern value are generated by earn-
ing income, not by incurring deductions. Thus, ordinarily, the transfer of these (or
similar) intangibles does not result in avoidance of Federal income taxes." 1984 BLUE-
BOOK, supra, at 428. The economic evidence on the nature of goodwill and going con-
cern value suggests that goodwill and going concern value are created by expenditures.
See supra text accompanying notes 19-63. One wonders to what extent the Joint Com-
mittee Staff's misunderstanding informed the law.
143 See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
144 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (as amended by T.D. 8069, 51 Fed. Reg. 1498
(1986)).
145 See I.R.C. § 1060 (West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (as
amended by T.D. 8092, 51 Fed. Reg. 33033 (1986)). The excess is allocated to good-
will or going concern value. However, to simplify the discussion, this Article treats
going concern value as a form of goodwill. While there are many views of these two
intangibles, a generalization, albeit oversimplified, is helpful. See Note, An Inquiry
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distinguishing amounts paid for goodwill from amounts paid for in-
tangibles with different tax treatments, discussed below,14 is compli-
cated and confused.
147
The seller is treated as having sold, and the buyer is treated as
Into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 660, 664-86, 697-707 (1953); Com-
ment, Depreciability of Going Concern Value, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 484, 484-87 (1973).
"Goodwill" is the extra value of a business independent from the business's other assets
that is attributable to an established customer or supplier base, a good reputation, and
the like. "Going concern value" is the extra value of a business that is attributable to
the business being in place, running, and producing income. See, e.g., Solitron Devices,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1, 17-22 (1983) (Purchased firm had goodwill value
where image as dependable manufacturer gave it competitive advantage, and going con-
cern value where it would have taken purchaser 18-24 months to build business of
identical size.), af/'d without opinion, 744 F.2d 95 (1984). See generally Doernberg &
Hall, supra note 2; Grigsby & Cotter, supra note 2, at 555-70 (discussing case law
treating going concern value as separate from goodwill); Wiener, Going Concern
Value: Goodwill by Any Other Name?, 33 TAX LAW. 183, 184-86 (1979) (contrasting
"goodwill" and "going concern value").
The Court of Claims, in Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 499
F.2d 677 (Ct. Cl. 1974), created a third intangible quasi-asset: "turnkey value."
"Turnkey value" is the extra price one pays a turnkey contractor for a completed and
operational plant and the implicit guarantee that the parts of the whole are coordinated
to function together. Id. at 680. It is similar to going concern value, but does not con-
tain elements of going concern value not related to the plant-such as value attributable
to trained employees, to established bookkeeping procedures, and to other activities dur-
ing a start-up phase. The Court of Claims treated turnkey value as allocable among the
assets constituting the plant, increasing the depreciable bases of the depreciable prop-
erty. Id. at 679-81. A similar treatment of going concern value generally has been
rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Cornish, 348 F.2d 175, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1965)
("The going concern element of an operating business cannot be classified as an en-
hancement in market value of depreciable assets for purposes of depreciation."). Miami
Valley Broadcasting may be inconsistent with this line of cases. See Wiener, supra, at
190-92. The best analysis is that turnkey value is merely an appraisal method for
tangible property, as the value can be transferred with the assets separately from the
operating business, and is not an intangible like going concern value. Cf Comment,
supra, at 497 (Some elements of going concern value should be depreciable, because
they may have reasonably estimable useful lives.).
Prior to enactment of section 1060 in the 1986 Act, there was some confusion in
the treatment of any excess. When one asset is purchased, its purchase price is its
purchase price, even if that price exceeds a price that otherwise might have been availa-
ble if the buyer had not been in a hurry, had been in a different location, etc. The same
should be true if a collection of assets is purchased. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (as
amended by T.D. 8069, 51 Fed. Reg. 1498 (1986)). Consequently, taxpayers were
arguing that in business purchases with huge excesses that any goodwill or going con-
cern value had little value (using appraisals), so that most of the excess could be allo-
cated to depreciable assets or inventory. The 1986 Act was intended to eliminate this
argument. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 251-55 (1986). The issue is a
hard one. If the buyer paid "too much," the tax law should reflect this. Conversely, any
excess is the best market evidence of the value of goodwill and going concern value.
Given that the "too much" situation seems unlikely, and that the section 1060 result
provides admirable simplicity, the 1986 provision seems sound.
148 See infra text accompanying notes 162-65.
1 7 See Dubin, Allocation of Costs to, and Amortization of Intangibles in Busi-
ness Acquisitions, 57 TAXES 930, 945 (1979).
19871
1208 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
having purchased, each asset for a price equal to the amount of consid-
eration allocated to the asset. 48 Each asset sale results in gain or loss to
the seller.1 49 The amount of gain (or loss) is the difference between the
consideration received for the asset and the asset's "adjusted basis" to
the seller at the time of sale. The seller's original purchase price for the
asset was the seller's "cost basis" in the asset. 5 This cost basis was
increased by other capitalized expenditures and reduced by the seller's
depreciation to determine the seller's "adjusted basis.
1 51
Taxable gain on the sale of an asset generally is "long-term capi-
tal gain." '52 Long-term capital gain currently receives a tax preference,
a maximum rate of 34% for corporations (compared to a maximum rate
on ordinary income of 40% plus a surtax) and 28% for individuals
(compared to a maximum rate of 38.5%).5' Basically, the preference
will expire if the ordinary income rates come down as scheduled in
1988 (to 34% plus a surtax for corporations, 28% plus a surtax for
individuals). 5 It seems possible, however, that due to the federal defi-
cit, the rates will not be reduced as scheduled. If this happens, a prefer-
ence for capital gain might be retained. Consequently, this Article takes
the preference into account.
In the case of personal property that has been subject to deprecia-
tion, any gain generally is ordinary income and not capital gain.15
This ordinary income is referred to as "depreciation recapture," as it
recaptures the ordinary depreciation deductions claimed to the extent
they exceed the asset's decline in value. 56 Gain attributable to the
amount by which the sale price exceeds the original cost basis is not
148 See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
149 I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3) (1982), 1001(a) (1982).
10 I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
11 I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) (1957).
152 Gain or loss on most non-business assets (held for over six months) generally is
"long-term capital" gain or loss. I.R.C. §§ 1221 (1982), 1222 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). Gain on most non-inventory business assets (held for over six months) is "sec-
tion 1231 gain" or "section 1231 loss." I.R.C. §§ 1231(a)(3), (b) (1982 & Supp. III
1985). The six-month period becomes one year for property acquired after January 1,
1988. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1001(e), 98 Stat. 1012 (1984).
Subject to complicated netting and carry forward rules (and the recapture rules dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 155-57), section 1231 gain generally is treated as
long-term capital gain and section 1231 loss generally is treated as an ordinary loss.
I.R.C. §§ 1231(a), (c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For simplicity, this Article generally
refers to section 1231 gain as capital gain and to section 1231 loss as ordinary loss.
"I See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985 & West Supp. 1987), 15 (Supp.
III 1985 & West Supp. 1987), 1201 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
The preference applies after the application of various netting rules.
"I See id.
185 See I.R.C. § 1245 (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
151 See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 78, at 321.
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subject to depreciation recapture, and generally qualifies as capital
gain.
157
There is some uncertainty in the taxation of sales of goodwill. In
general, gain on goodwill is capital gain.' 58 The "tax benefit rule"' 59 or
the "Corn Products doctrine"'' 0 may convert gain on goodwill to ordi-
nary income under certain circumstances. 6 ' This gain is likely to be
substantial, since, unless the seller itself previously purchased the busi-
ness, the seller probably has a zero adjusted basis in goodwill, having
immediately deducted the associated expenditures under the rules de-
scribed above.
Expenditures on purchased intangible capital (for example, good-
will acquired when a going business is purchased) are not allowed as
an immediate deduction.' 62 The regulations provide that an intangible
asset is depreciable only if it is useful in the business for a reasonably
estimable limited period. 83 In particular, the regulations provide that
goodwill cannot be depreciated. 6 Because of the limited useful life re-
quirement, buyers of goodwill and similar intangibles are not allowed
157 See I.R.C. §§ 1231 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 1245 (West Supp. 1987).
158 See, e.g., Watson v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 203, 209 (1960) (sale of goodwill
generally produces capital gain). There is no direct authority on a sale of going concern
value, but the reasoning underlying the goodwill authority should lead to this result.
158 The tax benefit rule, inter alia, converts capital gain on the sale of an asset to
ordinary income to the extent that the gain represents a recovery of non-depreciation
deductions previously taken with respect to the asset. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1952); Rowen, Research and Development
Partnerships: Section 174 and Capital Gain, 63 TAXES 523, 536-37 (1985). The
I.R.S recently ruled that a sale of technology does not result in an ordinary income
recapture of research and experimentation deductions. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B.
84. The rationale of the ruling is that tax benefit recapture would undermine the tax
incentive purpose of the special provision allowing an immediate deduction of research
or experimental expenditures. Implicitly, therefore, the tax benefit rule could apply to
sales of intangible capital created by regular deductions. In dictum, however, the ruling
notes that regular deductions generally cannot create an asset that can be disposed of in
a transaction subject to tax benefit recapture. The ruling, therefore, only confuses mat-
ters for intangible capital not created by research or experimental deductions. See Kras-
ner, Tax Benefit Rule and Related Doctrines as Applied to the Recapture of Research
and Other Intangible Development Costs, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 26, 28 (1985).
160 The "doctrine" is named after Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 46 (1955), reh. den. 350 U.S. 943 (1956). It provides that gain on assets
integrally related to the business is ordinary income. See Heyde, Transfers of Technol-
ogy: The Appropriateness of Capital Gain Treatment, 64 TAXES 3, 10-11 (1986).
161 An interesting question is how to determine how long intangible capital has
been held for purposes of the special treatment of gain on assets held for more than a
year (or six months). Goodwill, for example, arguably is reacquired each day. See Har-
ding, supra note 4, at 320-21; Olson, supra note 4, at 564-66.
16' Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(h) (1958).
... Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended by T.D. 6452, Feb. 3, 1960).
.64 Id. Gregorcich argues that it might be possible to depreciate goodwill if one is
able to develop remarkable proof of a limited life. Gregorcich, supra note 2, at 271-85.
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to depreciate the assets, since these assets are viewed as not having lim-
ited useful lives.
16 5
2. The Problem
A buyer of a depreciable asset claims depreciation based on the
purchase price. Consequently, when the purchase price exceeds the
seller's adjusted basis in the asset at the time of sale, the sale results in
increased future depreciation deductions with respect to the asset.
These new tax benefits can be viewed as reducing or eliminating the
total tax resulting from the sale. If the buyer and seller are in the same
tax bracket, the gross income generated by the asset will be subject to
roughly the same tax to the buyer as it would have to the seller. Conse-
quently, to the extent the seller's tax on the sale is offset, in present
value terms, by increased buyer deductions, the sale has less effect on
the total tax on the income generated by the asset. If the capital gain
preference expires, or, if it continues (to the extent the sale price is less
than the original cost of depreciable personalty), there probably still
will be a small net tax increase. Under these circumstances, it is likely
that the seller's ordinary income tax or recapture on the gain will be a
greater burden in present value terms than the buyer's new deductions,
in an amount equal to the gain, are a benefit. This would occur be-
cause the gain tax is paid currently and the deductions, while equal in
amount, are in the future and therefore smaller in present value."' In
a world with a meaningful capital gain preference, for depreciable real
property, and, to the extent the sale price exceeds the original cost ba-
sis, with respect to personal property, however, any gain is taxed only
at capital gain rates, which probably is less of a burden than the
buyer's associated deductions are a benefit. In fact, under these circum-
"' See, e.g., X-Pando Corp. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 48, 53-54 (1946). If the
business terminates, any amount allocated to goodwill or going concern value is deduct-
ible as an ordinary loss. See Edison Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 287, 288
(1986); Schenk, supra note 6, at 521-23.
166 R. GILSON, M. SCHOLES & M. WOLFSON, TAXATION AND THE DYNAMICS
OF CORPORATE CONTROL: THE UNCERTAIN CASE FOR TAX MOTIVATED ACQUISI-
TIONS 10-20 (Stanford Law and Economics Program Working Paper No. 24, 1986).
Gilson, et al. make an interesting point. Even with full taxation of capital gain, taxa-
tion can be deferred by installment reporting under section 453. Id. at 21-26. Section
453 generally permits the deferral of gain when a seller of property takes back a note
until principal payments are made on the note. I.R.C. § 453 (1982 & Supp. III 1985
& West Supp. 1987). Consequently, the no- or zero-tax result may be possible even in
a no-capital-gain preference world. Section 453 does not eliminate the extra tax on
sales of intangible capital, however, since only an unusual installment note will be of
sufficiently long term to defer the seller's gain until the time (liquidation) of the buyer's
associated deduction.
[Vol. 135:1179
BUSINESS INTANGIBLE CAPITAL
stances, a taxable sale can result, in present value terms, in no net tax
increase and perhaps a tax reduction on the income generated by the
asset.1 67 While it seems unlikely that this happens sufficiently fre-
167 This can be seen in a simple example. Assume that the market interest rate is
10%. The corporate tax rate is 40% and the capital gain rate 34%. A piece of personal
property is subject to three-year straight-line (pro rata) depreciation with no salvage
value. Current recapture law, but not the half-year convention, applies. The buyer
steps into the seller's depreciation period, which, as discussed below, is not current law.
At the beginning of year 1, X, a corporation, acquired the property for $100, claiming
$33.3 of depreciation in year 1. At the beginning of year 2, the property is sold to Y, a
corporation, for $150. X pays a total tax on the sale of $30.3 ([40% of $33.3] + [34%
of $50]). As a result of the sale, X lost deductions as follows:
Table II
Deduction Tax Benefit Present Value of
Benefit
Year 2 33.3 13.3 13.3
Year 3 33.3 13.3 12.5
25.8
The after-tax present value of the total tax cost of the sale to X, ignoring the tax that
would have resulted from the income generated by the asset, which is the same to X
and Y, is $56.1 ($30.3 + $25.8). The total tax benefit to Y, again ignoring the tax on
the income generated by the asset, is:
Table III
Deduction Tax Benefit Present Value of
Benefit
Year 2 75 30 30
Year 3 75 30 28.3
58.3
The tax benefits to Y exceed the tax cost to X, even with full recapture.
Two aspects of current law not reflected in this example change the analysis some-
what. First, under current law, a buyer must start a new depreciation period. See
I.R.C. § 168(a) (West Supp. 1987). This means that the buyer's depreciation deduc-
tions are spread out over a longer period than the seller's would have been, increasing
the extra tax. Second, current law provides accelerated depreciation. See I.R.C. § 168
(West Supp. 1987). This means that, since a buyer's depreciation starts in the fast
early years of an accelerated schedule while the seller's would have been in slower later
years, the buyer gets deductions more quickly, reducing the extra tax. These two effects
work against and can offset each other.
This can be seen by altering the example above to reflect the current law's 200%
of straight-line declining balance depreciation (with crossover to straight-line when
more favorable), half-year convention, and restart of the depreciation period by the
buyer. In this case, X would have claimed $33.4 depreciation in year 1 and $22.2 in
year 2. The tax on the sale would be $39.2 ([40% of $55.6] + [34% of $50]). The lost
deductions are:
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quently that one can say there is no net tax increase as a result of these
sales, it is clear that buyer depreciation significantly reduces the net tax
resulting from sales. It also is clear that the shorter the depreciation
period of the asset, the less likely that there will be a tax increase, as
the shorter the depreciation period, the greater the present value of the
new depreciation deductions created by the sale.
There are convincing reasons for viewing the buyer's new deduc-
tions as compensation for the seller's tax. The value of the asset to
buyers and sellers is the present value of the after-tax cash flow."'8 If
buyers get more favorable depreciation than sellers, the asset will gen-
erate more after-tax cash flow to buyers than sellers, if they are in
roughly equal tax brackets. Therefore, the asset will be worth more to
buyers than sellers. Buyers would be willing to pay a price at which all
sellers would sell, if it were not for the gain tax, a new tax imposed
with respect to the asset that would not be imposed if the asset were not
sold. Because of the gain tax, the price must be set sufficiently high so
that the after-tax proceeds of a sale to a seller equals the present value
of the after-tax future cash flow that the asset would have generated.
Buyers are willing to pay a "high" price (compared to a world with no
Table IV
Deduction Tax Benefit Present Value of
Benefit
Year 2 22.2 8.9 8.9
Year 3 14.8 5.9 5.6
Year 4 7.4 3 2.7
17.2
The tax cost to X is $56.4 ($39.2 + $17.2). Y's benefits are:
Table V
Deduction Tax Benefit Present Value of
Benefit
Year 2 50.1 20 20
Year 3 66.6 26.6 25.1
Year 4 22.2 8.9 7.9
Year 5 11.1 4.4 3.7
56.7
The two effects roughly offset each other.
18 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
BUSINESS INTANGIBLE CAPITAL
taxes) because of their new tax benefits. The "high" price compensates
sellers for the gain tax, but reduces the benefits to buyers. In other
words, sellers' taxes can be shifted to buyers through a higher price. If
there is no net tax increase, in present value terms, on the income gen-
erated by the asset, and the price adjusts perfectly, there is no effective
tax on the sale. The higher price offsets the seller's gain tax and elimi-
nates the buyer's benefits. A net tax increase, however, cannot be com-
pensated for through a price adjustment. One must look at both sides of
the sale to see if there is a net tax increase.1 6 9
The sale of a depreciable asset probably results in a relatively
small increase in the net tax on the cash flow generated by the asset
looking at both the seller and the buyer.170 In contrast, the sale of self-
developed nondepreciable preferred intangible capital probably results
in a significant net tax increase. Most or all expenditures associated
with the intangible were deducted, so that the seller has little or no
basis in the intangible capital. Any amount allocated to self-developed
preferred intangible capital, therefore, results in a taxable gain. The
gain could be characterized as ordinary income, in effect recapturing
the "accelerated depreciation" in the form of immediate deductions.
The buyer of a nondepreciable intangible gets no depreciation. Conse-
quently, unlike the case with depreciable property, the buyer's tax ben-
efits provide little relief from the seller's tax. Under these circum-
stances, the buyer of a nondepreciable intangible is not willing to pay a
"high" price to compensate for the seller's tax, as in the case of depre-
ciable property. This results, in effect, in an "extra" tax on sales of
businesses with self-developed nondepreciable preferred intangible capi-
tal that is present only to a much smaller extent with respect to depre-
ciable property.
This extra tax on sales of businesses with self-developed nondepre-
ciable preferred intangible capital is troublesome. It treats similar busi-
nesses differently depending upon the amount of such intangible capital
owned, violating the equity criterion. The extra tax also modifies be-
havior by discouraging sales of businesses with relatively more self-de-
veloped nondepreciable preferred intangible capital, as compared to
sales of businesses with relatively less. This reduces the general tax
'e See R. GILSON, M. SCHOLES & M. WOLFSON, supra note 166, at 10-15.
170 This is true only on average. In a given sale, there is likely to be some positive
or negative net tax. Buyers and sellers can be in different brackets. The price that
makes a seller whole depends upon the difference between the value of the asset and its
adjusted basis to the seller, which varies with how long the seller has held the asset and
with the market. Also, the ability of the market to compensate may depend upon the
depreciation period of the asset. Any of these factors changes the tax on a particular
transaction.
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benefits for preferred intangible capital, but at the price of changing
behavior with regard to business sales. There is no evidence that dis-
couraging sales of businesses with self-developed nondepreciable pre-
ferred intangible capital is economically advantageous.
It is likely that the extra tax applies rather frequently.7 ' There
are a wide variety of preferred intangible capital expenditures, which,
in the aggregate, are huge in amount.1 72 Large intangible capital pre-
miums have been present in recent acquisitions. For example, when
Exxon acquired Reliance Electric Company in 1979 for $1.236 billion,
the purchase price exceeded the value of identifiable assets by $327
million."'7 There is no economic analysis of the magnitude of the effect
of the extra tax, however. Nevertheless, lawyers planning business
purchases and sales have long recognized the central role of trying to
avoid the extra tax by allocating the purchase price away from goodwill
and to depreciable assets. 174 It seems reasonable to conclude that the
extra tax also affects decisions about what businesses are bought and
sold and the prices paid in such transactions.
E. Implicit Preference for Ongoing Businesses
1. Applicable Law
The third problem with current law is an implicit preference for
ongoing businesses. There are special limitations on the deductions of
start-up businesses. Many expenditures disallowed as a deduction by
the start-up rules are preferred intangible capital expenditures present
171 Section 736 provides elective special treatment for a partner who retires from a
partnership with goodwill. This treatment has the effect of avoiding the extra tax that
would result if the retirement were treated as a sale of the partnership interest. See W.
MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS % 15.02[2][a] (1977). With a properly drafted partnership agreement, pay-
ments for goodwill are not treated as a sale, but as if the retiring partner merely re-
ceived a profit share, just as if the partner had continued with the partnership. See
I.R.C. § 736 (1982).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 109-113.
178 EXXON, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1980).
174 See, e.g., Dubin, supra note 147, at 945 ("Imagination, and diligence in as-
sembling documentation, can yield handsome rewards to the thoughtful and energetic
planner."); Howell, Amortization of Acquired Intangibles: Evaluation of Current
Case Law, 32 J. TAX'N 344, 349 (1970) ("[A]wareness of the factors which determine
whether a taxpayer will be able to depreciate newly acquired intangible assets can be a
valuable planning aid."); Rettig, Tax Recovery of the Cost of Intangible Assets: Care-
ful Analysis and Planning Necessary, 18 J. TAX'N 154, 162 (1963) (Tax planner
must use "imagination and thoughtfulness in analysis" in order to support characteri-
zation of intangible assets as depreciable goods.); see Note, supra note 145, at 728-31
(noting purchasers' attempts to allocate as little of purchase price as possible to cost of
goodwill).
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in ongoing businesses. Consequently, the start-up rules produce an im-
plicit preference for ongoing businesses.
Two special rules apply to a business in the "start-up" phase, the
period prior to ordinary business operations. First, most courts that
have addressed the issue have concluded that expenses are deductible
only at those times that the business is "carrying on.' 7 5 A business is
not "carrying on" in the start-up phase. Second, section 195 explicitly
disallows the deduction of "start-up expenditures.' 7 ' The scope and
application of the "carrying on" requirement 177 and section 195178 are
175 See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th
Cir. 1980) (pre-operational start-up costs are nondeductible); Richmond Television
Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.) (start-up costs are non-current
capital expenditures incurred not while "engaged in carrying on any trade or business"
and therefore not deductible), vacated and remanded on other grounds per curiam,
382 U.S. 68 (1965). See generally Lee, supra note 2, at 41-51. The rationale of the
cases is that section 162 allows deductions only for amounts incurred in "carrying on" a
trade or business and that "carrying on" imposes a temporal limitation. The Court of
Claims and the Claims Court have held that "carrying on" does not impose a temporal
limitation, but is merely part of the general limitation of deductions to nonpersonal
expenditures. See Brotherman v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 407, 410 (1984); Blitzer v.
United States, 684 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1982). Individuals have successfully deducted
expenses incurred prior to carrying on a trade or business by treating them as expenses
of activities engaged in for the production of income that are deductible under section
212, which contains no "carrying on" requirement. I.R.C. § 212 (1982); see Lewis v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 868, 872 (1986) (result not affected by 1984 change
to § 195); Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538, 541 (1983), afd mem., 745
F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162-63
(6th Cir. 1986) (declining to follow Hoopengarner and limiting § 212 to "nonbusiness
income"); Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985) (same).
Corporations, however, may not take such a deduction.
Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9191 (U.S. 1987),
rejected the traditional test of a trade or business, selling goods or services, and held
that a full-time gambler is engaged in a trade or business. There has been some specu-
lation that Groetzinger might have the effect of allowing the deduction of some start-up
costs. See Uhlfelder, High Court's Groetzinger Decision Could Affect Deductibility of
Some Construction Expenses, 34 TAX NOTES 856, 856 (1987). See generally August &
Levine, Goods and Services Test for Trade or Business Rejected by Supreme Court, 66
J. TAX'N 298 (1987). This seems wrong, since the start-up cases interpret "carrying
on," not "trade or business," which was the issue in Groetzinger. The Supreme Court
in Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503 (1974), discussed infra at text accompa-
nying note 337, allowed a start-up business to deduct research or experimental expend-
itures under section 174 because section 174 does not contain "carrying on" language,
although section 174 does require the existence of a trade or business. By implication, a
different result would have been reached if section 174 contained "carrying on"
language.
178 I.R.C. § 195 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 195 was originally adopted in
1980 to provide 60-month or longer depreciation of "carrying on" amounts. See S. REP.
No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980). It was amended in 1984 to provide an
affirmative disallowance in response to the cases limiting "carrying on" discussed supra
at note 175. See EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS, supra note 21, at 283. See generally
Lee, supra note 2, at 71-89.
17 It is not clear what is a new business subject to "carrying on." A bank previ-
ously engaged solely in banking opening a gas station probably would result in disal-
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intricate and uncertain. It is clear, however, that the two rules, either
lowance of start-up costs for the gas station. In contrast, a bank opening new branches
has been held to constitute a new business for "carrying on" purposes, relying on sec-
tion 195 legislative history. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 290-92
(4th Cir. 1982).
The cases also do not indicate when the start-up phase terminates. Authority in
analogous areas may be helpful. Sections 248(a) and 709(b) provide that corporations
and partnerships, respectively, may elect to amortize organizational expenses commenc-
ing when the entity "begins business." I.R.C. §§ 248, 709 (1982). The regulations gen-
erally provide that business begins when the entity's activities are sufficient to establish
the nature of the business. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.248-1(a)(3) (1956), 1.709-2(c)
(1983). Acquiring operating assets ready to be used in the business generally satisfies
this standard. See id. There is some indication, however, that this is not the standard
for "carrying on" purposes. See Fowler, The Continuing Saga of Start-up Costs and
Their Identification, 17 TAX ADVISER 244, 250 (1986); Ludtke, Vitek & Witt, Tax
Aspects of the Formation and Initial Operation of a Real Estate Limited Partnership,
39 TAX LAW. 195, 196-99 (1986).
The accounting rules for determining what expenditures relate to the start-up
phase also are unclear. The cases do not discuss whether the disallowance applies to
amounts paid in the start-up phase, to amounts incurred in this phase, or to some other
amounts, or whether the result depends on the taxpayer's accounting method for the
relevant expenditures.
178 There are three basic issues: (i) the type of expenditures subject to section 195;
(ii) the type of businesses subject to section 195; and (iii) when these expenditures of
these businesses are subject to the deduction limitation.
First, one must determine what type of expenditures are potentially subject to
section 195. The section basically applies to expenditures made to investigate, create, or
operate a separate "active trade or business" prior to the time the business is acquired
or becomes active if the amounts would be deductible to an existing business. I.R.C.
§ 195(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This definition was intended to include all con-
ceivable start-up costs. See EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS, supra note 21, at 283. It is
not clear that it achieves its purpose. See Bradley, Deductibility of a Partnership's
Investigation and Start-up Expenses, 2 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 233, 251-54 (1985);
Lee, supra note 2, at 102-08.
Second, one must determine what type of businesses are subject to section 195.
The law is unclear as to what constitutes a separate "active" trade or business. In
general, an active trade or business requires more activities than a mere trade or busi-
ness. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 13.04 (4th ed. 1979) ("Active" business requires more activity
than mere trade or business for purposes of section 355.); Lee, supra note 2, at 102-18.
The 1980 legislative history suggests that, for purposes of section 195, an active trade
or business is any trade or business. See S. REP. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1980). The 1984 Senate Finance Committee Report contains the confused observation
that "[aictive trade or business means that the taxpayer is actively conducting a trade or
business. This definition of active trade or business may include a trade or business that
is in many respects passive." See EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS, supra note 21, at 283.
Third, one must determine to what periods section 195 applies. Section 195 could
apply to different periods than "carrying on." See generally Fowler, supra note 177, at
248; Lee, supra note 2, at 91-101; Ludtke, Vitek & Witt, supra note 177, at 196-99.
The history of the section 195 depreciation rule, see supra note 176, further confuses
matters. The statute suggests that the start-up phase should end when this depreciation
begins, so that depreciation authority is relevant to start-up period issues. I.R.C.
§ 195(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Under pre-1984 law, depreciation commenced
when the "business began." I.R.C. § 195(a) (1982), amended by I.R.C. § 195(a)
(Supp. III 1985). The 1980 legislative history indicated that the sections 248 and 709
standards of when business begins, supra note 177, applied for this purpose. S. REP.
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or both of which may apply to a start-up business,1 9 disallow the de-
duction of many intangible capital expenditures that would be deducti-
ble under the general asset-capitalized rules. For example, the two
rules may disallow the deduction of the costs of financial institution
marketing surveys 80 to a new financial institution, or to an existing
company entering a new financial business, but not to an ongoing
business."' 1
Expenditures disallowed as a deduction because of the "carrying
on" requirement or section 195 may be deductible in later years.
Amounts subject to section 195 may be depreciated over periods longer
than 60 months, commencing at the end of the start-up period."8 2 Items
subject to the "carrying on" requirement, but not subject to section 195,
are not depreciable, and it is unclear whether they are deductible when
the business is disposed of or abandoned. 8 3
No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980). Consequently, this legislative history sug-
gests that sections 248 and 709 standards, and not the section 162 standards, if differ-
ent, apply for purposes of section 195. The 1984 legislation, however, provides that
amortization does not begin until the commencement of an active trade or business,
perhaps changing the start-up period result. I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
1 This seems clear from the independence of the statutory provisions. The only
indication that this might not be the result is language in the Finance Committee Re-
port on the 1984 Act: "The bill provides that a taxpayer will be required to treat start-
up expenditures for which no deduction is currently allowed as deferred expenses."
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS, supra note 21, at 283. "[N]o deduction is currently
allowed" refers to the "carrying on" requirement. This quotation therefore suggests
that section was intended to make the "carrying on" requirement superfluous. Given
the imprecision of the quotation and the absence of any other similar indication, how-
ever, it seems that the two start-up rules are independent. The issue might be moot, as
section 195 might be so broad that "carrying on" has no separate role. Nevertheless, as
discussed supra note 178, section 195 may miss some "carrying on" situations.
180 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; Lee, supra note 2, at 89-91.
181 At least this rule has been adopted in the Fourth Circuit. See NCNB Corp. v.
United States, 684 F.2d at 285; supra note 177.
182 I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). If the business is disposed of or
abandoned before the end of the depreciation period, any nondeducted balance might be
deductible at that time as a loss. Section 195 merely says that these amounts are subject
to section 165. I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). However, it is not clear
how section 165 applies. See infra note 183.
183 As to nondepreciable intangibles, a loss deduction is provided by section 165.
I.R.C. § 165 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2
(1960); see, e.g., Rudd v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 225, 241 (1982) (Name of well-
established public accounting firm was an intangible asset for which a loss deduction
was available under section 165 upon dissolution of firm and abandonment of name.).
Under section 165, a corporation's losses generally are deductible, while an individual's
losses are deductible only if they are incurred in a trade or business, in a "transaction
entered into for profit," or if they are casualty or theft losses. I.R.C. §§ 165(a), (c)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). Some amounts that violate "carrying
on" can be viewed as not incurred in a trade or business or a transaction entered into
for profit and therefore may not be deductible by an individual as a loss upon the
abandonment of the enterprise. See Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63 (An individual's
19871 1217
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2. The Problem
The principal object of the start-up disallowances is preferred in-
tangible capital. Consider the nature of the expenditures disallowed as
a deduction by the start-up rules. Assuming that the start-up phase
does not end until income is being earned, no expenditures during the
start-up phase can relate to current taxable income, since there is no
taxable income in the start-up phase. Most asset-capitalized expendi-
tures of a start-up business would not be deductible to a going concern.
The disallowed deductions therefore must arise primarily from intangi-
ble capital expenditures that would be deductible to an ongoing
business.
Start-up businesses are not the only businesses that make pre-
ferred intangible capital expenditures."" Consequently, the start-up
rules' principal effect is to provide less favorable treatment of preferred
intangible capital of start-up businesses than of other businesses. This
effects an implicit preference for ongoing businesses. 
1 5
The implicit preference for ongoing businesses is objectionable on
equity grounds. For example, it is unfair that a large financial institu-
tion can deduct the costs of developing a new branch (at least in the
Fourth Circuit) while a new financial institution starting up in the
same location cannot.1 8 The implicit preference also violates the neu-
trality criterion. New businesses bear an extra tax burden in compari-
son with ongoing concerns. Because of the higher after-tax returns
available to investors in ongoing businesses, investors are more likely to
invest in ongoing businesses. There is no apparent economic advantage
expenses incurred in the course of a preliminary investigation of a business are not
deductible.). See generally Wilberding, supra note 2 (An individual is generally unsuc-
cessful in deducting expenses incurred in the investigation of a prospective business.).
Although there is little authority on the issue, the limitations on the deductibility of an
individual's losses incurred in activities that do not satisfy "carrying on" should not
apply to corporations. Cf Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86 (A corporation's acquisi-
tions department's expenses must be treated as costs of the acquisitions, with a loss
allowable when an acquisition is abandoned.). See generally Wabich, supra note 87, at
378-80 ("Expenditures incurred in unsuccessful acquisition attempts . . . are added to
the assets or stock actually acquired; they do not create independent, stand-alone as-
sets. If an attempt is unsuccessful, the expenditures retain their ordinary (noncapital)
status and are fully deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.").
18 See supra text accompanying notes 28-65.
188 Intriguingly, the amortization of start-up costs generally is treated by the fed-
eral government as a tax expenditure for budgetary purposes, implying that the nor-
mal, correct treatment is no deduction. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 120, at G-38 (The
estimated tax expenditure for start-up costs was between $300 and 350 million for each
of the years 1985-1987.).
188 See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
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to preferring established businesses. Making it more likely that estab-
lished concerns undertake what a new business might do better violates
the neutrality criterion.
Intangible capital taxation is not the only aspect of current law
that benefits ongoing businesses over start-up enterprises.187 Current
law provides that depreciation does not commence until property is
placed in service in a business."' 8 This rule prevents some start-up
businesses from claiming depreciation deductions that would be allowed
to an ongoing business under similar circumstances. Likewise, the net
operating loss ("NOL") rules189 also operate to benefit ongoing con-
cerns. Under these rules, when deductions exceed gross income in a
year, no tax benefit with regard to the current tax year results from the
excess. The excess is a NOL. Taxpayers are allowed to treat the NOL
as deductions in the three previous years to the extent that income ex-
ceeded deductions in those years. 90 Otherwise, the NOL carries for-
ward as deductions for future years. 91 The deductions in later years
are not as valuable in present value terms as current deductions. Start-
up businesses frequently generate NOLs and cannot use the carry back.
Consequently, the NOL rules serve to give start-up businesses deferred,
less valuable deductions than are allowed to profitable ongoing busi-
nesses. Notwithstanding these other provisions that benefit ongoing
187 Prior to the 1986 Act, special rapid depreciation was provided for trademark
and trade name expenditures. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 241, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2181 (repealing former
section 177 relating to the amortization of trademark and trade name expenditures).
The Finance Committee Report tells an interesting story of congressional concern for
small business:
Congress enacted the special amortization provision for trademark
and trade name expenditures in 1956 in part because of a perception that
certain large companies whose in-house legal staff handled trademark and
trade name matters were able in some cases to deduct compensation with
respect to these matters, because of difficulties of identification, while
smaller companies that retained outside counsel were required to capital-
ize such expenses. The committee does not believe that the possibility that
some taxpayers may fail accurately to compute nondeductible expenses is a
justification for permitting rapid amortization.
S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1986) (footnote omitted).
188 See I.R.C. §§ 168(a), (d) (West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(b)
(as amended in 1982). For example, in Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Commissioner,
84 T.C. 739, 745-48 (1985), equipment in remodeled stores was placed in service in
the year it was installed, but similar equipment in new and relocated stores was not
placed in service until the new and relocated stores opened.
"' See I.R.C. § 172 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
190 See I.R.C. §§ 172(a), 172(b)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp III 1985 & West Supp.
1987).
11 See I.R.C. §§ 172(a), 172(b)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp.
1987).
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businesses, however, the problems resulting from the taxation of intan-
gible capital are real and merit attention, even though solving the in-
tangible capital problems will not eliminate the bias in favor of estab-
lished concerns.
II. REASONS FOR CURRENT LAW
A. The Economics and Taxation of Expenditures
Theoretically, there are a variety of ways to structure a tax on
business net income. Current law basically taxes income related to gain
or loss on assets on a transactional basis: except for depreciation, gain
or loss is determined when the asset is disposed of, so that one transac-
tion, the ownership of the asset, is accounted for in its entirety indepen-
dently from other transactions. Most other income is accounted for on a
nontransactional basis: gross income and deductions are accounted for
separately with no attempt to determine profit or loss on a given trans-
action. Depreciation is allowed for expected declines in business asset
value. This basic regime appears to be the most workable way to struc-
ture a tax on business net income, as it provides the flexibility required
to deal with three types of uncertainty: (i) uncertainties in valuing as-
sets; (ii) uncertainties in accounting for certain types of transactions;
and (iii) uncertainties in accounting for tax-significant future
expectations.
Expenditures generally are divided into three types: (1) expendi-
tures to purchase, produce, develop, construct, or improve something
viewed as an asset that can be transferred separately from the associ-
ated business ("asset-related expenditures"); (2) expenditures to in-
crease net operating income in the current year ("current expenses");
and (3) expenditures to increase net operating income in future years
that are not associated with something viewed as a transferable asset
("prospective expenditures").192 The three types of business expendi-
tures are more alike than they first appear. All three types of expendi-
tures are made to generate a receipt. 9 ' Rational businessmen expect to
get their money's worth from any expenditure. For example, in the
case of expenditures to purchase an asset, the associated receipt is the
purchased asset, which, in turn, will generate future cash receipts. Sim-
ilarly, expenditures to improve an asset result in a receipt in the form
192 "Prospective expenditures" is a term coined solely for purposes of this Article.
193 See BASIC CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINAN-
CIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, Statement of the Accounting Principles
Board No. 4, 1 184 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1970). See infra note
194.
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of a more valuable property. Expenditures for current or future net
operating income-current expenses and prospective expendi-
tures-result in money's worth in the form of increased net operating
income.
1 9 4
Most business expenditures are either current expenses or asset-
capitalized expenditures (which constitute most asset-related expendi-
tures). 95 Consequently, the most fundamental aspects of current law
(as it applies to businesses) are the rules for the taxation of these ex-
penditures (and associated receipts). There are three essential aspects of
this regime. First, and most obviously, an immediate deduction is al-
lowed only for current expenses. Second, in some instances expendi-
tures are capitalized as part of a transaction, while in other instances
expenditures are accounted for without regard to the transaction in
which they are incurred. Asset-capitalized expenditures, in effect, are
paired with either the associated receipt, the asset, or the improvement,
so that no profit or loss is shown. This is a transactional form of ac-
counting. If a non-inventory asset is sold, its cost is paired with the sale
price to determine profit (or loss) on a transactional basis. 9 In con-
trast, current expenses are deducted in gross, with no attempt to pair
the expenses with associated receipts so as to determine the profit on
the transaction in which the expenditures are made. 9 In the case of
depreciation, asset-capitalized expenditures are accounted for without
regard to the associated receipt, but depreciation is determined with
regard to a specific asset, which is a form of transactional accounting.
Third, in certain instances, asset-capitalized expenditures are accounted
for on the basis of the expected future economic consequences of the
transaction in which the expenditures are made and not on the basis of
114 The only difference between a current expense and a prospective expenditure
is in the timing of the receipt. This is not a bright-line distinction. Only the unusual
expenditure results in a cash-equivalent receipt at the same time that the expenditure is
made. Most expenditures result in a receipt somewhat earlier or later than when made.
Consequently, in one sense, there is no such thing as a truly current expense. It is
helpful to draw a line between expenditures that will result in a cash-equivalent receipt
by the end of the year and other expenditures that will result in receipts at a later point
and treat the first type of expenditures as current expenses and the second as prospec-
tive expenditures. This article defines intangible capital expenditures as amounts that
result in intangible value at year end in order to exclude current expenditures that
result in assets or cash equivalents by year end from being treated as intangible capital
expenditures.
115 After the enactment of section 263A, outside the world of intangibles, it is
likely that deductible repairs are the principal class of asset-related expenditures that
are not capitalized. See infra note 221.
198 The classic case (which may no longer be good law) on when gain or loss is
sufficiently "realized" to be taxable is Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
'" The classic case on transactional accounting for operations is Burnet v. San-
ford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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the actual consequences. When the expenditures are made, no gain or
loss is taken into account, as it is reasonable to expect that the receipt
equals the expenditure, although it may not. Depreciation is based on
expected, not actual, value losses.'98
These three aspects of current law are reflected in the statutory
language as well as the case and ruling law. The asset-capitalized rules
are grounded in section 263(a)(1)' and its predecessors (referred to as
"section 263" for convenience).2"' This section provides that no deduc-
tion is allowed for "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of
any property or estate. ' ' 2 0 1 The statute focuses on property and requires
an expectations-based, transactional analysis. Deductions are not al-
lowed for expenditures made in a transaction in which specific prop-
erty is to be acquired or is expected to become more valuable.
The Supreme Court interprets section 263 expansively. In Com-
missioner v. Idaho Power,20 2 the taxpayer built various facilities itself.
It treated many construction-related expenditures, such as wages of
construction workers, as nondeductible costs of the facilities, but did not
capitalize the amount of depreciation claimed on equipment used in
19I Most depreciation currently is determined in accordance with inflexible sched-
ules that presumably reflect congressional expectations. See I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp.
1987). This represents a preference, discussed infra notes 327-29 and accompanying
text. Under prior law, and currently with respect to those assets not subject to schedu-
lar depreciation, however, expectations control nonpreferential depreciation, and
changed expectations can occasionally be reflected on a prospective basis. See Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-1, -9 (as amended in 1960); Rev. Rul. 74-154, 1974-1 C.B. 59.
199 I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
200 There may be additional authority for the asset-capitalized rules. For instance,
the Court, in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association, 403 U.S. 345, 354
(1971), disallowed the deduction of asset-related expenditures without regard to section
263 under the requirement of section 162 that a deductible expenditure must be an
"ordinary" expense. See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. Similarly, the Sev-
enth Circuit noted in dictum that perhaps any nonrecurring item may be disallowed
under the "ordinary" requirement. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 685 F.2d 212, 216-17 (7th Cir. 1982). A panel of the Fourth Circuit expressly
held that an amount could be capitalized under the "ordinary" requirement as inter-
preted in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), even if the amount does not relate
to a separate asset, but that opinion was reversed on rehearing en banc. See NCNB
Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 957-59 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd on rehearing en
banc, 684 F.2d 285, 287-89 (4th Cir. 1982). See generally Gunn, supra note 2 (argu-
ing that classification as capital expenditures should not be limited to costs that produce
or enhance an asset).
20 I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). The 1913 income tax act used essen-
tially the same language. See Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(B), 38 Stat.
114, 167 (1913). This basic language can be traced to T.D. 1606, 13 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 39, 43 52 (1910), interpreting the 1909 corporate income tax that contained no
similar language. To the same effect are Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in
1960), 1.461-1(a) (as amended in 1967).
202 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
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construction. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun,
held that "[c]onstruction-related depreciation is not unlike expenditures
for wages for construction workers. . . .It is . . .appropriately recog-
nized as a part of the taxpayer's cost or investment in the capital
asset."203
In the 1986 Act, Congress enacted new section 263A,0 4 which, as
to tangible property, pushes Idaho Power to its logical consequence and
requires the capitalization of all direct and indirect costs of self-con-
structed property.20 5 The provision was enacted (a) to clearly reverse
certain pre-Idaho Power cases that did not require the capitalization of
some overhead and (b) to ensure uniform capitalization rules for inven-
tory and non-inventory property.
20 6
When faced with uncertainty, section 263A reflects a very flexible
approach to transactional analysis. Pure transactional accounting would
magically follow a specific dollar of depreciation to the specific asset it
enhanced. This obviously cannot be done. Ad hoc rules that apportion
indirect and similar costs among self-produced assets are the best that
can be done. 17 The Finance Committee contemplated this necessity:
The uniform capitalization rules will be patterned after
the rules applicable to extended period long-term contracts
... .The existing long-term contract regulations provide a
203 Id. at 13-14.
24 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 803, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2350.
20 See I.R.C. §§ 263A(a)(1)(B), (b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). See generally Schnei-
der & Solomon, New Uniform Capitalization and Long-Term Contract Rules, 65 J.
TAX'N 424, 425-27 (1986). Section 263A applies to most production period interest.
See I.R.C. § 263A(f) (West Supp. 1987). Section 189 of prior law required ten-year
depreciation of real property construction period interest and taxes (except on low-
income housing). See I.R.C. § 189 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), repealed by Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 803(b)(1), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN
NEWS (100 Stat.) 2350, 2355. One interesting question is why Idaho Power did not
require capitalization of construction period interest and taxes. Dictum in a footnote in
the opinion can be read to exclude interest and taxes from capitalization. See Idaho
Power, 418 U.S. at 18 n.13. The footnote is based on the premise that section 266
allows an immediate deduction, which it does not, and therefore the footnote should be
given no weight. See S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL, H. AULT & S. KOPPELMAN, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION, 492-93 (1986). Congress apparently felt that interest and
taxes were not subject to mandatory capitalization when it enacted section 189. See
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMrIrEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976, at 25-26 (1976). Congress may have sensed intuitively
that interest may not stand on the same footing as other costs. See supra note 20.
208 See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 133, 136-37, 140 (1986). The first
temporary regulations under section 263A make clear that they do not apply to selling
expenses. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-1T(b)(2)(iii)(L) (1987).
207 The Tax Court, in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275,
283, 286-87 (1967), recognized that an accounting method is required to identify costs
subject to capitalization.
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large measure of flexibility to taxpayers in allocating indirect
costs to contracts inasmuch as they permit any reasonable
method of allocation authorized by cost accounting princi-
ples. The committee expects that the regulations under [sec-
tion 263A] will adopt a similarly liberal approach .... '0'
The section 263A temporary regulations for allocating indirect costs to
inventory allow various ad hoc methods "so long as the method em-
ployed for such allocation reasonably allocates indirect costs . ... "'09
Section 263A also deals with uncertainty by respecting expecta-
tions. For example, the depreciation of Idaho Power's construction
equipment did not necessarily result in an equivalent increase in the
value of the power facilities. In fact, the relationship between expendi-
tures and the offsetting asset value is necessarily more speculative with
self-produced assets or improvements than with purchased property,
because when an asset is purchased there is a market transaction that
indicates value. In Idaho Power, the Supreme Court did not acknowl-
edge this as a significant problem because it assumed that any loss (or
gain) on an asset should be taken into account later. The Court was not
troubled by this result, because it tacitly assumed that Idaho Power
expected to get its money's worth, hence failure to account more accu-
rately during construction was not unfair.
210
Similar reasoning appears to underlie section 263A. The Finance
Committee Report to the 1986 Act criticizes prior law because "the
existing rules may allow costs that are in reality costs of producing,
acquiring, or carrying property to be deducted currently, rather than
capitalized into the basis of the property and recovered when the prop-
erty is sold or as it is used by the taxpayer."21  Implicitly, "costs" of
property should be capitalized, without regard to whether there is an
associated value increase.
Different accounting for current expenses and asset-capitalized ex-
penditures is not required in order to tax net income. The classic defi-
nition of economic net income (for a year) is consumption (during the
208 S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-42 (1986).
209 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-1T(b)(3)(iii) (1987).
210 There are a variety of other ways to view Idaho Power. For example, Keller,
The Capitalization of Construction Costs: Expanding the Scope of Idaho Power, 62
TAxEs 618, 630 (1984), emphasizes that Idaho Power puts self-constructed assets on a
tax footing closer to that of purchased assets. While this certainly is correct, I believe
that the analysis in this text is the most complete analysis of the economics of Idaho
Power. See Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 14. My analysis is more in line with the purposes
of section 263A. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
" S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1986).
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year) plus the increase in wealth (during the year).2"2 In the case of a
business that retains all earnings but otherwise raises no new capital,
this can be simplified to defining income as equal to the business's in-
crease in value.21 3 This base can be calculated as follows: At the end of
each year, the business (assets and non-asset intangible capital) would
be appraised. Any increase (or decrease) from the appraisal at the end
of the preceding year would be the business's taxable income (or
loss).214 This regime measures economic net income on a value basis,
not by using cash flow, 215 as under current law. 1 ' Since this regime
takes no account of flows, identical accounting is provided for all ex-
penditures. Current law departs from this ideal, but still approximates,
ignoring preferences, a tax on economic net income.
217
It is possible to create a regime that goes to the other extreme-all
expenditures accounted for on an expectations, transactional basis. In-
come would be determined on a transaction-by-transaction basis, with
all expenditures (including depreciation) assigned to a transaction based
on expectations so as to determine the profit on the transaction, with no
separate deduction for current expenses. This regime also would ap-
proximate a tax on economic net income.
The current rules seem preferable to the alternatives for three rea-
212 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 74, at 27-32; Goode, The Economic Definition of
Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 1, 7-10, 28-30 (J. Pechman ed.
1977). For insightful analyses of various approaches to income, see Andrews, Personal
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 318-25 (1972); Kaplow
& Warren, An Income Tax by Any Other Name-A Reply to Professor Strnad, 38
STAN. L. REV. 399, 399-412 (1986).
21' This formulation ignores consumption, dividends, other distributions, and con-
tributions. Businesses do not consume, so it is reasonable to ignore this component of
the tax base. Issues involving contributions and distributions raise double taxation is-
sues that are beyond the scope of this paper. See supra note 4.
214 Current law approaches this regime in its marked to market accounting for
commodities futures contracts and options on futures. See I.R.C. § 1256 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
215 There has been a great deal of analysis lately of a cash flow regime for mea-
suring consumption. See, e.g., Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) (proposing that personal consumption be
taxed).
21 Financial accounting, in general, also uses a cash flow approach for determin-
ing income. It is recognized, however, that a balance sheet test could be used for finan-
cial accounting purposes. T. FIFLIS, H. KRIPKE & P. FOSTER, ACCOUNTING FOR Bus-
INFSS LAWYERS 127 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter FIFLIS].
217 See Goode, supra note 212, at 24-26. This result ignores preferences. See infra
notes 327-56 and accompanying text. The preferences for saving (IRAs, pension and
profit sharing plans) and investment (accelerated depreciation) are so substantial, that,
taking these into account, the tax looks nearly as much like a wage tax as a tax on
income. (Income is basically wages plus the return to savings and investment.) The
classic work noting the "halfway house" result is Andrews, supra note 215, at 1128-40.
See infra note 239.
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sons."' In each case, the reason relates to the tax system coming to
grips with an uncertainty-uncertainty in valuations, uncertainty in
identifying the consequences of transactions, or uncertainty in evaluat-
ing expectations. First, the current rules avoid difficult valuations. A
tax system based on yearly valuations probably would not be worka-
ble.219 The current cash flow rules approximate economic net income
without a need for valuations. Increases or decreases in value generally
are not taken into account until "realized" in a transaction that indi-
cates value.220 For example, transactions in which asset-capitalized ex-
penditures are made result in an asset or increase in value that is par-
ticularly difficult to value. In fact, expectations are that the receipt
equals the expenditure. Current law therefore does not attempt to mea-
sure profit or loss at the time the expenditures are made (in cash flow
terms, it assumes that the receipt equals the expenditure), but takes any
profit or loss into account when the asset generates cash-equivalent rev-
enues, either by being sold or by being used in current operations. The
receipt and associated expenditures are effectively ignored until later.
In contrast, operating receipts are treated as gross income and current
expenses are deducted. The contribution of operations to any change in
the business's value is easily measurable, since any change is the result
of transactions. The most significant exception to the principle that
changes in value are taken into account only when realized in a mea-
surable transaction is depreciation. Without depreciation, a cash flow
tax with a realization convention would vary too much from a tax on
economic net income. The need for valuations to determine depreciation
is avoided, however, by basing depreciation on expectations.
221
Second, the current rules are appropriate because of the differing
degrees of feasibility in adopting transactional accounting in various
contexts. In the case of most asset-related expenditures, it is easy to
2I A fourth reason is that realization accounting reduces the liquidity problems
that would result from taxing unrealized gains. See Shakow, supra note 4, at 1167-71.
This policy concern is never taken into account in evaluating capitalization issues, be-
cause capitalization, by itself, does not generate a tax. For this reason, I also do not
take liquidity concerns into account.
219 But see Shakow, supra note 4, at 1118-67 (arguing that yearly valuations
might be workable).
220 See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 78, at 69-71. For an analysis of the realiza-
tion notion in the financial accounting context, see FIFLIS, supra note 216, at 152-240.
221 Next to intangible capital, the line between a deductible repair and an im-
provement that must be capitalized has presented the most problems for the current
capitalization rules. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958). See generally, M. CHIREL-
STEIN, supra note 78, at 103-07 (analyzing the regulations that provide that expendi-
tures that extend the life of a property are capitalized and expenditures spent for main-
tenance are deducted). This is a situation where valuation is unworkable and yet
expectations provide little help.
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identify the receipt associated with a given expenditure. The expendi-
ture and receipt can be paired so as to determine profit or loss (as-
sumed to be zero) on the expenditure transaction. In contrast, for a
given current expense there is no way to determine the related receipt.
For example, in the case of a retail store, it is unworkable to allocate a
salesperson's salary to specific sales and determine profit or loss on a
transaction-by-transaction basis. It is more feasible to treat a tax year
as one big transaction, with gross revenues treated as income without
regard to the associated expenses, and with gross expenses related to
the current year deducted, so that the difference between aggregate
gross revenues and aggregate gross expenses indicates the total profit
from operations. Similarly, in the case of depreciable property, there is
no ready way to match the asset-capitalized expenditures with operat-
ing receipts, so a gross deduction is advisable. Depreciation is workable
because it is possible to estimate the expected value losses of an identi-
fied asset.
Third, the current regime respects practical limits on the utility of
expectations accounting. Expectations are central to an income tax,
since an income tax on business is ultimately a tax on changes in value,
and value is a function of market expectations of the future cash flow to
be generated by the business.222 Current law takes expectations into
account at the time asset-capitalized expenditures are made by, in ef-
fect, assuming that the receipt equals the expenditure. Similarly, depre-
ciation is feasible only because of expectations accounting. Although de-
termining actual losses of value often would not be feasible, it is
possible to determine the effect time is expected to have on an identified
asset. Sometimes, however, expectations do not lend themselves to
sound tax rules. For example, current law does not respect expectations
with regard to current expenses. The expectation at the time the ex-
penditures are made is that the expenditures will increase net current
revenues by a roughly equal amount. It also is expected, however, that
current revenues will return a profit (return to capital or labor) as well
as repay the expenditures. There is no way to separate out the current
revenues associated with expenditures from those that represent a
profit. Consequently, with respect to current operations, it is best to
ignore expectations and tax results.
In short, the current general rules for the taxation of current ex-
penses, asset-capitalized expenditures, and associated receipts appear to
be the best way to structure a tax on business income in light of uncer-
tainties in valuations, transactional accounting, and expectations ac-
222 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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counting. The question then arises as to the treatment of prospective
expenditures. Prospective expenditures are a form of intangible capital
expenditure. Consequently, their treatment is considered below in the
discussion of (a) the reasons for the current specific rules that result in
the three problems with the taxation of intangible capital and (b) the
proposal for business intangible capital taxation reform.
B. Implicit Preference for Preferred Intangible Capital
The basic rules for current expenses and asset-capitalized expendi-
tures reflect an approach that, when faced with uncertainty, respects
expectations and is not overly concerned with precise transactional ac-
counting. Unfortunately, the special rules that control the taxation of
asset-capitalized expenditures at the time the expenditures are made
are based on a non-expectations, transactional, asset-oriented approach.
This inflexible approach is responsible for the implicit preference for
preferred intangible capital.
It is not possible to adopt rules for intangible capital expenditures
that are mechanically inconsistent with the general regime just dis-
cussed. For example, it would not be possible to apply the economic
income appraisal regime described above only to intangibles.22 Simi-
larly, it would not be reasonable to allow a deduction for all intangible
capital expenditures in the year the expenditures are made and tax the
associated receipt (intangible asset or value increase), given that this is
not done with tangible asset expenditures. Current law adopts 'ules for
intangible capital that are mechanically consistent with the general re-
gime, but that provide a current deduction for intangible capital ex-
penditures unless they are directly allocable to an identifiable, separate
asset in a specific transaction.
The concerns underlying the present rules can be seen in the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings &
Loan Association,224 an opinion three years before Idaho Power, also
written by Justice Blackmun. In Lincoln Savings, the taxpayer savings
and loan tried to deduct a payment into a special fund held by the
223 Congress has had difficulty limiting the current marked to market rules, re-
ferred to supra note 214. The original 1981 provision applied only to regulated futures
contracts. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 503(a), 95
Stat. 172, 327 (1981). Because of the similarity of these contracts to "interbank con-
tracts," the rules were expanded in 1982 to cover interbank contracts. See Technical
Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 105(c)(5), 96 Stat. 2365, 2385 (1983);
S. REP. No. 592, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1982). In 1984, the rules were expanded to
some options. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 102(a)(2), 98
Stat. 494, 620 (1984).
224 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
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F.S.L.I.C. The taxpayer had a partially transferable interest in its
share of the fund, that is, its deposits plus associated earnings. Under
certain circumstances, the F.S.L.I.C. could use the fund to pay losses,
but otherwise the taxpayer's share of the fund would benefit the tax-
payer, either by being returned in cash or by being applied against
amounts owing for F.S.L.I.C. insurance. In an easy case, the Court
held that the payments were not deductible. It is not the holding, but
the analysis and dicta in the case, however, that are significant. The
Court did not rest its holding on section 263, apparently considering
section 263 inapplicable.225 It merely held that the payment did not
satisfy the basic requirement of deductibility that an expenditure be an
"ordinary" expense.226 This alone would have expanded the scope of
capitalization. Partially in dicta, however, the Court noted:
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some
future aspect is not controlling; many expenditures conced-
edly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year.. . . What is important and controlling, we feel, is that
the ...payment serves to create or enhance for Lincoln
what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset
and that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capi-
tal in nature and not an expense, let alone [a deductible] or-
dinary expense ... .
Somewhat surprisingly, courts generally have interpreted this as nar-
rowing the scope of capitalization, including narrowing section 263's
application, by adding a requirement that nondeductible expenditures
must relate to a "separate and distinct additional asset. '228 This lan-
guage ensured the continued vitality of the old cases on advertising,
R&D, etc., discussed above, which reflect a similar analysis.
229
Lincoln Savings suggests the reasons for its asset-oriented ap-
proach. Under the current cash flow regime, all gross operating reve-
225 See Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 358. Gunn suggests that the statutory language
implies that section 263 applies only with respect to tangible property. See Gunn,
supra note 2, at 448.
228 See supra note 200.
227 Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 354.
228 See Central Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185
(5th Cir. 1984); see also NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 288-89 (4th
Cir. 1982); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th
Cir. 1979); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (10th
Cir. 1974); Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 782-85 (2d Cir.
1973). Contra Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 225
(1985). See generally Lee, supra note 2, at 51-57, 64-71.
229 See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
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nues are taxable income. In order to ensure that the tax base under this
regime approximates net, and not gross, income, an immediate deduc-
tion must be available for expenditures related to the current revenues.
The Court sees great uncertainty in the determination of the portion of
current expenditures that should be deductible immediately. In a vague
sense, all expenditures have a future "benefit." If the business stopped
making any expenditures, it would cease to operate and there would be
no future. The Court did not attempt to look behind this problem and
try to define what expenditures economically should be capitalized. It
recognized that it could not solve the problem by pairing intangible
capital expenditures with specific receipts. The Court therefore leaped
upon the asset/non-asset line. Outside the world of intangible capital,
this line polices an immediate deduction fairly well. It was natural for
the Court to extend the asset/non-asset line to intangible capital ex-
penditures, equating the asset/non-asset line with the deduct/no-deduct
line.
Section 263A and the Lincoln Savings analysis, as reflected in the
case itself and the earlier case law on advertising, R&D, etc., are key
contributors to the implicit preference for preferred intangible capital.
Most tangible, asset-related expenditures are capitalized under section
263A. Other expenditures are immediately deductible unless they "en-
hance. . . a separate and distinct additional asset."230 Much intangible
capital is not a separate and distinct additional asset in any traditional
sense. For example, goodwill, while treated as an asset for most tax
purposes, is not a separate asset. It cannot be identified by itself, but
only when the business changes hands or otherwise is valued.3 '
The Lincoln Savings analysis does more than invoke an asset-ori-
230 I.R.C. § 263A (West Supp. 1987). Section 446(b) grants the Secretary of the
Treasury broad powers to change a taxpayer's accounting method if it does not "clearly
reflect income." I.R.C. § 446(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See generally Gunn, supra
note 2, at 452-65 (discussing why the cost of an asset may not be immediately deducti-
ble under section 446(b)). This has been used to require a taxpayer to defer the deduc-
tion of amounts associated with intangible capital. For example, section 446 imposes
limitations on a cash basis taxpayer's deduction of prepayments that can operate inde-
pendently of the separate asset disallowance. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Boylston Mkt.
Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966, 968 (1st Cir. 1942) (holding that prepaid insurance is a capital
expenditure and can only be deducted over the life of the policy). The panel decision in
NCNB relied on section 446(b). See NCNB, 651 F.2d at 954-55. Some believe that the
courts can read section 446 to solve most of the issues addressed in this Article. See,
e.g., Deductibility, supra note 2, at 635-39 (arguing that the capital/expense distinc-
tion should be drawn by reference to the clear reflection of income test). The cases and
rulings discussed supra notes 69-107, 228, however, suggest that section 446(b), at least
in its current form, is not able to overcome the Lincoln Savings separate asset notion.
Consequently, this Article generally assumes that section 446(b) does not require defer-
ral of all preferred intangible capital deductions.
231 See supra notes 88-107, 145-47 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 135:1179
BUSINESS INTANGIBLE CAPITAL
ented approach. It implicitly adopts a narrow, transactional perspective.
The quotation suggests that the Court assumes that one can determine
that a "payment serves to create or enhance . . . a separate and distinct
additional asset" only on a transactional basis. A specific expenditure
must relate to a specific asset. The uncertain nature of intangible capi-
tal makes the application of a transactional analysis quite difficult.
Consider advertising. Assuming that the intangible capital related to
advertising is a separate and distinct asset, for example, a trademark,
there is no clear method for determining which or how much advertis-
ing enhances the asset.2 32 The difficulty in applying a transactional ap-
proach results in many intangible capital expenditures being deductible,
exacerbating the implicit preference. This is borne out in the cases and
rulings regarding specific types of intangible capital expenditures, dis-
cussed above.233 For example, little advertising that enhances a trade or
service mark is capitalized, because of the difficulty in linking a given
expenditure to the mark. The Senate version of the 1986 Act would
have applied section 263A with respect to intangibles,"3 4 while the Act
itself applies the capitalization rules only to tangibles.2"5 It seems possi-
ble that the problems in allocating expenditures to intangibles might
have motivated the conferees to avoid the issue by excluding intangibles
from section 263A.
There is an additional aspect implicit in the Lincoln Savings anal-
ysis. Because of the uncertain nature of intangible capital, expectations
can have little play, since the expectations with many intangible capital
expenditures, that is, prospective expenditures, usually are not directed
at a specific asset. For example, the financial institution marketing
surveys discussed above,23 ' while clearly expected to result in intangible
capital, probably do not relate to anything normally thought of as an
asset. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, allowed a deduction for the
surveys."'7
The Lincoln Savings analysis, on the one hand, and section 263A
232 One cannot work backwards by seeing how much the intangible increased in
value and assume that this amount of advertising must be capitalized because there is
no ready way to value the intangible. See Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Commissioner,
29 F.2d 262, 263 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 844 (1929).
233 See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
234 The 1986 Senate Finance Committee Report, in its discussion of H.R. REP.
No. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1986), indicated that Lincoln Savings was to
control for purposes of determining whether an expenditure relates to a separate asset.
See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1981).
235 See I.R.C. § 263A(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
23I See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
'87 See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 288 (4th Cir. 1982). See also
supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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and Idaho Power, on the other, illustrate markedly different ap-
proaches to uncertainty. When tangible property, or traditional, sepa-
rate intangibles, such as patents, are involved, section 263A and Idaho
Power stretch transactional and expectations analysis. In the case of
intangibles, as illustrated by Lincoln Savings, a perceived greater un-
certainty 8 results in a non-expectations, narrowly transactional, asset-
oriented approach. This inflexible approach to uncertainty creates the
implicit preference for preferred intangible capital. A narrow approach
is attractive because it reduces the valuation, transactional accounting,
and expectations accounting problems that motivate the basic current
regime. Allowing an immediate deduction for all business and individ-
ual investment expenditures would go even further towards advancing
these goals. Unfortunately, ignoring borrowing, this would effectively
eliminate the tax on income associated with these investments, as the
present value of the tax savings from the immediate deduction would
approximate the future taxes on receipts (including interest) to be gen-
erated by the investments.2"9 This generally is considered an unaccept-
able result under an income tax. 40 Some valuation and related
problems are unavoidable.
Two historical flukes also contributed to the development of cur-
rent law." 1 First, the earliest cases involving advertising were litigated
in a reversed posture, with the taxpayers arguing for capital treat-
ment.242 These cases involved taxable years subject to the World War I
excess profits taxes. Taxpayers could reduce their tax (a) by trying to
capitalize pre-war advertising and depreciate the capitalized amounts in
the high tax rate war years or (b) by treating advertising as "invested
capital" so as to reduce the amount of excess profits subject to high
rates of tax.24 ' As a result, the I.R.S. developed an anti-capitalization
I's This perception is illustrated nicely by the following quotation from a leading
legal accounting text: "Because of their lack of physical characteristics, and their ten-
dency to be sui generis, a great deal more uncertainty is involved in solving ... [finan-
cial accounting] questions for intangibles than for other assets." J. Cox, FINANCIAL
INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 381 (1980).
9 For an interesting discussion of this result, see W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 528-30 (3d ed. 1985).
240 Cf 1 TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 105-09 (discussing capital consumption
allowances). An immediate deduction is allowed under a cash flow consumption tax on
individuals. This simplification of the tax on capital income is one of the principal
advantages of the personal consumption tax. See id. at 195-97. The personal consump-
tion tax has been rejected for other good reasons, however. See id. at 211-12. It has
never received serious congressional consideration.
241 See B. BITTKER, supra note 2, at 1 20.4.5.
242 See, e.g., Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 232 (1926).
242 See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, §§ 300-328, 40 Stat. 1088-93
(1919); Excess Profits Tax, War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 203, 40
Stat. 304 (1917). Also, the NOL rules were not enacted until 1918, so that prior to that
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bias. Since taxpayers generally have the burden of proof on factual is-
sues (like capitalization) in a tax controversy,244 the I.R.S. position
pushed the courts in an anti-capitalization, anti-investment direction.
By the time the shoe was on the other foot, the I.R.S. was faced with
bad judicial precedent that it had helped create. Interestingly, as dis-
cussed below,2 " Congress provided elective capitalization for much ad-
vertising and other promotional expenditures under the later (World
War II and Korean War) excess profits taxes.
Second, the regulation severely limiting the depreciation of in-
tangibles was promulgated in 1919,246 quite early in the history of the
income taxes. With this rule in place, capitalization of intangible capi-
tal expenditures leads to the harsh result of effectively no deduction.
This certainly influenced the courts to allow an immediate
deduction.247
C. Extra Tax
In a world in which many intangible capital expenditures are de-
ductible, the rule that no depreciation is allowed for nondepreciable
preferred intangible capital, combined with the rule that the costs of
purchased intangibles must be capitalized, creates an extra tax on sales
of businesses with self-developed, nondepreciable preferred intangible
capital. These rules also reflect varying responses to the uncertainty
associated with intangible capital.
The no-depreciation rule arose primarily as a result of administra-
tive action, a regulation originally promulgated in 1919.24 It provides
that depreciation of intangibles is allowed only for assets useful in the
business for "a limited period, the length of which can be estimated
time taxpayers with start-up losses had an incentive to create a do-it-yourself carry
forward by depreciating advertising. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, §
204, 40 Stat. 1060-61 (1919).
24 See M. GARBIS, P. JUNGHANS & S. STRUNTZ, FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION
l 12.01[1], 17.0311] (1985).
245 See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
246 See infra notes 248-56 and accompanying text.
247 For example, in X-Pando Corp. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 48, 51-54 (1946),
the court easily rejected the taxpayer's arguments for depreciating advertising, noting
the ordinary immediate deduction of such expenditures, and implying that this solved
any problems caused by not depreciating them. In a few unusual instances, the courts
have disallowed a deduction for expenditures that relate to a nondepreciable intangible.
A former employee of a bankrupt corporation who paid debts of the corporation so as
to facilitate his new business was allowed no deduction in Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 116 (1933), because the payments were not ordinary. See supra note 200.
24 See T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 214 (1919). This regulation
explicitly disallowed depreciation of goodwill.
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with reasonable accuracy."249 (There is no issue of depreciating non-
asset expenditures since they are immediately deductible.) The regula-
tion places a "reasonably estimable"'2 50 limited useful life requirement
on top of taxpayer expectations of value losses as the standards for de-
termining depreciability.
The concerns underlying the regulation are apparent.25 Taxpay-
ers want to use short depreciation periods to claim depreciation deduc-
tions more quickly and thereby increase the present value of the deduc-
tions. There appears to be a greater potential for depreciation abuse
with intangibles. In the case of tangibles, there is an upper bound on
expected value loss: expected physical wear and tear. This gives some
comfort that it is possible to police expectations without looking at val-
ues. Any comfort is more apparent than real, however, as taxpayer use
may make wear and tear quite unpredictable. In any event, for many
intangibles there is no easily verifiable proxy for value that is analogous
to tangibles' wear and tear. One simply cannot see goodwill wear out,
although it is expected to, and does, lose value.252 (A business's good-
will holds value due to "improvements" in the form of current expendi-
tures.) A useful life requirement is the closest analogy to wear and tear
expectations for intangibles. This supports the limitation of an expecta-
tions approach by adding a useful life requirement.253 A similar analy-
sis probably was the basis for the 1919 regulation. The 1913 income
tax allowed depreciation only on assets subject to exhaustion, wear, and
tear.254 Depreciation for obsolescence was enacted in 1918,55 because
249 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
250 The "reasonably estimable" gloss is not particularly important and is not con-
sidered further. See Note, Amortization of Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax
Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 81 HARV. L. REV. 859, 874 (1968) [hereinafter
Harv. Note].
251 See Gregorcich, supra note 2, at 254-58; Harv. Note, supra note 250, at 871.
252 One theme running through this area is that goodwill and going concern value
never lose value. See, e.g., X-Pando Corp. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 48, 54 (1946). All
economic evidence indicates that this is not the case. The economic analysis of expendi-
ture-created goodwill and going concern value, see supra notes 29-43 and accompany-
ing text, finds fairly short lives.
5I Looking at a given buyer, a limited life requirement does not appear to be
unfair, since most of the costs of "improving" the intangible, which would be capital-
ized in the case of a tangible asset, might be deductible under the general asset-capitali-
zation rules. See supra notes 69-107 and accompanying text. This overstated improve-
ment deduction compensates for understated depreciation.
254 See Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167 (1913);
Schenk, supra note 6, at 504-05. The 1909 corporation income tax merely allowed "a
reasonable allowance for depreciation of property." Revenue Act of 1909, Pub. L. No.
61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 113 (1909). One aspect of pre-1918 Revenue Act law must be
noted. T.D. 2690, Reg. 33, arts. 162, 167, 168, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 203-05
(1918), disallowed depreciation on assets not subject to wear and tear, including good-
will and trademarks, "except patents, copyrights, etc." Apparently the Treasury
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of congressional concern for post-war obsolescence.2 5 The 1919 regula-
tory useful life requirement (including no depreciation for goodwill)
apparently was an attempt to limit the 1918 legislation. As with the
Lincoln Savings analysis, a concern for a perceived greater uncertainty
associated with intangible capital led to different results for intangibles
and tangibles.
The cases and rulings that developed the rules regarding capitali-
zation do not explain why purchased intangible capital must be capital-
ized, while much self-developed intangible capital is deductible. The
reason is fairly apparent, however. With an ongoing business, some ex-
penditures are current expenses. When a business is sold, the consider-
ation paid is for the business and is not a current expense. Ignoring
intangible capital, there is no uncertainty whether an expenditure
should be capitalized or expensed; the purchase price must be capital-
ized, the only question is to what account. Simple notions of consistency
suggest that intangible capital expenditures should not be immediately
deductible, notwithstanding that this requires an expectations approach
(assuming that the value of intangible capital equals the amount of in-
tangible capital expenditures). Because there is less uncertainty with
purchased intangibles than with self-developed intangibles, purchased
intangibles are taxed with an approach closer to that applied to
tangibles than that applied to self-developed intangibles.
In short, current law reflects a non-expectations, transactional, as-
set-oriented approach to the uncertainty in determining the taxation of
expenditures to develop intangible capital and in depreciating intangi-
ble capital, but adopts a more flexible expectations approach to the
lesser uncertainty in capitalizing purchased intangible capital. The hes-
itancy to apply an expectations approach is understandable, as it is
based on the same concerns that motivated the general asset-capitalized
rules, but seems to be an overreaction. Worse, the inconsistent ap-
proaches result in the extra tax on sales of businesses with self-devel-
oped nondepreciable preferred intangible capital.
D. Preference for Ongoing Businesses
The implicit preference for ongoing businesses results from the
start-up rules-the "carrying on" requirement and section 195. These
rules reflect a flexible approach because of a perceived lower level of
thought that what happens to patents and copyrights is "exhaustion."
25 See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 234(a)(7), 40 Stat. 1078
(1919); Schenk, supra note 6, at 504-05.
28 See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1918).
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uncertainty in the start-up context.
The "carrying on" requirement is attributable in part to the per-
haps accidental appearance of the words "carrying on" in the deduction
statute.2 57 However, as the Claims Court (which does not respect the
"carrying on" requirement) has noted about the "carrying on" cases:
Although the rationale of these decisions is not fully articu-
lated, they appear to accept or assume the underlying theory
that where a business requires substantial start-up expendi-
tures before it can begin operations, which are not directly
for the purchase of tangible assets and which will not ordi-
narily be recovered out of revenues for the same year, the
capital investment is in the business as a whole rather than
merely in the tangibles, and it includes the start-up costs.
2 58
Start-up costs must be expected to increase intangible capital even
though the capital items cannot be identified on a transactional basis.
The Senate Finance Committee report to the 1984 provision making
section 195's disallowance mandatory indicates similarly that "[t]he
committee believes that start-up expenditures generally result in the
creation of an asset which has a useful life which extends substantially
beyond the year in which incurred. 2 59 The approach of Congress and
the courts to start-up costs is based on expectations and does not look to
transactions.
With a start-up concern, the costs of self-developed preferred in-
tangible capital are easy to identify. Under these circumstances, Con-
gress and the courts are willing to look at expectations, and relax or
ignore transactional, asset-oriented modes of analysis. With an ongoing
concern, however, the uncertainty is viewed as more troubling, and a
wooden approach is taken. In the abstract, the start-up rules come
closer to the ideal. Given the general regime for ongoing businesses,
however, the start-up rules result in the preference for ongoing
businesses.
E. Conclusions
The basic rules for the taxation.of expenditures (and associated
receipts) appear to be preferable to alternative regimes. If it always
were possible to identify and value intangible capital and to estimate
25 I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). The 1913 income tax contained "carrying on" lan-
guage. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913).
258 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 220, 228 (1985).
259 EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS, supra note 21, at 282.
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accurately the effect time will have on intangible capital, the applica-
tion of these rules to intangible capital probably would have developed
without the current problems. Unfortunately, a great deal of uncer-
tainty is associated with intangible capital, and the non-physical nature
of intangible capital has caused policy makers to be particularly leery
of this uncertainty. It is easiest to be satisfied of the presence of intangi-
ble capital, and of its value only when a business changes hands or in a
start-up business. This pushed the law towards a flexible view in these
situations (purchased intangibles and start-up costs), but towards a
wooden, non-expectations, transactional, asset-oriented view outside
these situations (capitalization and depreciation). The resulting patch-
work regime is responsible for the three problems with current law.
III. PROPOSAL
A. The New Approach
The problems with current law are attributable to its non-expecta-
tions, transactional, asset-oriented approach to dealing with various un-
certainties associated with intangible capital. It is possible to develop an
expectations, nontransactional, non-asset oriented approach that is re-
sponsive to the current problems. The approach has precedent in two
provisions of current law, section 195 and the research and experimen-
tation credit, and in obscure regulations under the World War II and
Korean War excess profits taxes. Under the approach, increased cur-
rent expenses are deductible only at such time as revenues increase or
other expenses decrease.
The basis for a new approach is suggested in regulations under
the excess profits taxes in World War II and the Korean War. Tax-
payers were allowed to elect to capitalize (and not depreciate) advertis-
ing and goodwill expenditures (in the pre-war excess profits tax base
period) viewed as capital investments.2 60 Such capitalization could be
260 See 26 U.S.C. § 451 (1952) (Korean War); 26 U.S.C. § 733 (1946) (World
War II). The election applies to the excess profits tax base period and all subsequent
years and can apply today to a taxpayer that made the historical election. See I.R.C.
§ 263(b) (1982); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-14 (1969), 1.263(b)-1(1973). The Senate Fi-
nance Committee Report to the Excess-Profits Tax Amendments of 1941 notes:
This . . . permits a taxpayer . . . to capitalize expenditures for advertis-
ing and goodwill promotion made in the base period, which the taxpayer
had previously deducted as an expense. Such a provision will prevent
hardship to taxpayers who deducted such items at a time when the effect
of such deduction on their excess-profits credit could not be foreseen.
S. REP. No. 75, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1941). Congress apparently felt that capitali-
zation was elective, but that relief was required to reopen the pre-war base period
years.
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more beneficial than expensing, because capitalization increased the ex-
cess profits credit (a deduction for normal profits based on pre-war
profits or a reasonable return on invested capital) for a number of years
taxed at higher rates instead of merely reducing taxable income taxed
at low rates in one year, as under-expensing.281 Under the regulations,
capitalization was allowed for expenditures made for the purpose of
increasing earning capacity over a substantial period.2" 2 Capitalization
also was permitted for: (i) expenditures to promote the taxpayer in a
new territory or to promote a new product during the first year of such
promotion and (ii) advertising -expenditures in excess of the average
amount of such expenditures for the two preceding years ("Increased
Advertising").2' 8 These rules generally follow a transactional, asset-ori-
ented approach and therefore are of little help. The Increased Advertis-
ing rules, however, are promising.
The Increased Advertising rules reflect a notion that an increase in
expenditures probably represents intangible capital. This notion is in
line both with the early cases that treated extraordinary advertising as
capital and with the analysis of Lincoln Savings and other cases that
only "ordinary" expenses are deductible.2"4 It adopts the sort of expec-
tations approach implicit in Idaho Power and section 263A for all in-
tangible capital. Unfortunately, the Increased Advertising rules do not
address the more difficult question of when the capitalized amounts
should be deducted.
The expectations perspective underlying section 195 provides the
beginning of a solution to the deduction issue. Section 195 operates on
the premise that, until the business is operating (which is close to the
time it starts earning income), all expenditures are capital. This ap-
proach can be applied on an incremental basis. An increase in expendi-
tures should not be deductible until there is an increase in revenues. If
there is no current increase in revenues to show for an increase in ex-
penditures, the taxpayer probably expects a commensurate current in-
crease in the (noncash equivalent) value of the business. Otherwise, the
taxpayer is throwing money away, and this is not likely.
A similar analysis applies to expenditures that increase future net
income by saving future expenses. The current expenditures should not
be deductible until the occurrence of the associated future savings.
281 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 430, 431, 434-36 (1952); 26 U.S.C. §§ 710-14 (1946). Cap-
italization increased the invested capital credit automatically only under the Korean
War version. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 437(c) (1952) with 26 U.S.C. § 715 (1946).
282 See Treas. Reg. §§ 30.733-2 (1941), 35.733-2 (1944), 40.451-2 (1953).
283 See Treas. Reg. §§ 30.733-2 (1941), 35.733-2(a), (b) (1944), 40.451-2 (1953).
28 See supra notes 200, 247.
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When future expenses decline, the current expenditures should be de-
ductible. The Increased Advertising approach can be refined to achieve
this result automatically. Nondeducted amounts paid today would be
carried forward indefinitely to be deductible in a year in which current
expenses decrease.2"5
This general approach is consistent with the three uncertainty-re-
lated reasons for the general asset-capitalized rules discussed above.
The first reason is a concern for speculative valuations.266 In the case of
an asset-capitalized expenditure, it is better to wait until the receipt of
a cash equivalent to determine profit or loss. The same is true for pre-
ferred intangible capital. Preferred intangible capital expenditures are
either asset-related (but not asset-capitalized) or prospective expendi-
tures.287 The reason for the current general rules applies directly to
asset-related preferred intangible capital expenditures. Prospective ex-
penditures are an even clearer case, since there is no identifiable imme-
diate receipt. Consequently, the proposal provides rules for preferred
intangible capital expenditures similar to those for asset-capitalized
expenditures.
The second reason for the current general rules is a concern for
the limitations on transactional accounting.268 Current expenses are ac-
counted for in gross because transactional accounting would not be fea-
sible. Similarly, the proposal applies a nontransactional accounting for
preferred intangible capital, as transactional accounting would be
equally unworkable for preferred intangible capital, particularly pro-
spective expenditures.
The third reason for the current rules is a concern for the limita-
tions on expectations accounting. 269 Asset-capitalized expenditures are
not deducted immediately because it is reasonable to assume that the
associated receipt is equal in value. The same goes for preferred intan-
gible capital expenditures. Similarly, asset depreciation is based on ex-
pectations, as this is the only workable way to structure value loss de-
ductions. For parallel reasons, the proposal provides an expectations-
based depreciation with respect to preferred intangible capital.
265 The carry over would continue year to year until used up. There is precedent
for an indefinite carry forward. See I.R.C. §§ 465(a)(2), 704(d) (1982), 469(b) (West
Supp. 1987).
216 See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 80.
268 See supra text following note 221.
269 See supra text accompanying note 222.
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B. Basic Deduction Limitation
The basic deduction limitation would work as follows: In a given
tax year, a taxpayer would determine whether the amount of potential
intangible capital-related deductions for the current year exceeds the
average amount of such deductions for the three preceding years. Any
excess would be deductible only to the extent of the sum of (a) the
amount by which the current year's potential intangible capital-related
gross income exceeds the average amount of such income for the three
preceding years plus (b) 20% of any remaining nondeducted amount.
The amount of potential intangible capital-related deductions for a
year would be the total amount of deductions of any sort decreased by
any NOL carry back or carry forward, interest, any other deduction
related to raising capital, individuals' deductions not related to produc-
ing income, and cost of goods sold (basically the basis of inventory sold,
which is really an adjustment in determining gross income and not a
deduction anyway).2 70 The reasons for the special rule for interest and
the costs related to capital are discussed below.271 For example, in the
case of a regular corporation, the amount of potential intangible capi-
tal-related deductions would be the amount on line 27 of Form 1120,272
decreased by interest and other costs of raising capital (such as depreci-
ation of organizational costs), and increased by any carry forward
under the proposal, discussed below.2 7' The potential intangible capi-
tal-related gross income for a year would equal the gross income for the
year (which reflects cost of goods sold and the bases of non-inventory
assets sold, including assets sold at a loss, subject to loss limitations).
For example, in the case of a regular corporation, the potential intangi-
ble capital-related gross income would be the amount on line 11 of
Form 1120.
The amount by which the total potential intangible capital-related
deductions for the current year exceeds the average of such deductions
for the three preceding years ("Increased Deductions") would be de-
270 Some of these deductions may not be useful because of the NOL rules. See
supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. This is a problem with the NOL rules and
not with the proposal.
271 See infra text accompanying notes 302-04.
2172 Line 27 of Form 1120 is the sum of compensation and wages, repairs, bad
debts, rents, taxes, interest, contributions, depreciation, depletion, advertising, pension,
profit sharing, other employee benefits, and other deductions before any NOL carry
back or carry forward. See I.R.S. Form 1120-W (FY) (Worksheet) (1987).
27 This reflects a view that a NOL carry back or carry forward should not be
viewed as a current deduction but as part of an averaging device, which apparently is
the policy underlying current NOL law. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
230-31 (1986).
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ductible in an amount equal to the sum of (a) the amount by which the
current year's potential intangible capital-related gross income exceeds
the average amount of such income for the three preceding years plus
(b) 20% of any remaining nondeducted Increased Deductions. 2 74 In the
case of a partnership, the limitation would apply to the partnership and
not to the partners. The balance of any nondeducted Increased Deduc-
tions would carry forward as a deduction for the succeeding year, sub-
ject to the same limits as applied to the later year, effecting an indefi-
nite carry forward.2 75 Any nondeducted carry forward balance of
Increased Deductions would be deductible when the taxpayer ceased all
business operations.
Consider an example: A corporation's Forms 1120 (with a calen-
dar year tax year) show the following information (in thousands of
dollars):
Table VI
Line 11 Line 27
1991 1,000 900
1990 900 700
1989 850 650
1988 800 600
The corporation pays no interest and has no other deductions related to
raising capital. It also has no carry forward to 1991 under the proposal.
274 Rules would be required to source this deduction for foreign tax credit and
U.S. tax jurisdiction purposes. These issues generally are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. See supra note 4. The obvious source rule, however, would treat these deductions
as constituting a pro rata share of the underlying potential intangible capital-related
deductions. Any carry forward to future years would also consist of the appropriate pro
rata shares, so that deductions carried forward would maintain their source.
275 Complicated rules control the availability of NOLs and other favorable tax
attributes after a change in ownership of the business. See I.R.C. §§ 382, 383 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). These rules basically police the use of acquisi-
tions to increase the deductibility of NOL carry forwards. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 230-31 (1986). With respect to the proposal, the controlled-group and
acquisitions rules, see infra notes 276-79 and accompanying text, should come close to
serving this purpose by providing that the three-year averages are determined back-
wards on a combined basis. As a result, a business combination would increase the
deduction of the carry forward only if, looking at the combined businesses separately,
one of the businesses expects increased gross income (or decreased deductions) in excess
of the other's decreased gross income (or increased deductions) and the other has a
carry forward that otherwise would not be used. This is a much more unusual transac-
tion than the combination of a profitable and a loss corporation that motivates the
NOL rules. If the unusual combination that increases deductions under the proposal is
troubling, rules similar to those under sections 382 and 383 can be developed.
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For 1991, the Increased Deductions are 250 (900 - [(700 + 650 +
600) / 3 ]). The increased potential intangible capital-related gross in-
come is 150 (1,000 - [(900 + 850 + 800) / 3]). Consequently, the
Increased Deductions are limited to a deduction of 170 (150 + [0.2 X
(250 - 150)]). In other words, the corporation's total deductions are
820 (650 + 170). The nondeducted 80 carries forward as a potential
deduction in later years.
For purposes of determining the three-year averages of deductions
and gross income, rules would be provided to take into account con-
trolled groups of taxpayers, acquisitions and dispositions of businesses,
new taxpayers (fewer than three preceding tax years), and short tax
years. These rules would be patterned on the simple rules for determin-
ing similar averages for purposes of the research and experimentation
credit.2176 The research and experimentation credit is, basically, 20% of
the amount by which the current year's qualified research expenses ex-
ceed the average such expenses for the three prior years.177 Conse-
quently, the credit is based on an averaging of prior years, much like
the proposal. It, therefore, is appropriate to borrow solutions to
problems raised by such averaging for the proposal. For example, the
research and experimentation credit controlled-group rules27 guard
against related taxpayers shifting qualified research expenditures be-
tween themselves in order to increase the credit artificially.27 9 The pro-
posal would adopt this rule to prevent shifting of potential intangible
capital-related gross income and deductions.
C. Start-up Businesses
The "carrying on" requirement and section 195 would be re-
pealed. Consequently, the only restriction on the deduction of start-up
costs would be the limitation on the deduction of Increased Deductions.
However, the research or experimental credit new taxpayer rule pro-
vides that if the taxpayer has less than three preceding tax years, it will
be treated as if it had been in existence for three years with no quali-
fied research during the years it was not in existence. 80 This rule
would be adapted to the proposal by providing that a new taxpayer
28 See I.R.C. §§ 41(c) (new taxpayers), (f)(1) (controlled groups), (0(3) (acquisi-
tions and dispositions), (0(4) (short years) (West Supp. 1987); Prop. Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.44F-3(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 2790, 2794 (1983) (new taxpayers), 1.44F-3(d), 48 Fed.
Reg. 2790, 2794 (1983) (short tax years).
277 See I.R.C. §§ 41(a), (c) (West Supp. 1987).
2718 See I.R.C. § 41(0(1) (West Supp. 1987); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.44F-6, 48
Fed. Reg. 2790, 2797 (1983).
217 See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1981).
280 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.44F-3(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 2790 (1983).
[Vol. 135:1179
BUSINESS INTANGIBLE CAPITAL
would be treated as having no potential intangible capital-related gross
income or deductions for any year it was not in existence. Conse-
quently, except for the automatic 20% deduction, a start-up taxpayer
would get deductions only to the extent of income. This is very similar
to the result under current section 195 for start-up taxpayers.2 81
D. Sales of Businesses
In a taxable sale of a business, no consideration would be allocated
to goodwill or similar nondepreciable intangibles. The seller's non-
deducted carry forward balance (appropriately adjusted to the time of
sale) would be treated as an asset with a value equal to the amount of
the balance.282 Consequently, an amount of consideration would be al-
located to the balance.28 3 This consideration would be tax-free to the
seller (since the seller's basis in the deemed asset would equal the sale
price) and treated as a deduction for the buyer (subject to the new lim-
its). In other words, the buyer would be allowed the seller's carry for-
ward, thus effectively stepping into the seller's shoes with regard to the
nondeducted balance.
The question arises as to the treatment when the consideration
paid does not equal the sum of the aggregate value of the assets sold
plus the seller's nondeducted carry forward balance. No obvious way
exists to deal with the situation where the total purchase price falls
short of the total value of the assets (and deemed asset). The shortfall
may be evidence that the seller's deemed preferred intangible capital
(the nondeducted carry forward balance) exceeds the actual value of
preferred intangible capital. Rules consistent with this view would: (a)
reduce the nondeducted balance by the amount of the shortfall (but not
below zero), allowing an ordinary loss2" 4 for the amount of the reduc-
tion; (b) give the buyer a carry forward equal to the seller's balance so
reduced; and (c) allocate the consideration among the assets (and the
deemed asset, so reduced) proportionately to their respective values.
Consider an example: Seller Corporation sells its entire business
operations to Buyer Corporation for $1 million in cash. On the day of
the sale, the value of Seller's separately identifiable assets (determined
281 I.R.C. § 195 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
282 Sales of these deemed assets would be treated generally as asset dispositions,
which, for example, qualify for installment reporting under section 453 and treatment
as dispositions for purposes of section 904(0(3).
283 There is precedent for having a seller provide tax information that is binding
on a buyer. When a sports franchise is sold, the seller must tell the I.R.S. the consider-
ation allocated to player contracts and that amount generally is binding on the buyer.
See I.R.C. § 1056(c) (1982).
284 More precisely, a section 1231 loss. See supra note 152.
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by appraisers) is $900,000 and its nondeducted carry forward balance
is $150,000. The consideration falls short of the sum of the value of the
assets plus the nondeducted balance by $50,000. Under the view that
the shortfall is attributable to intangible capital, the $50,000 is allo-
cated to the nondeducted carry forward balance, as if an asset with a
$150,000 adjusted basis were sold for $100,000, so that Seller would
have a $50,000 loss and Buyer would be allowed only a $100,000 carry
forward from Seller.
This regime, however, is not free from problems. The shortfall
may not be attributable solely to preferred intangible capital.2"" For
example, a shortfall can occur because the assets (including some pre-
ferred intangible capital, like human capital) are more valuable in al-
ternative businesses. This type of shortfall represents the costs required
to change businesses so as to realize the greater value."' Additionally,
this regime would accelerate intangible capital deductions, creating a
tax reward for sales of businesses with nondeducted carry forward
balances.
An alternative regime would continue to treat the nondeducted
carry forward balance as an asset worth the amount of the balance.
The consideration paid would be allocated proportionately to the value
of the assets (and deemed asset), so that a portion of the shortfall would
be allocated to the balance along with the assets, resulting in an ordi-
nary loss.28 7 The buyer would get a carry forward equal to the seller's
nondeducted balance reduced by the portion of the shortfall allocated to
the balance. In the example above, this rule would allocate the $50,000
among the assets and the balance. The assets would be treated as sold
for $857,000 and the balance as sold for $143,000. Seller would have
less gain (or a greater loss) on the assets and a $7,000 loss on preferred
intangible capital. Buyer would be treated as having bought the assets
for $857,000 and be allowed a $143,000 carry forward. This regime
would increase the loss on assets, but decrease the "loss" on the non-
deducted carry forward balance, and, because it makes the tax conse-
quences of a sale less dependent on the amount of Seller's nondeducted
carry forward balance, it seems more attractive.
It is even less obvious how to treat any excess consideration. An
analysis of the possible reasons for an excess is beyond the scope of this
Article. It is clear, however, that preferred intangible capital can con-
28 The Tax Court appears to have found this to be the case in Concord Control,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 742, 750-52 (1982).
288 See Doernberg & Hall, supra note 2, at 374-75.
287 More precisely, a section 1231 loss. See supra note 152.
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tribute to an excess.2"" For example, a particularly successful advertis-
ing campaign can increase the intangible capital of the business by sub-
stantially more than the cost of the campaign. The excess may be
attributable entirely to intangible capital. Rules consistent with this
view would allocate any excess to the nondeducted carry forward bal-
ance, giving the seller gain. A nondeducted carry forward balance equal
to the entire amount so allocated would be allowed to the buyer.
Consider an example: Seller Corporation sells its entire business
operations to Buyer Corporation for $1 million in cash. On the day of
sale, the value of Seller's identifiable assets is $800,000 and its non-
deducted carry forward balance is $150,000. There is a $50,000 excess.
Under the view that the excess is attributable to intangible capital, the
$50,000 would be allocated to the nondeducted carry forward balance,
as if an asset with a $150,000 adjusted basis was sold for $200,000,
resulting in $50,000 of gain to Seller and a $200,000 balance to Buyer.
One could assume that any excess is not attributable to intangible
capital. The nondeducted carry forward balance would be treated as an
asset worth its amount and the consideration would be allocated among
the assets (and deemed asset) proportionately to their values. In the
example above, the $50,000 excess would be allocated: $42,000 to the
assets, $8,000 to the nondeducted balance. This would result in Seller
recognizing an additional $42,000 of gain (or less loss) on the assets
and $8,000 of gain on preferred intangible capital. Buyer would be
treated as paying an additional $42,000 for the assets and be allowed a
$158,000 nondeducted carry forward balance.
The American Law Institute has suggested a final approach,
which provides that any excess would be tax-free to Seller and nonde-
preciable to Buyer. 8 ' Applying the American Law Institute approach
to the example, Seller would not be taxed on the $50,000, but Buyer
would be treated as paying only $800,000 for the assets and be allowed
only a $150,000 carry forward from Seller. This regime would ensure
288 There is a body of economics literature dealing with the ratio of business value
to the replacement cost of assets. This ratio is referred to as "Tobin's q," as it was
originally defined in Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, I
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 15, 19-20 (1969). Monopoly power can give a high q.
See Lindenberg & Ross, Tobin's q Ratio and Industrial Organization, 54 J. Bus. 1,
29 (1981). Most recognize that failure to include the replacement cost of intangibles in
the denominator also contributes to a high q. See Hirschey & Weygandt, supra note
40, at 328-29; Ross, Accounting and Economics, 58 Ac'r. REV. 375, 376-78 (1983).
289 See ALI, supra note 4, at 124-25. The ALI would impose two additional re-
quirements for tax-free treatment: (a) that the consideration for the intangibles be re-
ceived by a corporate seller that distributes the consideration to its shareholders and (b)
that the seller have net capital and section 1231 gain. Consideration of the purposes
served by these requirements is beyond the scope of this Article.
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that preferred intangible capital does not result in an extra tax. For
this reason, the American Law Institute's approach seems the most
attractive.
The question then arises as to the character of any gain.2"' In
order that intangible capital be treated similarly to depreciable tangible
personal property, depreciation recapture should apply to any gain,
with the excess over recapture treated as capital gain.291 There is, how-
ever, no way to determine the amount of recapture. A recapture calcu-
lation requires that one know the amount of deductions attributable to
the sold intangible capital. This is not possible. Simplicity therefore
suggests that all gain on the nondeducted balance should be ordinary.
Because of the buyer's deductions, this probably would result in a
smaller extra tax than results under current law.
Current law would apply both for purposes of distinguishing be-
tween the sale and lease of an intangible asset and for purposes of dis-
tinguishing between a transfer of intangible capital and the provision of
services.29 2 When these rules result in a transaction being characterized
as the sale or other transfer of an asset separately from the business
and some portion of the costs of the asset may be attributable to ex-
penditures under the new accounting, there is no obvious way to allo-
cate a portion of any nondeducted carry forward balance to the trans-
fer. A sound rule would be to allocate none. In the case of self-
developed intangibles, the same result occurs under current law because
these expenditures would have been deducted earlier. The result
changes, however, in the case of the resale of purchased nondepreciable
intangibles. The new result would treat purchased and self-developed
intangibles similarly, which is attractive, but might discourage sales of
intangibles compared to sales of tangibles, which is troubling. Fortu-
nately, few intangibles should be subject to the new tax, as it would
apply only to separately transferable nondepreciable intangibles, and
there are very few of these.2"'
290 The gain should be sourced where the associated deductions were incurred. Cf
I.R.C. § 865(d)(3) (West Supp. 1987) (gain on goodwill treated as from sources in the
country in which it was generated). Arbitrary rules based on the past three years' de-
ductions could be used for this purpose.
20. More precisely, a section 1231 gain. See supra note 152.
292 See supra note 4.
29 An example of an asset-like nondepreciable intangible is a television network
affiliation contract. See, e.g., Forward Communications Corp. v. United States, 608
F.2d 485, 505 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (network affiliation contract nondepreciable). These con-
tracts customarily cannot be assigned.
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E. Design Problems
The proposal would apply to all deductions. No attempt is made
to identify preferred intangible capital on a transactional basis. This is
not as unreasonable as it might first appear. Consider promotional ex-
penditures. One can increase future sales revenues in a variety of ways.
Salesmen can do long-term promotion, in which case a portion of their
salaries is related to intangible capital. One can buy a billboard, in
which case the depreciation on the billboard is related to intangible
capital. There is no easy way to assure that only those amounts likely
to have long-term effects are subject to the new deduction limitation.294
Additionally, economic evidence indicates that there is a close relation-
ship between the level of all deductible expenditures and the level of
intangible capital expenditures." 5
The proposal contains various arbitrary features. For example,
three-year averaging of income and deductions is chosen to conform
with the similar average used in determining the research and experi-
mentation credit, 298 and not because of a refined judgment that three-
year averaging is best in light of a balancing of manipulability, feasibil-
ity, and accuracy. Similarly, the additional deduction of 20% of non-
deducted Increased Deductions is arbitrary. Retaining current law for
self-developed intangible capital expenditures capitalized under current
law and for drawing the sale/lease and transfer/service lines is done
for convenience. Each of these features should be scrutinized before the
proposal is given serious consideration. In particular, an empirical
analysis of how accurately the proposal conforms to the actual econom-
29 An interesting analogous problem was presented by Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 644 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1981). Pacific Power was claiming de-
preciation on equipment used to construct electric distribution facilities. It argued that
Idaho Power only requires the capitalization of regular depreciation, not the acceler-
ated portion of preferential accelerated depreciation. See id. at 1360. The court, how-
ever, required the capitalization of all depreciation. See id. at 1361. This overstates the
tax basis of assets constructed early in the life of the equipment and understates the
basis of assets constructed in the later years. The court apparently felt that providing
different treatment for the accelerated and regular portions of depreciation was un-
workable, at least as a matter of court-made law.
295 See Ben-Zion, supra note 1, at 229. Ben-Zion finds a relationship between all
deductible expenses (not including interest or depreciation) and advertising plus R&D
intangible capital. The proposal assumes a relationship between all deductions (not
including interest but including depreciation) and preferred intangible capital. Never-
theless, Ben-Zion's result is evidence that the proposal's assumption is reasonable. It is
worth noting that Ben-Zion's result is consistent with the evidence of the varying effects
of advertising discussed supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text. This is because
there is no reason to believe that, even for businesses in which advertising is the princi-
pal source of intangible capital, advertising is proportional to total deductions.
298 See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
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ics of intangible capital should lead to improvements in the proposal's
operation (or, perhaps, to a complete rejection of the proposal).
Under the proposal, the value of services committed to developing
intangible capital by owners of non-corporate businesses should be
treated as an intangible capital expenditure. For example, an inventor
can spend years developing a new patented product. Subjecting the ser-
vices of partners and proprietors to the new deduction limitation would
require that imputed returns to proprietors and partners be treated as
potential intangible capital-related deductions. A partial imputation29
for the earned income of partners and proprietors is frequently re-
quired for social security tax purposes,298 which imputation is used for
purposes of the research and experimentation credit. 9 " Amounts sub-
ject to this partial imputation could be treated as potential intangible
capital-related deductions.300 Under current law, however, no imputed
297 The imputation treats a portion of the taxable income of the proprietorship or
partnership as earned income. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987). In a proprietorship or partnership with less taxable income than the true
services income for the year, the imputation can understate the true services income
from the transaction. Consider a proprietor who is a carpenter and spends an entire
year building a house to sell the next year. The proprietorship will have no taxable
income, so it will have no earned income. If the proprietor had hired someone else to
build the house, the employee would have had taxable wages and the proprietor would
have been required to capitalize the wages.
291 See I.R.C. §§ 1401 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 1402 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 &
West Supp. 1987).
299 See I.R.C. § 41(b)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1987).
200 In order that imputed amounts be treated consistently with wages, the services
of the proprietors or partners actually expended in self-production should be treated as
additional income to the proprietors or partners. This can be seen by modifying the
example in note 296. Assume that the carpenter also had income from performing car-
pentry for third parties. In this instance, the proprietorship would have earned income.
This earned income, however, understates the true services income. If an employee had
performed the house construction, the proprietor would have been taxed on the same
amount as when the proprietor performed all services herself, because the wages would
be capitalized while the carpentry revenues would be taxable, and the employee would
have been taxed on her income from her services. There is more taxable income when
the employee comes into the picture. When the proprietor performs the self-construc-
tion, therefore, she should be taxed on the saved wages as well as any other partnership
profits. This is only true because the imputed services should be capitalized. When a
partner or proprietor performs deductible services, one need not worry about the impu-
tation, as it would be offset by an identical deduction. (This is why no income imputa-
tion is required with respect to the amounts imputed for purposes of the research and
experimentation credit.)
The correct imputed income bears no relationship to the partial imputation re-
quired for social security tax purposes. The noncorporate business may have relatively
little or a lot of owner services tied up in self-production compared to the owner ser-
vices tied up in generating current taxable income. Imputing additional income equal to
the amount of the partial imputation (which already is taxable) would be unacceptably
arbitrary. Some formula imputing income to the extent the partial imputation increases
the disallowance might be workable. Alternatively, the partial imputation could be
treated as a potential intangible capital-related deduction for purposes of determining
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services capitalization is required in the case of self-constructed tangible
assets.301 The proposal, therefore, does not impute a services return for
proprietors and partners.
A similar problem is posed by returns to investors in the business
(either as profits or interest). The value of self-produced property
should reflect the cost of capital tied up during production as well as
expenditures."0 2 When the capital is provided by borrowing, this value
can be accounted for by treating interest as a potential intangible capi-
tal-related deduction. There is no easy way to impute the cost of capital
(lost interest) when the taxpayer uses its own funds in (equity finances)
the construction. The proposal therefore avoids the issue-it does not
try to impute lost income on equity financing and does not treat interest
as a potential intangible capital-related deduction. This is inconsistent
with the rules for tangible property, which capitalize interest paid but
fail to impute interest lost on equity. 33 The proposal therefore views
the bias against debt finance that would result from applying the cur-
rent tangible property rules to intangible capital as more troubling than
the resulting treatment-which would favor debt-financed intangible
capital over debt-financed tangibles.304 This judgment is not inherent in
the proposal, which could be modified easily to parallel the current
treatment of tangibles by treating interest as a potential intangible capi-
tal-related deduction.
There are problems in deciding how gains and losses on assets
should affect the new deduction limitation. If gains and losses enter the
calculation of the deduction limitation, realization accounting would al-
low taxpayers to manipulate gross income and deductions to avoid the
new limitation. Also, it is not clear whether net gains should be poten-
tial intangible capital-related gross income with net losses treated as
potential intangible capital-related deductions (or as a reduction of
gross income), or whether the gross proceeds from sales should be
treated as gross income with the adjusted bases of sold assets treated as
deductions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to simply ignore gains and
losses. Sales of inventory must be taken into account or the determina-
tion of potential intangible capital-related gross income would be mean-
ingless. The same is true with respect to inventory-like assets traded to
the ceiling on current deductions, but the imputation would not be deductible. This at
least assures that the imputation not artificially create deductions.
301 See I.T. 2196, IV-2 C.B. 112 (1925).
302 See supra note 20.
303 See I.R.C. § 263A(d) (West Supp. 1987).
804 Cf Mundstock, supra note 15, at 1258-59 (problems with debt-financed accel-
erated depreciation property are also present with equity-financed property, and thus
limitations on debt financing would discriminate against debt finance).
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make a profit, such as patents held for sale but not required to be held
in inventory. Moreover, the principal assets (other than receivables)
held by businesses are depreciable assets.30 5 As to these assets, gain, to
the extent the sale price does not exceed the original cost (and any loss),
reflects overstated (or understated) depreciation. Because depreciation is
treated as a potential intangible capital-related deduction, consistency
suggests that these related gains and losses also should enter the calcu-
lation of the new deduction limitation. In short, most asset dispositions
should be taken into account under the proposal. Consequently, it
seems best to reflect all gains and losses. The mechanical rules of the
proposal (netting out basis in the determination of gross income, subject
to current law's loss limitation and related netting rules) was chosen to
conform with traditional usage and to simplify calculation of the new
limitation on the basis of the current Form 1120.06 These rules also
have the advantage of incorporating the current loss limitation and re-
lated netting rules, which should reduce the problems from taxpayer
manipulation of realizations.
Another question involving gains and losses is what account should
be taken of the favorable rate of tax on capital gain. Current law, for
purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation (which is based on taxable
income), reduces taxable income from gains and losses so as to reflect
the rate preference.30 7 This rule could be adapted to the proposal.
More analysis of this and similar gains and losses problems would be
required before the proposal is given serious consideration. 0" In partic-
ular, the potential for abuse of realization accounting might require
additional anti-abuse rules.
The final design problem is how to account for new investment in
the business. This is the most fundamental problem with the proposal.
In order to see this problem, consider an example: In a 10% interest
world, a taxpayer expends $100. If the $100 generates receipts only the
next year, approximately $110 ($100 plus 10% interest) should be gen-
-05 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 113, at 22.
306 See I.R.S. Form 1120-W, supra note 272.
a07 See I.R.C. § 904(b) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
.08 For example, it may be necessary to refine the limits on the amounts that may
be inventoried. A taxpayer with no increase in potential intangible capital-related gross
income would have an incentive to increase inventories so as to increase the deduction
of the items added to inventory (to the extent these items are allocated to current sales,
particularly with Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) inventory accounting). John Bishop called
this problem to my attention. Other taxpayers have no incentive to overstate invento-
ries, however, as increasing inventories reduces the deduction of other items. Also, new
section 263A contemplates new regulations that will reduce taxpayer discretion in cal-
culating inventories. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-42 (1986). The
Temporary Regulations do this somewhat. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-IT
(1987).
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erated in order to repay the $100 plus compensate the taxpayer for the
time delay (and risk) in receiving the $100 back. Similarly, if receipts
are generated only two years later, approximately $121 of receipts
should be generated. The perfect tax treatment of the $100 in these two
transactions under the basic approach of the proposal would be, in the
first instance, a $100 deduction in the next year and, in the second, a
$100 deduction two years later. In fact, under the proposal (ignoring
the additional 20% deduction) the additional receipts from the $100 ex-
penditure actually could result (if there are otherwise nondeductible
amounts subject to the new deduction limitation), in the first instance,
in a $110 deduction in the next year and, in the second, in a $121
deduction two years later. This would occur because the additional po-
tential intangible capital-related gross income would increase the
amount of allowable deductions under the new limitation. There is no
way to solve this problem perfectly, because, as the example illustrates,
the solution, reducing potential intangible capital-related gross income
for any interest-like element (by $10 in the first instance and by $21 in
the second), requires knowing the year of the related expenditure,
which is impossible. Imputing a return on capital, as discussed above,
would reduce the problem, but even that much simpler fix seems un-
workable and inappropriate, particularly if imputation would apply
solely for purposes of the new deduction limitation.
New investment exacerbates this defect. For example, a business
that raises new capital and buys a bond increases potential intangible
capital-related gross income, and thereby may improperly increase de-
ductions under the new limitation. In fact, any new investment that
quickly generates profits artificially increases deductions under the pro-
posal. If an interest-like element were backed out of receipts, this
would not happen. More realistically, one could restate prior years' po-
tential intangible capital-related gross income as if the new capital had
been in the business earning a market return."°9 The controlled-group
rules (to be adapted from the parallel rules for the research and experi-
mentation credit310) should in effect do this in many instances. For this
reason, the proposal contains no explicit new investment rules. Further
analysis of the proposal could well conclude, however, that additional
rules are needed to deal with the new investment problem.
09 Under the wartime excess profits taxes, rules allowed an increased credit for
new capital. Cf supra text accompanying notes 243, 261. This would remove the need
for a new taxpayer rule, discussed supra note 276 and accompanying text.
310 See I.R.C. § 41(0(1) (West Supp. 1987).
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F. Advantages
There are numerous advantages to the proposal. The proposal
would be much simpler than current law. Eliminating the "carrying
on" requirement and section 195 would simplify the law. Also, reduc-
ing the tax significance to an ongoing business of the complicated and
confused distinction between nondeductible asset-capitalized expendi-
tures and deductible expenditures (non-asset capitalized treatment no
longer means immediate deductibility while asset-capitalized treatment
potentially means no deductions at all) would simplify the lives of
many taxpayers as well as the I.R.S. Similarly, allowing depreciation
for purchased goodwill would reduce the effect of the law pertaining to
allocation of the purchase price paid for a business to this intangible.
Only if the anti-abuse rules become cumbersome, which is always a
possibility, would the proposal not represent a simplification.
The proposal would also reduce most of the equity and neutrality
problems with current law. It would reduce the tax differences between
preferred intangible capital and other expenditures. While the formula
for deducting intangible capital expenditures almost never matches the
perfect deduction for the expected decline in value of the business, the
proposal should be closer than current law. Current law contains any
number of rough approximations-including schedular depreciation."'
The proposal might be no more inaccurate than these provisions.
Under the proposal, in a sale of a business, consideration allocated
to the nondeducted carry forward balance would be tax-free to the
seller. To the extent the balance accurately measures the value of pre-
ferred intangible capital, the proposal would eliminate the extra tax on
the sale of businesses with intangible capital. If the balance exceeds the
correct value, capital gain and ordinary income on other assets would
be understated (or loss overstated). This tax reduction would compen-
sate the seller for understated intangible capital deductions. It would,
however, reward the seller compared to an ongoing business. This re-
sult is not that troubling. As noted above, the current rules for depreci-
ation recapture probably result in a small extra tax on business sales." 2
The seller benefit in the proposal would offset the extra tax, although
in a haphazard fashion. If the value of any preferred intangible capital
exceeds the nondeducted carry forward balance, the excess probably
would be reflected by the total consideration exceeding the value of the
assets plus the balance. In this case, the American Law Institute rule of
"I1 See I.R.C. § 168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (accelerated
cost recovery system based on statutorily-fixed depreciation schedules).
312 See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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the proposal, which would make the excess tax-free to the seller and
nondepreciable to the buyer, would eliminate the current extra tax.
The new rules would reduce the tax differences between start-up
and other businesses.3 13 A start-up business would get few deductions
until it generates income, much as under current law. However, a con-
glomerate increasing otherwise deductible expenditures also would get
few deductions until it has income to show for the expenditures. In
order to deduct new expenditures, the conglomerate could reduce de-
ductions in an old business. The incentive for this is relatively small, as
the worst consequence of losing current deductibility would be 20% per
year depreciation. Also, there is a good non-tax reason for the conglom-
erate not to so manipulate its expenditures: cutting back current ex-
penditures should reduce profits.
G. Disadvantages
The principal drawbacks of the proposal are that it would unduly
reward winners and penalize losers. A business whose gross income
increases for reasons independent from expenditures (or whose deduc-
tions decrease), a winner, could deduct amounts subject to the new lim-
itation, even when the amounts do not increase current taxable income.
Similarly, a business whose gross income decreases for reasons indepen-
dent from expenditures (or whose deductions increase), a loser, could
not deduct as much of its amounts subject to the new limitation as other
businesses, even when the amounts increase taxable income.
The winner's problem is not as bad as it first appears. Under cur-
rent law, an ongoing business can deduct many intangible capital ex-
penditures that are not deductible to a start-up business. The winner's
benefit under the proposal can be viewed as the current start-up prob-
lem scaled back and spread around more evenly. This does not mean
that one should ignore the problem, but the winner's benefit seems suf-
ficiently small compared to similar problems under current law elimi-
nated by the proposal that the problem should not of itself cause one to
reject the proposal. Moreover, if the winner's problem is viewed as suf-
ficiently troubling, the deductions otherwise resulting from a large (e.g.,
20%) increase in revenues (or decrease in deductions) could be limited,
e.g., only half this year with the other half carried forward. Restricting
this additional rule to appropriate cases, however, could be quite
complicated.
The loser's problem also is not that troubling. As discussed
"I They also would reduce the loss branch problem underlying section
367(a)(3)(C). See supra note 142.
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above,3"4 under current law, a business that generates a NOL and can-
not benefit from the NOL carry back is only allowed deferred deduc-
tions, less valuable in present value terms, for the NOL in later
years.315 The proposal would reduce NOLs by limiting otherwise al-
lowable deductions, softening this effect, while enacting a similar effect,
the loser's penalty, for profitable businesses that experience business
declines. It seems reasonable to conclude that the new effect, while un-
fortunate, is no worse than the old effect. Additionally, the loser's pen-
alty for a business with increased expenditures is softened by the addi-
tional deduction of 20% of otherwise nondeductible expenditures. The
loser's penalty on a business whose revenues drop could be reduced by
allowing extra deductions for such businesses. It would be difficult,
however, to ensure that only sympathetic cases benefit from the extra
deduction relief.
Another disadvantage of the proposal is that it would differ from
the financial accounting treatment of the same items. For financial ac-
counting purposes, an immediate deduction is required for the costs of
developing intangible assets that are not specifically identifiable, that
have indeterminate lives, or that inhere in a going concern and relate to
the whole concern. 8' Research and development expenditures must be
deducted currently. 17 In a purchase of a business, the consideration
must be allocated over the assets of the business by their individual
value, with any excess treated as goodwill.3"" Purchase intangibles, in-
cluding goodwill, must be capitalized and depreciated over a period of
no longer than 40 years.3 19 Start-up costs cannot be capitalized and
depreciated.320
There are two reasons not to be overly concerned about the differ-
ent accounting. First, the approach underlying the financial accounting
suffers from many of the same defects as the approach behind current
tax law. The very types of expenditures that must be deducted, such as
314 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
1I See I.R.C. § 172 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
318 See INTANGIBLE ASSETS, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17, 1 24
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1970) [hereinafter APB 17].
317 See ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 2, 7 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1974)
[hereinafter FAS 2] ("All research and development costs encompassed by this State-
ment shall be charged to expense when incurred.").
318 See BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16,
1 68, 87 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1970).
319 See APB 17, supra note 316, at 1 24-31.
310 See ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING BY DEVELOPMENT STAGE ENTERPRISES,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 7, 7 10. (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1975) [hereinafter FAS 71. The Board is more sensitive to parallel reporting for
start-up and going businesses than Congress or the courts. See id. at V 30.
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those that do not relate to specific assets, indicate an asset-oriented ap-
proach. Similarly, financial accounting has a non-expectations, transac-
tional perspective. For example, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, in justifying an immediate deduction for R&D, noted:
Because there is generally no direct or even indirect basis for
relating costs to revenues, the Board believes that the princi-
ples of "associating cause and effect" and "systematic and
rational allocation" cannot be applied to recognize research
and development costs as expenses. . . Indeed, the general
lack of discernable future benefits at the time the costs are
incurred indicates that the "immediate recognition" principle
of expense recognition should apply. 2
In the same statement, the Board acknowledged that although any
given R&D expenditure may not result in a receipt, R&D programs
are undertaken for future benefits. Nevertheless:
The Board believes. . . that it is not appropriate to consider
accounting for research and development activities on an ag-
gregate or total-enterprise basis for several reasons. For ac-
counting purposes the expectation of future benefits gener-
ally is not evaluated in relation to broad categories of
expenditures on an enterprise-wide basis but rather in rela-
tion to individual or related transactions or projects. 22
As these quotations demonstrate, financial accounting also adopts a
non-expectations, transactional approach. This approach, much like the
traditional tax approach, makes it difficult to deal with intangible
capital.
Second, the differing purposes underlying financial accounting and
tax law support different treatments. Problems in accounting for intan-
gible capital arise because of various uncertainties. Tax policy and fi-
nancial accounting have radically different approaches to uncertainty.
A principal concern of accountants auditing income statements is to en-
sure that profits are not overstated. One of the central maxims of finan-
cial accounting is "conservatism"-in the face of uncertainty, adopt the
least optimistic treatment, the treatment that shows the smallest profit
(or greatest loss).,2 The tax law generally rejects conservatism. As the
321 FAS 2, supra note 317, at 49.
322 Id. at 1 52.
323 See QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION, State-
ment of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, 111 91-97 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1980).
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Supreme Court has noted, "the accountant's conservatism cannot bind
the Commissioner in his effort to collect taxes." '324 The financial ac-
counting for intangible capital generally is consistent with conservatism
(deductions are taken as early as possible), while the proposal is more
consistent with tax accounting notions.
As different approaches to uncertainty support differing rules, dif-
ferent attitudes towards the appropriateness of accounting seeking to
approximate economic income also support varying treatments. Some
believe that, because the purpose of financial accounting is to provide
useful information, the current financial accounting rules are sound, as
they, rather than an economically correct method, provide the most use-
ful information. 25 The neutrality criterion requires that tax accounting
comport with economics as much as possible.32 In short, the different
policies motivating tax and financial accounting justify the differences
between the proposal and financial accounting.
IV. PREFERENCES, PENALTIES, AND INFLATION
A. Introduction
The discussion thus far has considered only one tax preference, the
special treatment of capital gain. A complete analysis of the taxation of
intangible capital requires a consideration of a variety of preferences,
both those that apply to intangible capital and thosethat do not, but do
have an effect on the tax system that should be taken into account in
considering the taxation of intangible capital. The discussion first ex-
amines those tangible capital preferences and then reviews the intangi-
ble capital preferences. This is followed by a consideration of (a) the
one existing tax penalty on intangible capital expenditures and (b) the
effect taking inflation into account has on the analysis. One thing be-
comes clear from this review: The proposal, by reducing the current
problems, rationalizes the analysis of other issues related to intangible
capital.
B. Accelerated Depreciation
Current law provides accelerated depreciation on most tangible de-
'24 Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 543, (1979).
25 See FAS 2, supra note 317, at 1 50; Ross, supra note 288, at 379-80.
.28 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 79, at 606 (arguing that rapid depreciation,
because it fails to reflect the real putative decline in economic value, will interfere with
the optimization of market decisions and hence the discounted valuation of assets).
[Vol. 135:1179
BUSINESS INTANGIBLE CAPITAL
preciable assets. 27 Accelerated depreciation provides larger deductions
in the early years of an asset's life (and less in later years) than would
be allowed under depreciation intended to approximate the asset's ex-
pected decline in value. The earlier deductions are more valuable in
present value terms and, therefore, increase the present value of the
after-tax cash flow generated by the asset as compared to that derived
under regular depreciation. 28 Accelerated depreciation was enacted for
a variety of purposes, including to encourage the acquisition of covered
property, to stimulate investment, and to enhance saving.329
The relationship of accelerated depreciation to the taxation of in-
tangible capital depends on how accelerated depreciation is viewed. If
accelerated depreciation is viewed as a tax preference for the specific
assets for which accelerated depreciation is allowed, no modification of
the above analysis is necessary. The implicit preference for intangible
capital is unacceptable because it undercuts the explicit preference by
providing greater tax benefits for preferred intangible capital expendi-
tures (immediate deduction) than for expenditures on assets subject to
accelerated depreciation (accelerated, but still deferred, deductions). 330
If one believes in a preference for the assets subject to accelerated de-
preciation, one is not happy to discover that preferred intangible capital
is even more favored. Thus, no modification to the proposal is required.
The analysis changes if accelerated depreciation is viewed as an
investment incentive, a saving incentive, or a normal part of the tax
system. Expenditures associated with intangible capital represent in-
vestment, just like expenditures to purchase a machine. Both are ex-
penditures now for increased future revenues. Consequently, an even-
handed investment incentive would give the same tax preference to
intangible capital as to property subject to accelerated depreciation.
Similarly, if one believes that accelerated depreciation is a saving incen-
tive, similar treatment should apply to investment in intangible capital.
Finally, a parallel conclusion is reached if one views accelerated depre-
ciation as a normal part of the tax system. 3 ' In this case, a tax regime
327 See I.R.C. § 168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
I28 An immediate deduction is the ultimate form of accelerated depreciation. Con-
sequently, the "preference for intangible capital" example, supra text accompanying
notes 76-79, illustrates the economics of accelerated depreciation.
329 See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1986). For a discussion of
the distinction between savings and investment, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, Eco-
NOMICS 505, 542 (4th ed. 1975).
330 This statement must be tempered somewhat. Accelerated depreciation on a
very long-lived asset can be more valuable than expensing of a very short-lived asset.
Consequently, expensing of short-lived intangible capital might not be more of a pref-
erence than some tangible asset accelerated depreciation.
331 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
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with economic effects similar to those of accelerated depreciation should
apply to the taxation of intangible capital.
There are a variety of ways to modify the proposal to provide a
regime for intangible capital that would approximate accelerated depre-
ciation more closely. One possibility would provide that the 20% auto-
matic additional deduction be changed to some greater amount, for ex-
ample, 50% of the nondeducted increased deductions. Alternatively (or
additionally), the deduction triggered by increased revenues (or de-
creased expenditures) could be greater than the revenue increase (or
expenditure decrease), for instance, two times the revenue increase (or
expenditure decrease). For purposes of these rules, in a sale of a busi-
ness, the allocations to intangible capital would be determined under
the non-accelerated proposal. The seller would treat the resulting gain,
the difference between the accelerated deductions allowed and the de-
ductions it would have claimed under the non-accelerated proposal, as
ordinary (recapture) income. The buyer would be allowed a carry for-
ward equal to the carry forward the seller would have had without
acceleration.
These regimes would have a number of advantages over current
law. They would be simpler than current law. The current biases for
preferred intangible capital and for ongoing businesses would be re-
duced. Although these regimes would effect an extra tax on sales of
businesses with preferred intangible capital, the extra tax would be
smaller than currently exists. Any extra tax would result from the deci-
sion to accelerate depreciation, and not from the taxation of intangible
capital. As suggested above, when depreciation exactly tracks the de-
cline in value of the asset, there cannot be an extra tax on the sale of
the asset.3"2 Accelerated depreciation makes an extra tax possible by
ensuring that the adjusted basis of an asset is less than the asset's value.
Consequently, an extra tax on preferred intangible capital cannot be
avoided if the taxation of preferred intangible capital is to approximate
the taxation of asset-capitalized expenditures.
C. Research or Experimental Expenditures
The best known preference that applies to intangible capital ex-
penditures is section 174,"' the provision enacted in 1954 in part to
reduce the uncertainty caused by the application of the asset-capitalized
THE PRESmENT, supra note 120, at G-7.
$11 See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
33 I.R.C. § 174 (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
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rules to R&D. 3 4 Section 174 provides that a taxpayer may deduct "re-
search or experimental expenditures" unless it elects to depreciate the
expenditures pro rata over a period of not less than 60 months. 35 In
addition, sections 195 and 263A do not apply to section 174 amounts.
336
The Supreme Court has held that the "carrying on" requirement does
not apply to section 174 amounts.33 7 Besides reducing uncertainty, sec-
tion 174 was intended to encourage R&D and to ensure that start-up
businesses can deduct R&D that would be deductible by an ongoing
concern.
338
The proposal would address, in a more comprehensive fashion, the
concerns of reducing uncertainty and minimizing the preferred position
of ongoing businesses. It would not eliminate the uncertain asset/non-
asset line, as does section 174 for covered expenditures, but would re-
duce the significance of the line sufficiently that it might not be neces-
sary to have a special R&D provision along with the proposal. 39 The
proposal would not, however, by itself provide a preference for R&D.
This could be done by providing an immediate deduction for research
or experimental expenditures and excluding them from the new deduc-
tion limitation.34 Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of the
preference would be improved, as it would give more favorable treat-
ment to R&D than other preferred intangible capital expenditures,34
not merely equal treatment, as is done currently. 42
" See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
336 I.R.C. §§ 174(a), (b) (1982).
See I.R.C. §§ 195(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 263A(c)(2) (West Supp.
1987).
337 See Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 504 (1974) (holding that taxpayer
was entitled to research and experimentation deduction despite having no sales during
the tax year).
"I8 See id. at 503-04; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1954); H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1954).
"' Section 174 merely substitutes the line between covered and noncovered ex-
penditures for the asset/non-asset line. Section 174's line may not be much simpler
than the asset/non-asset line. See infra note 341.
340 Current section 174 provides elective depreciation for any period of 60 months
or longer. See I.R.C. § 174(b) (1982). This enables businesses that do not have suffi-
cient income in the years the expenditures are made to move the deductions into later,
higher income years when the deductions may be more valuable. Since 1954, however,
the general NOL rules, supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text, have become so
generous that it does not seem necessary to provide special rules for research or experi-
mental expenditures.
341 The different treatment will require a more careful definition of research or
experimental expenditures. This has proved to be a real problem for purposes of the
research and experimentation credit. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 178
(1985).
"" Some portion of the deduction could be treated as a preference for minimum
tax purposes.
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An additional preference for R&D exists-the research and exper-
imentation credit, as discussed above. 43 The credit was enacted to en-
courage R&D. 44 It could be continued along with, and operate sepa-
rately from, the proposal. 45
D. Employment Preferences
Current law provides two preferences that encourage employment:
the earned income credit and the targeted jobs credit. The earned in-
come credit is a refundable tax credit allowed to qualified low-income
persons (with dependents) who have small amounts of wages or other
earned income. 4" It was enacted in 1975 to compensate for the per-
ceived regressive effects of the social security taxes on low-income
workers with dependents; 47 however, it has evolved into tax welfare
for the working poor with dependents.3 48 The targeted jobs credit is
allowed to employers with respect to wages of qualified newly hired
workers.3 49 It was enacted in 1977 to relieve unemployment.350 To the
extent, if any, encouraging employment encourages employer intangible
(human) capital, these credits are related to business intangible capi-
tal.3 5' Because both credits are essentially separate from the rest of the
tax system, they could be continued under the proposal if desired. 52
E. Circulation Expenditures
One final provision is arguably a preference for intangible capital:
section 173, the special deduction for circulation expenditures discussed
above. 53 It was enacted to eliminate the uncertainty created by the ap-
plication of the asset-capitalized rules to these amounts. 5 Conse-
See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
8" See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1981).
The credit generally is viewed as inefficient. See Mansfield, The R&D Tax
Credit and Other Technology Policy Issues, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 190, 190-91 (1986).
348 See I.R.C. §§ 32(a), (c)(1) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
14 See S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975).
8 See EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS, supra note 21, at 859.
a See I.R.C. §§ 51-52 (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
350 See S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-66 (1977).
851 See Stephan, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV.
1357, 1377-79 (1984) (suggesting that these preferences can be viewed as relating to
employee human capital because encouraging employment nurtures the development of
"basic employment skills" that constitute human capital).
"I U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE USE OF TAX SUB-
SIDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT 4-7 (1986) concludes that there is little evidence that either
credit achieves its objective well.
311 See I.R.C. § 173 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); see also supra
note 94 and accompanying text.
-" See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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quently, accepting the stated congressional intent, section 173 would be
needed less under the proposal, because the proposal would take pres-
sure off the asset/non-asset line. If the proposal is viewed as an inade-
quate simplification, the special provision could be continued along
with the proposal (subject to the new deduction limitation).
F. Human Capital Preference
Some believe that a preference for employer human capital ex-
penditures is desirable. 55 This could be done in the same fashion as
with R&D, a special deduction or a credit. In either case, the goal of
encouraging employer investments in human capital would be advanced
compared to current law. Human capital expenditures would be treated
more favorably than other preferred intangible capital expenditures.
This would represent a greater incentive than exists currently, as there
is no special benefit to human capital expenditures compared to other
preferred intangible capital expenditures."'
G. Grassroots Lobbying and Similar Expenditures
A complete analysis of the taxation of intangible capital requires a
review of the one tax penalty that can apply to intangible capital. Ex-
penditures related to grassroots lobbying, political campaigns, and simi-
lar activities of influencing government (other than with respect to leg-
islation of direct interest to the business) are nondeductible without
regard to the asset-capitalized rules.357 The analysis underlying the dis-
allowance is that it is unfair to let businesses influence government
with deductible expenses while the ordinary citizen must lobby or cam-
paign with after-tax dollars.3 58 This disallowance could be continued
'" See Schultz, supra note 4, at 145. Section 127 allows employees to exclude
from income certain employer educational assistance payments. See I.R.C. § 127 (1982
& Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). If the employee education solely benefited the
employer, the business human capital with which this Article is concerned, the em-
ployee probably would have no income anyway on an agency theory or under the de
minimis fringe exclusion. See I.R.C. § 132(a)(4) (Supp. III 1985). Consequently, the
object of section 127 is employee human capital outside the scope of this Article. A
similar analysis applies to the exclusion of employer-provided accident and health in-
surance under section 106. See I.R.C. § 106 (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
356 Some portion of the deduction could be treated as a preference for minimum
tax purposes.
357 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c) (as amended in 1969); see also Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510 (1959) (finding Treasury Regulation prohibiting de-
duction of lobbying expenses to "have acquired the force of law").
358 See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513. This analysis is defective. The correct anal-
ysis is that, because businesses generally make after-tax expenditures, disallowing the
deduction of grassroots lobbying, etc., is a tax penalty on this type of business expendi-
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under the proposal.
H. Inflation
The discussion to this point has not considered the effects of infla-
tion on the tax system. However, the same basic analysis applies once
inflation is taken into account. Inflation results in the overstatement of
income when current revenues measured in terms of a large number of
the current, cheap dollars are offset by deductions measured in terms of
fewer, more valuable dollars. 59 Depreciation is measured using histori-
cal cost and therefore is understated in an inflationary environment.
The nondeducted carry forward balance under the proposal that is de-
ducted in later years also would be understated in an inflationary
economy.
Preferred intangible capital should be subject to the same inflation
adjustment rules as assets. If depreciation of assets is not adjusted for
inflation, no adjustment should be made with respect to depreciation of
preferred intangible capital. Any adjustment with respect to preferred
intangible capital would provide an implicit tax preference. This pref-
erence would violate the equity and neutrality criteria. Similarly, if de-
preciation of assets is adjusted for inflation, so should depreciation of
preferred intangible capital. This could be done under the proposal by
restating the nondeducted carry forward balance to reflect inflation.
Inflation poses one additional problem for the proposal. In an in-
flationary environment, potential intangible capital-related gross in-
come will increase automatically over historical averages, potentially in-
creasing deductions in an artificial manner. This is offset by the reverse
effect with potential intangible capital-related deductions, which also
will automatically grow, thus increasing the amount of deductions sub-
ject to the proposal's new limitations. The error that results when the
two effects do not offset exactly does not seem sufficiently troubling to
merit some sort of inflation adjustment. No similar adjustment is pro-
vided for purposes of the research and experimentation credit, where
any inflationary error is entirely in the taxpayer's favor. If this problem
is troubling, one can restate prior years' income and deductions used for
calculating the new deduction limitation to reflect inflation.
ture. See Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and
Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 801, 810-13 (1968).
"9 See Aaron, Inflation and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in INFLATION
AND THE INCOME TAX 1, 10-12 (H. Aaron ed. 1976).
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CONCLUSION
Recognized defects exist in the current rules for the taxation of
business intangible capital. Two misunderstandings apparently under-
lie the failure of Congress and the courts to address these defects. First,
lawmakers may not appreciate the significance of the defects. Second,
lawmakers may believe that no workable solutions to the defects are
available. This Article addresses both of these misunderstandings.
First, by fleshing out the extent and consequences of three de-
fects-an implicit preference for much intangible capital, an unjustified
extra tax on sales of businesses with intangible value, and an implicit
preference for ongoing concerns-this Article demonstrates that the
current regime is quite troubling and requires attention. Second, this
Article shows that the failure of current law to deal with business in-
tangible capital can be explained as well by current law's implicit,
wooden, transactional, asset-oriented approach as by the intractable na-
ture of the associated problems.
This Article presents a legislative proposal that addresses most of
the current defects. While the proposal has a number of disadvantages,
it demonstrates that the current defects may be cured if a nontransac-
tional, non-asset oriented approach is adopted. Policy makers should
re-evaluate the taxation of business intangible capital, as real improve-
ment could result.
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